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Block ciphers are an essential ingredient of modern cryptography. They are
widely used as building blocks in many cryptographic constructions such as en-
cryption schemes, hash functions etc. The security of block ciphers is not currently
known to reduce to well-studied, easily formulated, computational problems. Never-
theless, modern block-cipher constructions are far from ad-hoc, and a strong theory
for their design has been developed. Two classical paradigms for block cipher design
are the Feistel network and the key-alternating cipher (which is encompassed by the
popular substitution-permutation network). Both of these paradigms that are iter-
ated structures that involve applications of random-looking functions/permutations
over many rounds.
An important area of research is to understand the provable security guaran-
tees offered by these classical design paradigms for block cipher constructions. This
can be done using a security notion called indifferentiability which formalizes what
it means for a block cipher to be ideal. In particular, this notion allows us to assert
the structural robustness of a block cipher design. In this thesis, we apply the in-
differentiability notion to the two classical paradigms mentioned above and improve
upon the previously known round complexity in both cases. Specifically, we make
the following two contributions:
• We show that a 10-round Feistel network behaves as an ideal block cipher
when the keyed round functions are built using a random oracle.
• We show that a 5-round key-alternating cipher (also known as the iterated
Even-Mansour construction) with identical round keys behaves as an ideal
block cipher when the round permutations are independent, public random
permutations.
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Block ciphers are fundamental building blocks of cryptography. They enjoy
widespread use in various cryptographic constructions such as encryption schemes [4],
hash functions [42,50] etc. Block ciphers take a key k and another input x and pro-
duce an output y. They are keyed objects that are intended to produce families of
pseudorandom permutations [44]. Roughly speaking, a permutation is said to be
“pseudorandom” when an efficient attacker interacting with it cannot tell if it is
interacting with the object or a perfectly random permutation.
The design of modern block ciphers follows two main approaches [39] both of
which rely on Shannon’s confusion and diffusion paradigm [32,55]. In this paradigm,
the input is first subjected to a confusion step where a (pseudo-)random function(s)
is applied on part of the input. Then, in the diffusion step, the output of the
confusion step is “mixed” such that the confusion propagates through the output
bits. These two steps together form one round and are repeated multiple times
resulting in what is expected to be a random-looking output.
Feistel Networks. Following this paradigm, one well-known approach for build-
ing practical block ciphers is to use a Feistel network [32], an iterated structure in
which key-dependent, “random-looking” round functions on {0, 1}n are applied in a
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sequence of rounds to yield a permutation on {0, 1}2n. Block ciphers that are based
on Feistel networks include DES [49], FEAL [56], MISTY [46] and KASUMI [1].
In analyzing the security that Feistel networks provide, it is useful to consider an
information-theoretic setting in which the round functions are instantiated by in-
dependent, truly random (keyed) functions. The purpose of such an analysis is to
validate the structural robustness of the approach. Luby and Rackoff [44] proved
that when independent, random round functions are used, a three-round Feistel
network is indistinguishable from a random permutation under chosen-plaintext at-
tacks, and a four-round Feistel network (depicted in Fig. 2.1) is indistinguishable
from a random permutation under chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks.
Key-alternating Ciphers/Iterated Even-Mansour Constructions. Another
popular approach for block cipher design is by construction of key-alternating ci-
phers. Such block ciphers alternatively apply two types of transformations to the
current state: the (usually bitwise) addition of a secret round key, and the appli-
cation of a public permutation to the entire block. This is in particular the case of
virtually all Substitution Permutation Networks, a popular methodology for block
cipher construction, such as AES [20]. Other examples of key-alternating ciphers
include block ciphers such as Serpent [9] and PRESENT [13]. This class of block
ciphers has also been analyzed in an information-theoretic setting by modeling the
public permutations as oracles that the adversary can only query in a black-box
way (in both directions), each behaving as a perfectly random permutation. Again,
this approach allows to assert the nonexistence of generic attacks, i.e., attacks not
2
exploiting the particular structure of “concrete” permutations. This approach to an-
alyzing the key-alternating ciphers dates back to Even and Mansour [30] who studied
the one-round case. For this reason, such key-alternating cipher constructions with
public permutations that can be queried only in a black-box manner are often called
the iterated Even-Mansour (IEM) construction, which is the terminology we will use
in the rest of this thesis.
Indistinguishability. In both the Luby-Rackoff [44] and the Even-Mansour [30]
results for Feistel networks and the IEM construction respectively, the security no-
tion considered—namely, indistinguishability—is one in which the key of the overall
block cipher is unknown to the adversary. Indistinguishability results establish that
the block ciphers satisfy the pseudorandomness property, i.e., an efficient adversary
cannot tell whether it is interacting with the block cipher for an unknown key or a
truly random permutation.
Even though pseudorandomness has been the primary security requirement
any block cipher should satisfy, in some cases this property is not enough to estab-
lish the security of higher-level cryptosystems where the block cipher is used. For
example, the security of some real-world authenticated encryption protocols such as
3GPP confidentiality and integrity protocols f8 and f9 [38] rely on the stronger block
cipher security notion of indistinguishability under related-key attacks [5,8]. Another
context where this problem arises is in block-cipher based hash functions [42,50]. In
such cases, the adversary controls both the input and the key of the block cipher,
and hence can exploit “known-key” or “chosen-key” attacks [10,41] in order to break
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the collision- or preimage-resistance of the hash function.
Hence, cryptographers have come to view a good block cipher as something
close to an ideal cipher (IC) [55], i.e., an oracle where each key defines an indepen-
dent, random permutation. Perhaps not surprisingly, this view has turned out to
be very fruitful for proving the security of constructions based on a block cipher
when the pseudorandomness assumption is not enough [6,7,12,25,34,40,48,57], by
using a model known as the ideal cipher model. However, this ultimately remains
a heuristic approach, as one can construct (contrived) schemes that are secure in
the ideal cipher model, but insecure for any concrete instantiation of the block ci-
pher [11]. This means that there is no hope to formalize (let alone prove) what
it means for a concrete block cipher to “behave” as an ideal cipher and that the
strength of a concrete block cipher in this respect should ultimately be evaluated
through cryptanalysis.
Indifferentiability. This does not mean that the provable security approach has
nothing to offer regarding how to design something close to an ideal cipher. Indeed,
the indifferentiability framework, introduced by Maurer et al. [47] (and popularized
by Coron et al. [16]), helps formalize the notion of what it means for a block cipher to
behave like an ideal cipher. More generally, it allows to assess whether a construction
of some target primitive A (e.g., a block cipher) from some lower-level ideal primi-
tive B (e.g., for the IEM construction, a small number of random permutations or
for the Feistel network, a small number of random functions) is “structurally close”
to the ideal version of A (e.g., an ideal cipher). Furthermore, the notion of indif-
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ferentiability is accompanied by a powerful composition theorem [47] which ensures
that a large class of protocols that are provably secure when used with the ideal-A
primitive, remain secure in the ideal-B model — as long as one uses a construction
of A from ideal-B that is indifferentiable from ideal-A (see [24, 52] for restrictions
on the applicability of the theorem).
Proving indifferentiability is more complex than proving indistinguishability:
to prove indifferentiability from an ideal cipher IC of a block cipher construction C
that relies on an ideal primitive O, one must exhibit a simulator S such that the
view of any distinguisher interacting with (CO,O) is indistinguishable from its view
when interacting with (IC,S IC). Once a tentative simulator has been determined, the
indifferentiability proof usually entails two technical challenges: on the one hand,
proving that the simulator is never trapped into an inconsistency, and on the other
hand, proving that it runs in polynomial time. Finding the right balance between
these two requirements is at the heart of the design of a suitable simulator.
1.1 Contributions
Indifferentiability of Feistel Networks. In a landmark result building on [18,37,
53], Coron et al. [17] proved that when using independent, random round functions,
a 14-round Feistel network is indifferentiable from a random permutation. This
suffices to show that a 14-round Feistel network with keyed round functions built
using a random oracle is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher. The key question left
open by the work of Coron et al. is one of efficiency : how many rounds are needed
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in order for indifferentiability to hold? It is known from prior work [17] that 5
rounds are not sufficient, while (as we have just noted) 14 rounds are. In Chapter 3,
we narrow this gap and show that a 10-round Feistel network is indifferentiable
from an ideal cipher.1 The results in this chapter are based on work published in
Eurocrypt 2016 [19].
Indifferentiability of IEM. Andreeva et al. [2] showed that the 5-round IEM con-
struction with an idealized key-schedule (i.e., the function(s) mapping the master
key onto the round key(s) are modeled as random oracles) is indifferentiable from
an ideal cipher. Lampe and Seurin [43] showed that the 12-round IEM construction
with the trivial key-schedule, i.e., in which all round keys are equal, is also indiffer-
entiable from an ideal cipher. In both settings, the question of the exact number of
rounds needed to make the IEM construction indifferentiable from an ideal cipher
remained open. In Chapter 4, considering the case of non-idealized key-schedules
(i.e., key derivation does not make use of an ideal primitive), we show that a 5-round
IEM construction is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher. The results in this chapter
are based on work to be published in Crypto 2017 [21].
Summary. In this thesis, we analyze two popular block cipher design methodolo-
gies, namely the Feistel network and the iterated Even-Mansour construction, and
further our understanding on the number of rounds required for such constructions
to behave like an ideal cipher under certain assumptions.
1 A proof claiming that the 10-round Feistel is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher was published
in [53] but the authors later found a distinguishing attack [54].
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Chapter 2: Preliminaries
A block cipher with key space {0, 1}κ and message space {0, 1}m is a mapping
C : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m such that for any key k ∈ {0, 1}κ, x 7→ C(k, x) is a
permutation. An ideal cipher with block length m and key length κ is a block cipher
drawn uniformly at random from the set of all block ciphers with block length m
and key length κ.
The Feistel Network. The r-round Feistel construction, given access to functions
F = (F1, . . . , Fr) from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n, is defined as follows. Let (Li−1, Ri−1) be
the input to the i-th round, with (L0, R0) denoting the initial input. Then, the
output (Li, Ri) of the i-th round of the construction is given by Li := Ri−1 and
Ri := Li−1 ⊕ Fi(Ri−1). So, for a r-round Feistel, if the 2n-bit input is (L0, R0),
then the output is given by (Lr, Rr). A Feistel network with r = 4 is illustrated in
Figure 2.1.
The Iterated Even-Mansour Construction. Let g = (g0, . . . , gr) be a (r + 1)-
tuple of functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n specifying the key schedule of the IEM.
Then, given access to P = (P1, . . . , Pr) of permutations over {0, 1}n, the r-round








Figure 2.1: The 4-round Feistel network.
a key k ∈ {0, 1}n to the output defined by
EMP(k, x) = gr(k)⊕ Pr(gr−1(k)⊕ Pr−1(· · ·P2(g1(k)⊕ P1(g0(k)⊕ x)) · · · )).
We say that the key-schedule is trivial when all gi’s are the identity.
We observe that the first and the last key additions do not play any role for
indifferentiability. This is because in the indifferentiability setting the key is just
a “public” input to the construction. Hence, in Chapter 4, we focus on the slight
variant of the trivial key-schedule where g0 = gr = 0 (see Fig. 2.2), but our results
carry over directly to the “standard” trivial key-schedule (and more generally to










Figure 2.2: The 5-round IEM with independent permutations and identical round
keys where the first and last round key additions are omitted.
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Notation. Throughout, n will denote the block length of the underlying primitive
used for the block cipher construction — in the case of the Feistel network, n denotes
the block length of the round functions Fi, and for the IEM construction, the block
length of the permutations Pi — and will play the role of the security parameter for
asymptotic statements. Given a finite non-empty set S, we write s ←$ S to mean
that an element is drawn uniformly at random from S and assigned to s.
A distinguisher is an algorithm D with oracle access to a finite list of oracles
(O1, O2, . . .) and that outputs a single bit b, which we denote DO1,O2,... = b.
Indifferentiability. We present the standard definition of indifferentiability below.
(For clarity, we state it directly in the context of indifferentiability from an ideal
cipher for a block cipher C instantiated from a primitive O.) This definition is
obtained by adapting the definition used by Coron et al. [17] based on the original
definition of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [47].
Definition 1. Let C be a construction that, for any n, accesses oracles O =
(O1, . . . , Or) over {0, 1}n and implements a block cipher with key space {0, 1}κ and
message space {0, 1}m. We say that C is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher if there
exists a simulator S and a polynomial t such that for all distinguishers D making at
most q = poly(n) queries, S runs in time t(q) and
|Pr[DCO,O(1n) = 1]− Pr[DIC,S IC(1n) = 1]|
is negligible, where IC is an ideal cipher with key space {0, 1}κ and message space {0, 1}m.
Note that Definition 1 allows the simulator to depend on the number of
queries q. In fact, the simulators that we present do not depend on q, but these
9
simulators are efficient only with high probability, as will become clear in the proofs.
However, we can modify these simulators such that they can use the knowledge of q
(as allowed in Definition 1) and abort whenever their runtime exceeds t(q), thus
ensuring that the simulator is efficient with probability 1.
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Chapter 3: Indifferentiability of the 10-Round Feistel Network
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in the context of Feistel networks, it is known
(see [17]) that one can simplify the problem of indifferentiability from an ideal
cipher and focus on indifferentiability of the Feistel network when using independent,
random, unkeyed round functions from a public random permutation; an ideal cipher
can then be obtained by keying the round functions. Coron et al. [17] proved
that a 14-round Feistel network using random, independent, round functions is
indifferentiable from a random permutation. Left unresolved is the best possible
efficiency of the transformation. In this chapter, we improve upon the result of
Coron et al. [17] and show that 10 rounds suffice.
3.1 Overview
We first describe the proof structure used by Coron et al., and then describe
how our proof differs.
3.1.1 The Techniques of Coron et al.
Consider a naive simulator for an r-round Feistel construction, which responds
to distinguisher queries to each of the round functions F1, . . . , Fr, by always return-
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ing a uniformly random value. Unfortunately, there is a simple distinguisher who
can distinguish oracle access to (FeistelFr , F ) from oracle access to (P,SP ): The dis-
tinguisher will query (x0, x1) to the first oracle, receiving (xr, xr+1) in return and
will use oracle access to the second oracle to evaluate the r-round Feistel and com-
pute (x′r, x
′
r+1) on its own, creating a chain of queries, (x1, . . . , x
′
r). Note that in




r+1) with probability 1, while in the second case the




r+1) is negligible, so security is broken.
The following is an approach to fixing the above attack, which essentially gives
the very high-level intuition for how a successful simulator works: If the simulator
can find out the value of P (x0, x1) = (xr, xr+1) before the distinguisher queries the
entire chain, then the simulator can assign values for the remaining queries Fi(xi),
conditioned on the restriction FeistelFr (x0, x1) = (xr, xr+1). More specifically, if there
are two consecutive rounds (i, i + 1), where i ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, which have not yet
been queried, the simulator can adapt its assignments to Fi(xi), Fi+1(xi+1) to be
consistent with P (x0, x1) = (xr, xr+1). When the simulator adapts the assignment
of Fi(xi) to be consistent with a constraint P (x0, x1) = (xr, xr+1), we say that this
value of Fi(xi) has been assigned via ForceVal. We next discuss further details of
the Coron et al. [17] construction.
Partial chain detection and preemptive completion. To allow the simulator
to preemptively discover P (x0, x1) = (xr, xr+1), Coron et al. fix two “detect zones”
which are sets of consecutive rounds {1, 2, 13, 14}, {7, 8}. Each time the simulator
assigns a value to Fi(xi), it also checks whether there exists a tuple of the form
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(x1, x2, x13, x14) such that (1) F1(x1), F2(x2), F13(x13), F14(x14) have all been as-
signed and (2) P (F1(x1)⊕ x2, x1) = (x14, F13(x13)⊕ x14); or whether there exists a
tuple of the form (x7, x8) such that F7(x7) and F8(x8) have both been assigned. A
pair of consecutive round values (xk, xk+1) is referred to as a “partial chain” and
when a new partial chain is detected according to the detect zones described above
it is “enqueued for completion” and will later be dequeued and preemptively com-
pleted. When a partial chain is detected due to a detect zone that includes both x1
and xr, we say it is a “wraparound” chain. Note that preemptive completion of a
chain can cause new chains to be detected and these will then be enqueued for com-
pletion. This means that in order to prove indifferentiability, it is necessary to argue
that for xi that fall on multiple completed chains, all restrictions on the assignment
of Fi(xi) can be simultaneously satisfied. In particular the “undesired case” will
be when some assignment Fi(xi) must be adapted via a ForceVal assignment, but
an assignment to Fi(xi) has already been made previously. If such a case occurs,
we say the value at an adapt position has been “overwritten.” It turns out that
to prove indifferentiability, it is sufficient to prove that this occurs with negligible
probability.
4-Round buffer zone. In order to ensure that overwrites do not occur, Coron
et al. [17] introduce the notion of a 4-round buffer zone. Their simulator has two
4-round buffer zones, corresponding to rounds {3, 4, 5, 6} or {9, 10, 11, 12}. Within
the buffer zones, positions {3, 6} (respectively {9, 12}) are known as the set uniform
positions, and positions {4, 5} (respectively {10, 11}) are known as the adapt posi-
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tions. Coron et al. [17] prove the following property (which we call henceforth the
strong set uniform property): At the moment that a chain is about to be completed,
the set uniform positions of the buffer zone are always unassigned. This means that
the simulator will always assign uniform values to F3(x3) and F6(x6) (respectively
F9(x9) and F12(x12)) immediately before assigning values to F4(x4) and F5(x5) (re-
spectively F10(x10) and F11(x11)) using ForceVal. This will ensure that ForceVal
never overwrites (except with negligible probability) since x4 = x2 ⊕ F3(x3) is only
determined at the moment F3(x3) is assigned and so the probability that F4(x4) has
already been assigned is negligible (a similar argument holds for the other adapt
positions).
Rigid structure. The fixed 4-round buffer zones of their simulator is used in
their proof in two ways: First, since all assignments, across all completed chains are
uniform except in the fixed adapt positions {4, 5} and {10, 11}, it is easier to argue
about “undesired events” occurring. In particular, since the 4-round buffer of one
chain ({3, 4, 5, 6} or {9, 10, 11, 12}) cannot overlap with the detect zone of another
chain ({1, 2, 13, 14} or {7, 8}), they can argue that if a “undesired event” occurs
while detecting a chain C, then either an equivalent chain was already enqueued or
that event must have been caused by a uniform setting of Fi(xi).
Bounding the simulator’s runtime. The approach of Coron et al. [17] (originally
introduced by Seurin [53]) is to bound the total number of partial chains that get
completed by the simulator. Note that in order to create a partial chain of the form
(x1, x2, x13, x14), it must be the case that P (F1(x1)⊕ x2, x1) = (x14, F13(x13)⊕ x14)
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and so, intuitively, the distinguisher had to query either P or P−1 in order to
achieve this. Thus, the number of partial chains of the form (x1, x2, x13, x14) (i.e.,
wraparound chains) that will get detected and completed by the simulator is at most
the total number of queries made by the distinguisher. Since there is only a single
middle detect zone {7, 8}, once we have a bound on the number of wraparound
chains that are completed, we can also bound the number of completed partial
chains of the form (x7, x8).
3.1.2 Our Techniques
We next briefly discuss how our techniques differ from the techniques of Coron
et al. [17] in the four main areas discussed above.
Separating detection from completion for wrap-around chains. When the
distinguisher makes a query Fi(xi) to the simulator, our simulator proceeds in two
phases: In the first phase, the simulator does not make any queries, but enqueues for
completion all partial chains which it predicts will require completion. In the second
phase, the simulator actually completes the chains and detects and enqueues only
on the middle detect zone (which in our construction corresponds to rounds {5, 6}).
This simplifies our proof since it means that after the set of chains has been detected
in the first phase, the simulator can complete the chains in a manner that minimizes
“bad interactions” between partial chains. In particular, in the second phase, the
simulator first completes chains C with the property that one of the set uniform
positions is “known” and hence could already been assigned (in the completion of
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another chain D) before the chain C gets dequeued for completion. (Although this
contradicts the strong set uniform property of [17], in our proof we are able to relax
this requirement. See the discussion of the weak set uniform property below for
further details.) The simulator then proceeds to complete (and detect and enqueue)
other chains. This allows us to simplify our analysis.
Relaxed properties for the 4-round buffer zone. When a partial chain is about
to be completed, we allow the case that one of the set uniform positions has already
been assigned to occur, as long as the adapt position adjacent to this set uniform
position has not yet been assigned. Henceforth, we call this the weak set uniform
property. We prove that the weak set uniform property holds in Claim 3.35.
Relaxed structure. Requiring only the weak set uniform property allows us to
consider a more relaxed structure for detect zones and 4-round buffer zones. Instead
of requiring that for every chain that gets completed the 4 round buffer positions
({3, 4, 5, 6} or {9, 10, 11, 12} in the case of [17]) are always unassigned, we allow more
flexibility in the position of the 4-round buffer. For example, depending on whether
the detected chain is of the form (x1, x2, x10), (x1, x9, x10), or (x5, x6), our 4-round
buffer will be one of: {3, 4, 5, 6} or {6, 7, 8, 9}, {2, 3, 4, 5} or {5, 6, 7, 8}, {1, 2, 3, 4} or
{7, 8, 9, 10}, respectively. This flexibility allows us to reduce the number of rounds.
However, now, the adapt zone of one chain may coincide with the detect zone of
another chain. Since there are no dedicated roles for fixed positions and since partial
chains in the middle detect zone are detected during the completion of other chains,
we need additional bad events BadlyHitFV and BadlyCollideFV to argue that unde-
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sired effects do not occur. Furthermore, in order to prove that a new wraparound
chain does not get created during the completion of other chains we introduce the
new bad event BadlyCollideP.
Bounding the simulator’s runtime. In comparison to the construction of Coron
et al. [17], our construction has more detect zones and, moreover, for wraparound
chains, we detect on partial chains consisting of three consecutive queries instead of
four consecutive queries. Nevertheless, at a high-level, our proof that the simulator
runtime is bounded follows very similarly to theirs. We can first bound the number
of completed partial chains of the form (x1, x2, x10) and (x1, x9, x10) (such chains are
wraparound chains since they contain both x1 and x10). Once we have done this,
we again have only a single non-wraparound detect zone and so we can follow the
argument of Coron et al. [17] to bound the number of completed partial chains of
the form (x5, x6). Once we have a bound on the number of completed partial chains,
it is fairly straightforward to bound the simulator complexity.
3.1.3 Related Work
Dai and Steinberger have since showed that a 8-round Feistel network is in-
differentiable from an ideal cipher [22, 23]. In other related work, Ramzan and
Reyzin [51] proved that a 4-round Feistel network remains indistinguishable from a
random permutation even if the adversary is given access to the middle two round
functions. Gentry and Ramzan [33] showed that a 4-round Feistel network can
be used to instantiate the random permutation in the Even-Mansour cipher [29]
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and proved that such a construction is a pseudorandom permutation, even if the
round functions of the Feistel network are publicly accessible. Dodis and Puniya [27]
studied security of the Feistel network in a scenario where the adversary learns in-
termediate values when the Feistel network is evaluated, and/or when the round
functions are unpredictable but not (pseudo)random.
Coron et al. [16] adapted the notion of indifferentiability to the framework of
interactive Turing machines. Various relaxations of indifferentiability, such as public
indifferentiability [27, 58], or honest-but-curious indifferentiability [26], have also
been considered. Dodis and Puniya [26] proved that a Feistel network with super-
logarithmic number of rounds is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher in the honest-
but-curious setting. Mandal et al. [45] proved that the 6-round Feistel network is
publicly indifferentiable from an ideal cipher.
3.2 Preliminaries
Since we are focusing on the indifferentiability of the Feistel network from
a random permutation, instead of Definition 1 which presented the definition of
indifferentiability from an ideal cipher, we recall the definition of indifferentiability
from a random permutation which was used by Coron et al. [17]. (Again, based on
the definition of Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [47].)
Definition 2. Let C be a construction that, for any n, accesses functions F =
(F1, . . . , Fr) over {0, 1}n and implements an invertible permutation over {0, 1}2n.
(We stress that C allows evaluation of both the forward and inverse direction of the
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permutation.) We say that C is indifferentiable from a random permutation if there
exists a simulator S and a polynomial t such that for all distinguishers D making at
most q = poly(n) queries, S runs in time t(q) and
|Pr[DCF,F(1n) = 1]− Pr[DP,SP (1n) = 1]|
is negligible, where F are random, independent functions over {0, 1}n and P is a
random permutation over {0, 1}2n. (We stress that P can be evaluated in both the
forward and inverse direction.)
3.3 Our Simulator
We present an informal overview of the simulator before giving a formal de-
scription.
3.3.1 Informal Description
The queries to F1, . . . , F10 are answered by the simulator through the proce-
dure S.F(i, x) for i = 1, . . . , 10. When the distinguisher asks a query F(i, x), the
simulator checks to see if response to the query has already been set. The queries
that are already set are held in tables G1, . . . , G10 as pairs (x, y) such that if F(i, x) is
queried, and if x ∈ Gi, then y is returned as the answer to query F(i, x). If the query
has not already been set, then the simulator adds x to the set Aji where j indicates
the jth query of the distinguisher. The simulator then checks if i ∈ {1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10}
(where these positions mark the endpoints of the detect zones) and, if so, checks
to see if any new partial chains of the form (x9, x10, 9), (x1, x2, 1) and (x5, x6, 5)
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need to be enqueued. Informally, (xk, xk+1, k) is referred to as a partial chain where
(xk, xk+1) denote two consecutive round values for rounds k and k + 1. If no new
partial chains are detected, the simulator just sets the value of Gi(x) uniformly at
random and returns that value. If new partial chains are detected and enqueued in
Qenq, then the simulator evaluates these partial chains “forward” and “backward”
as much as possible (without setting any new values of Gi′(x
′) for any i′ and x′). Say
the evaluation stopped due to x′ /∈ Gi′ for some x′ and i′. Then, the simulator adds
x′ to Aji′ and checks if i
′ ∈ {1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10} and, if so, detects any additional partial
chains and enqueues them for completion if necessary and continues repeating the
process until no more partial chains are detected.
The chains enqueued for completion during this process are enqueued in queues
Q1,Q5,Q6,Q10 and Qall. Any chain that has been enqueued in Qenq is also enqueued
in Qall. The chains enqueued in Qb for b ∈ {1, 5, 6, 10} are those that exhibit the weak
set uniform property. Specifically, say a partial chain C = (xk, xk+1,k) is enqueued
to be adapted at positions ` and `+ 1 and the “set uniform” positions for C are at
`− 1 and ` + 2. The design of the simulator ensures that one of the “set uniform”
positions is adjacent to the query that caused the chain C to be enqueued. We refer
to this “set uniform” position as “good” set uniform position g and the other “set
uniform” position as “bad” set uniform position b. (Thus, g, b ∈ {` − 1, ` + 2} by
definition.) The chain C is enqueued in Qb if at the time of enqueueing of the chain
C, C can be evaluated up to the “bad” set uniform position b and the value of chain
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C at b, say xb, is such that xb /∈ Gb.1
The completion of enqueued chains starts with the completion of the chains
enqueued in Qb for b ∈ {1, 5, 6, 10}. This process proceeds similarly to the comple-
tion process in Coron et al. [17]. A chain C is dequeued from Qb and the simulator
evaluates the chain forward/backward up to the 4-round buffer setting Gi(xi) values
uniformly for any xi /∈ Gi that comes up in the evaluation. In the 4-round buffer
consisting of the “set uniform” positions and the “adapt” positions, the simulator
sets the values of C at the set uniform positions uniformly (if it has not already been
set) and forces the values at the adapt positions such that evaluation of the Feistel
is consistent with the random permutation. (Note that this could possibly lead to
a value in Gi(·) getting overwritten. A major technical part of the proof is to show
that this happens with negligible probability.) Once the simulator has completed
the chain C, it places C in the set CompletedChains along with the chains that are
obtained by evaluating C forward that are in the detect zone positions, i.e., chains
of the form (xk, xk+1, k) for k = 1, 5, 9.
Once the simulator completes the chains enqueued in Qb for all b ∈ {1, 5, 6, 10},
the simulator completes the remaining chains enqueued in Qall. The completion
process for the remaining chains enqueued in Qall is the same as the completion
1 There are chains that exhibit this property that are not enqueued for completion and are
instead added to a set MidEquivChains. The reason for not enqueueing these chains is only to
simplify the analysis for the bound of the complexity of the simulator. We will later show that
ignoring these chains does not affect the simulation and in fact, these chains will be completed at
the end of the simulator’s run while answering D’s jth query.
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process described above except that the simulator detects additional partial chains
of the form (x5, x6, 5) during the completion and enqueues them in a queue Qmid, i.e.,
during the completion of a chain C in Qall, if an assignment occurs such that xk ∈ Gk
for some k ∈ {5, 6} due to the assignment and xk /∈ Gk before the assignment, then
the simulator enqueues the partial chain (x5, x6, 5) in Qmid for all xk′ ∈ Gk′ such
that k′ ∈ {5, 6} and k 6= k′. (Note that the assignment could be a ForceVal
assignment as well.)
Finally, the simulator completes all the chains in Qmid that are not already in
CompletedChains. The completion process again is the same as the process described
for chains enqueued in Qb. The simulator then returns the answer Gi(x) to the
query F(i, x).
3.3.2 Formal Description
The simulator S internally uses hashtables G1, . . . , G10 to store the function
values. Additionally, it uses sets A1, . . . , A10 to detect partial chains that need to
be completed; Ai stores input values that will be added to Gi in the future. The
simulator uses a queue Qenq to detect partial chains that need to be completed
and stores a copy of Qenq in a queue Qall that is used during completion. Queues
Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10 are used to store the chains in Qenq whose “bad” set uniform position
is known at the time of detection. Additionally, a queue Qmid is used to store new
chains of the form (x5, x6, 5) that are enqueued during the completion of chains from
Qall. A set CompletedChains is used to store the chains that have been completed
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already. Finally, a set MidEquivChains is used to hold chains of the form (x1, x2, 1)
and (x9, x10, 9) that are detected due to P/P
−1 queries made by the simulator. This
set is needed only for the purpose of analyzing the complexity of the simulator.
Variables: QueuesQenq, Qall, Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10, Qmid, hashtablesG1, . . . , G10, sets
Aji initialized to ∅ for i = 1, . . . , 10 and j = 1, . . . , q where q is the maximum
number of queries made by the distinguisher, set CompletedChains:= ∅ and set
MidEquivChains := ∅. Initialize j := 0.
The public procedure F(i, x) of the simulator provides the interface to a dis-
tinguisher.
1 procedure F(i, x):
2 j := j + 1
3 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 10} do
4 Aji := ∅
5 FENQ(i, x)
6 while ¬Qenq.Empty() do
7 (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) := Qenq.Dequeue()
8 if (xk, xk+1, k) /∈ CompletedChains then
9 (xr, xr+1, r) := EvalFwdEnq(xk, xk+1, k, `− 2)
10 if r + 1 = b ∧ xr+1 /∈ Gr+1 then
11 Qb.Enqueue(xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b)
12 (xr, xr+1, r) := EvalBwdEnq(xk, xk+1, k, `+ 2)
13 if r = b ∧ xr /∈ Gr then
14 Qb.Enqueue(xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b)
15 for each Q ∈ 〈Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10, Qall, Qmid〉 do . processed in that order
16 while ¬Q.Empty() do
17 (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) := Q.Dequeue()
18 if (xk, xk+1, k) /∈ CompletedChains then
19 (x`−2, x`−1) := EvalFwdComp(Q, xk, xk+1, k, `− 2)
20 (x`+2, x`+3) := EvalBwdComp(Q, xk, xk+1, k, `+ 2)
21 Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b)
22 (x1, x2) := EvalBwdComp(⊥, xk, xk+1, k, 1)
23 (x5, x6) := EvalFwdComp(⊥, x1, x2, 1, 5)
24 (x9, x10) := EvalFwdComp(⊥, x1, x2, 1, 9)
25 CompletedChains := CompletedChains∪{(x1, x2, 1), (x5, x6, 5), (x9, x10, 9)}
26 FCOMP(⊥, i, x)
27 return Gi(x)
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28 procedure EvalFwdEnq(xk, xk+1, k,m):
29 if k = 5 then
30 flagForMid:= 1
31 while (k 6= m) ∧ ((k = 10) ∨ (FENQ(k + 1, xk+1) 6=⊥)) do
32 if k = 10 then
33 (x0, x1) := P
−1(x10, x11)
34 k := 0
35 else
36 if k = 9 ∧ flagForMid = 1 then
37 MidEquivChains := MidEquivChains ∪ {(xk, xk+1, k)}
38 xk+2 := xk ⊕G(k + 1, xk+1)
39 k := k + 1
40 flagForMid:= 0
41 return (xk, xk+1, k)
42 procedure EvalBwdEnq(xk, xk+1, k,m):
43 if k = 5 then
44 flagForMid:= 1
45 while (k 6= m) ∧ ((k = 0) ∨ (FENQ(k, xk) 6=⊥)) do
46 if k = 0 then
47 (x10, x11) := P (x0, x1)
48 k := 10
49 else
50 if k = 1 ∧ flagForMid = 1 then
51 MidEquivChains := MidEquivChains ∪ {(xk, xk+1, k)}
52 xk−1 := xk+1 ⊕G(k, xk)
53 k := k − 1
54 flagForMid:= 0
55 return (xk, xk+1, k)
56 procedure FENQ(i, x):
57 if x ∈ Gi then
58 return Gi(x)
59 else if x ∈ Aji then
60 return ⊥
61 else
62 Aji := {x} ∪ A
j
i
63 if i ∈ {1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10} then
64 EnqNewChains(i, x)
65 return ⊥
66 procedure EnqNewChains(i, x):
67 if i = 1 then
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68 for all (x9, x10, x1) ∈ (G9 ∪ Aj9)×G10 × {x} do
69 if CheckBwd(x10, G10(x10)⊕ x9, x1) then
70 if (x9, x10, 9) /∈ MidEquivChains then
71 Qenq.Enqueue(x9, x10, 9, 3, 2, 5)
72 Qall.Enqueue(x9, x10, 9, 3, 2, 5)
73 if i = 2 then
74 for all (x10, x1, x2) ∈ (G10 ∪ Aj10)×G1 × {x} do
75 if CheckFwd(x2 ⊕G1(x1), x1, x10) then
76 if (x1, x2, 1) /∈ MidEquivChains then
77 Qenq.Enqueue(x1, x2, 1, 4, 3, 6)
78 Qall.Enqueue(x1, x2, 1, 4, 3, 6)
79 if i = 5 then
80 for all (x5, x6) ∈ {x} × (G6 ∪ Aj6) do
81 Qenq.Enqueue(x5, x6, 5, 2, 4, 1)
82 Qall.Enqueue(x5, x6, 5, 2, 4, 1)
83 if i = 6 then
84 for all (x5, x6) ∈ (G5 ∪ Aj5)× {x} do
85 Qenq.Enqueue(x5, x6, 5, 8, 7, 10)
86 Qall.Enqueue(x5, x6, 5, 8, 7, 10)
87 if i = 9 then
88 for all (x9, x10, x1) ∈ {x} ×G10 × (G1 ∪ Aj1) do
89 if CheckBwd(x10, G10(x10)⊕ x9, x1) then
90 if (x9, x10, 9) /∈ MidEquivChains then
91 Qenq.Enqueue(x9, x10, 9, 6, 8, 5)
92 Qall.Enqueue(x9, x10, 9, 6, 8, 5)
93 if i = 10 then
94 for all (x10, x1, x2) ∈ {x} ×G1 × (G2 ∪ Aj2) do
95 if CheckFwd(x2 ⊕G1(x1), x1, x10) then
96 if (x1, x2, 1) /∈ MidEquivChains then
97 Qenq.Enqueue(x1, x2, 1, 7, 9, 6)
98 Qall.Enqueue(x1, x2, 1, 7, 9, 6)
99 procedure CheckFwd(x0, x1, x10):
100 (x′10, x
′












105 procedure EvalFwdComp(Q, xk, xk+1, k,m):
106 while k 6= m do
107 if k = 10 then
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108 (x0, x1) := P
−1(x10, x11)
109 k := 0
110 else
111 xk+2 := xk ⊕ FCOMP(Q, k + 1, xk+1)
112 k := k + 1
113 return (xm, xm+1)
114 procedure EvalBwdComp(Q, xk, xk+1, k,m):
115 while k 6= m do
116 if k = 0 then
117 (x10, x11) := P (x0, x1)
118 k := 10
119 else
120 xk−1 := xk+1 ⊕ FCOMP(Q, k, xk)
121 k := k − 1
122 return (xm, xm+1)
123 procedure FCOMP(Q, i, x):
124 if x /∈ Gi then
125 Gi(x)← {0, 1}n
126 if Q 6=⊥ ∧Q = Qall ∧ i ∈ {5, 6} then
127 EnqNewMidChains(i, x)
128 return Gi(x)
129 procedure EnqNewMidChains(i, x):
130 if i = 5 then
131 for all (x5, x6) ∈ {x} ×G6 do
132 Qmid.Enqueue(x5, x6, 5, 2, 4, 1)
133 if i = 6 then
134 for all (x5, x6) ∈ G5 × {x} do
135 Qmid.Enqueue(x5, x6, 5, 8, 7, 10)
136 procedure Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b):
137 flagMidAdapt0 := 0
138 flagMidAdapt1 := 0
139 FCOMP(Q, `− 1, x`−1)
140 x` := x`−2 ⊕G`−1(x`−1)
141 if (Q = Qall) ∧ (` = 5 ∨ ` = 6) ∧ (x` /∈ G`) then
142 flagMidAdapt0 := 1
143 FCOMP(Q, `+ 2, x`+2)
144 x`+1 := x`+3 ⊕G`+2(x`+2)
145 if (Q = Qall) ∧ (`+ 1 = 5 ∨ `+ 1 = 6) ∧ (x`+1 /∈ G`+1) then
146 flagMidAdapt1 := 1
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147 ForceVal(x`, x`+1 ⊕ x`−1, `)
148 if flagMidAdapt0 = 1 then
149 EnqNewMidChains(`, x`)
150 ForceVal(x`+1, x` ⊕ x`+2, `+ 1)
151 if flagMidAdapt1 = 1 then
152 EnqNewMidChains(`+ 1, x`+1)
153 procedure ForceVal(x, y, `):
154 G`(x) := y
3.4 Proof of Indifferentiability
Let Feistel denote the 10-round Feistel construction, let F be 10 independent
random functions with domain and range {0, 1}n, and let P denote a random per-
mutation on {0, 1}2n. We let S denote the simulator from the previous section. This
section is dedicated to proving the following result:
Theorem 3.1. The probability that a distinguisher D making at most q queries
outputs 1 in an interaction with (P,SP ) and the probability that it outputs 1 in an
interaction with (FeistelF,F) differ by at most O(q12/2n). Moreover, S runs in time
polynomial in q.
For the remainder of the chapter, fix some distinguisher D making at most q
queries.
3.4.1 Proof Overview
Our proof structure utilizes four hybrid experiments H1, . . . , H4 as in the proof
of Coron et al. [17]. Hybrid H1 denotes the scenario in which D interacts with
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(P,SP ), and H4 denotes the scenario in which D interacts with (FeistelF,F). To
prove indifferentiability, we show that the difference between the probability D out-
puts 1 in H1 and the probability D outputs 1 in H4 is at most O(q12/2n).
In H2, we replace the random permutation P in H1 with a two-sided random
function R that also implements R.CheckFwd and R.CheckBwd. Following
Coron et al. [17], we first upper bound the simulator complexity in hybrid H2. In
order to bound the simulator’s complexity in H1, we would like to argue that the
simulator ’s views are indistinguishable in H1 and H2. However, in H1 the simu-
lator itself implements CheckFwd and CheckBwd, while in H2 the procedures
R.CheckFwd and R.CheckBwd are provided by the two-sided random func-
tion R. Thus, we introduce an additional hybrid H1.5 in which D interacts with
(P, ŜP+), where P+ denotes a random permutation equipped with additional pro-
cedures CheckFwd and CheckBwd that are implemented as in the simulator S.
The simulator Ŝ in H1.5 implements the procedures CheckFwd and CheckBwd
by simply calling P+.CheckFwd and P+.CheckBwd. Thus, the difference in hy-
brids H1 and H1.5 is purely conceptual. To bound the simulator’s complexity in H1
we then argue that (1) the number of queries made by the simulator is essentially
the same in H1 and H1.5; and (2) the views of the simulator in H1.5 and H2 are
indistinguishable.
Next, we define certain low-probability events (referred to as “bad events”)
that can occur in an execution of H2, and show that if these events do not occur in
an execution of H2, then we can prove certain “good” properties; in particular, we
can prove that for every call to ForceVal(x, ·, j) that occurs in the execution, we
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have that x /∈ Gj before the call. If this is true, we say that “ForceVal does not
overwrite.” This is the main technical part of the proof.
In H3, we replace the two-sided random function R from H2 with the 10-round
Feistel construction Feistel. This implies that the distinguisher D interacts with
(Feistel, ŜFeistel+), where Feistel+ (similar to P+) denotes the Feistel construction with
additional procedures CheckFwd and CheckBwd, and the Feistel construction
and the simulator share the same randomness. Given the property that ForceVal
does not “overwrite,” we prove that the distinguishing advantage of D is exactly the
probability with which the “bad events” occur by explicitly mapping the randomness
used in H2 to the randomness used in H3. The mapping and the proof follow exactly
along the lines of the proof in Coron et al. [17].
Finally, in H4, the distinguisher accesses the random functions F directly
instead of accessing them through the simulator.
3.4.2 Indistinguishability of the First and Second Experiments
Recall that in experiment H1, the distinguisher D interacts with (P,SP ). We
define an intermediate hybrid experiment H1.5 in which D interacts with (P, ŜP
+
),
where P+ is a random permutation that provides procedures CheckFwd and
CheckBwd that are implemented as in the simulator S. Also, the simulator Ŝ in
experiment H1.5 differs from S in that Ŝ.CheckFwd simply calls P+.CheckFwd
and Ŝ.CheckBwd simply calls P+.CheckBwd.
The difference between experiments H1 and H1.5 is only conceptual, as all
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we have done is to move the CheckFwd and CheckBwd procedures from the
simulator into an oracle to which the simulator has access. The following is thus
immediate.
Lemma 3.2. The probability that D outputs 1 in H1 is equal to the probability it
outputs 1 in H1.5. Moreover, the number of queries S makes to P plus the number of
times S internally runs CheckFwd and CheckBwd in H1 is equal to the number
of queries Ŝ makes to P+ in H1.5.
ExperimentH2 differs fromH1.5 in that we replace the random permutation P
+
with a random two-sided function R. This two-sided function maintains a hashtable
p containing elements of the form (↓, x0, x1) and (↑, x10, x11) that can be mapped to
each other. Whenever the procedureR.P(x0, x1) is queried, R checks if (↓, x0, x1) ∈ p
and if so, answers accordingly, i.e., it returns (x10, x11) = p(↓, x0, x1). Otherwise, an
independent uniform output (x10, x11) is picked and (↓, x0, x1) as well as (↑, x10, x11)
are added to p, mapping to each other. Queries to the procedure R.P−1(·) are
answered analogously.
In addition to procedures P and P−1, R contains the following two proce-
dures: CheckFwd(x0, x1, x10) and CheckBwd(x10, x11, x1).
2 The former, proce-
dure CheckFwd(x0, x1, x10), works as follows: If (↓, x0, x1) ∈ p, it returns true if
(↓, x0, x1) maps to (x10, x11) for some value of x11 ∈ {0, 1}n and false otherwise. The
latter procedure CheckBwd(x10, x11, x1) works as follows: If (↑, x10, x11) ∈ p, it
returns true if (↑, x10, x11) maps to (x0, x1) for some value of x0 ∈ {0, 1}n and false
2This is similar to the check procedure in [17].
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otherwise.
The pseudocode for the two-sided random function R, using hashtable p, is as
follows:
1 procedure P(x0, x1):
2 if (↓, x0, x1) /∈ p then
3 (x10, x11)
$← {0, 1}2n
4 p(↓, x0, x1) := (x10, x11)
5 p(↑, x10, x11) := (x0, x1) // May overwrite an entry
6 return p(↓, x0, x1)
7 procedure P−1(x10, x11):
8 if (↑, x10, x11) /∈ p then
9 (x0, x1)
$← {0, 1}2n
10 p(↑, x10, x11) := (x0, x1)
11 p(↓, x0, x1) := (x10, x11) // May overwrite an entry
12 return p(↑, x10, x11)
13 procedure CheckFwd(x0, x1, x10):
14 if (↓, x0, x1) ∈ p then
15 (x′10, x
′





18 procedure CheckBwd(x10, x11, x1):
19 if (↑, x10, x11) ∈ p then
20 (x′0, x
′





Figure 3.1: Random two-sided function R.
Next, we show that H2 and H1.5 are indistinguishable.
Indistinguishability of H2 and H1.5. We first bound the effect of replacing P
+
with R as a function of the total number of queries q′ made to this oracle. Let S ′
consist of both the simulator and D and the number of queries to S ′ correspond to
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the queries to P/P−1 and CheckFwd/CheckBwd made by both the simulator
and the distinguisher. To conclude the proof of indistinguishability, we bound the
number of queries to the oracle as a function of the total number of queries q made
by D.
Theorem 3.3. Let S ′ be an algorithm that makes at most q′ queries to an oracle.
Then the difference between the probability that S ′ outputs 1 when interacting with
P+, and the probability that S ′ outputs 1 when interacting with R is at most 12q′2/2n.
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we consider experiments E0, E1, . . . , E3, where
E0 corresponds to S ′ interacting with P+, and E3 corresponds to S ′ interacting
with R.
Experiment E0: S ′ interacts with P+.
Experiment E1: S ′ interacts with P1 where procedure P1.P is defined as follows:
1 procedure P1.P(x0, x1)
2 if (↓, x0, x1) /∈ p then
3 (x10, x11)
$← {0, 1}2n
4 if (↑, x10, x11) ∈ p then
5 (x10, x11)
$← {0, 1}2n \ {(x′10, x′11)|(↑, x′10, x′11) ∈ p}
6 p(↓, x0, x1) := (x10, x11)
7 p(↑, x10, x11) := (x0, x1)
8 return p(↓, x0, x1)
Procedure P1.P
−1 is defined analogously. Procedures P1.CheckFwd and
P1.CheckBwd are defined as follows.
1 procedure CheckFwd(x0, x1, x10):
2 if (↓, x0, x1) ∈ p then
3 (x′10, x
′











7 procedure CheckBwd(x10, x11, x1):
8 if (↑, x10, x11) ∈ p then
9 (x′0, x
′












Claim 3.4. The probabilities that S ′ outputs 1 in E0 and E1 are identical.
Proof. The values assigned through procedures P and P−1 are chosen uniformly
from the set of values that have not been assigned so far in both E0 and E1. Also,
the procedures CheckFwd and CheckBwd are implemented in a similar manner
in both experiments. So, experiments E0 and E1 behave identically.
Experiment E2: S ′ interacts with P2 where the procedures P2.P and P2.P−1 are
defined exactly asR.P andR.P−1 respectively, while procedures P2.CheckFwd and
P2.CheckBwd are defined as in P1.CheckFwd and P1.CheckBwd respectively.
Claim 3.5. The probability that S ′ outputs 1 in E1 differs from the probability that
it outputs 1 in E2 by at most q
′2/22n.
Proof. The proof of the claim follows exactly along the lines of [17, Lemma 3.8].
Experiment E3: S ′ interacts with R.
Claim 3.6. The probability that S ′ outputs 1 in E2 differs from the probability that
it outputs 1 in E3 by at most 11q
′2/2n.
Proof. In order to prove this claim, we introduce events BadCheckForward, Bad-
CheckBackward, BadOverwrite, and BadBackwardQuery and prove that these events
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occur with probability at most 11q′2/2n. We proceed to argue that if none of these
events occur the experiments E2 and E3 behave exactly the same.
The event BadCheckForward occurs if P ′.CheckFwd returns true in the last
line in E2. Similarly, the event BadCheckBackward occurs if P
′.CheckBwd returns
true in the last line in E2. The probability of the events BadCheckForward and
BadCheckBackward is at most q′/2n.
The event BadOverwrite occurs if in either E2 or in E3, in any call to the
procedures P or P−1, an entry of p is overwritten. The probability that BadOverwrite
occurs in E2 and E3 is at most 2(q
′)2/22n.
The event BadBackwardQuery occurs if in E2 either one of the two following




11) such that all of the following hold:
(i) The query P(x0, x1) is issued in the last line of a CheckFwd query, and
p(↓, x0, x1) is set to (x∗10, x∗11).
(ii) A query P−1(x∗10, x
∗
11) or CheckFwd(x0, x1, x
∗





is issued after (1).
(iii) The query P(x0, x1) is not issued by the distinguisher between point (i) and
point (ii).
(2) There exist (x∗0, x
∗
1), (x10, x11) such that all the following hold:
(i) The query P−1(x10, x11) is issued in the last line of a CheckBwd query, and
p(↑, x10, x11) is set to (x∗0, x∗1).











(iii) The query P−1(x10, x11) is not issued by the distinguisher between point (i)
and point (ii).
Consider the probability with which the event (BadBackwardQuery∧
¬BadCheckForward ∧ ¬BadCheckBackward) occurs. To analyze the probability of
this event, let us consider the first case by which BadBackwardQuery can occur.




11) such that condition (i) of event (1) holds. Since
BadCheckForward does not occur, we have that the CheckFwd query returns false.
Now, as long as the queries P(x0, x1), P
−1(x∗10, x
∗












distributed uniformly in the set of all pairs (x′10, x
′







11) were not queried. Thus, the probability that in a single
query, the distinguisher queries (a) P−1(x∗10, x
∗
11), is at most
q′
22n−q′ , (b) CheckFwd(x0,
x1, x
∗
10), is at most
q′




11) is at most
q′
22n−q′ . By a
similar argument for event (2) and by assuming q′ < 2n/2 and since there are at
most q′ queries made by the distinguisher, the probability of (BadBackwardQuery ∧
¬BadCheckForward ∧ ¬BadCheckBackward) is at most 2 ∗ (2(q′)2/22n + 2q′2/2n) ≤
8(q′)2/2n.
If the bad events defined above do not occur, the experiments E2 and E3
behave identically.
Theorem 3.3 follows from Claims 3.4–3.6.
Theorem 3.3 bounds the effect of replacing P+ with R in terms of the total
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number of queries q′ made to the P+/R oracle. In the following sequence of claims,
we show that q′ = O(q6) (where, recall, q is the total number of queries made by
the original distinguisher D).
Claim 3.7. In H2, the simulator dequeues from the queue Qenq a partial chain of
the form (x1, x2, 1, `, g, b) such that (x1, x2, 1) /∈ CompletedChains at most q times in
total.
Proof. Consider such a dequeue call and let (x1, x2, 1, `, g, b) be the chain dequeued
from Qenq. The chain must have been enqueued in Qenq when CheckFwd(x2 ⊕
G1(x1), x1, x10) = true for a fixed x10 in lines 75 and 95 of the simulator. Since G1(x1)
is never overwritten (as 1 is not an adapt position for any chain), there is a tuple
(x0, x1, x10) where x0 = x2 ⊕ G1(x1) such that CheckFwd(x2 ⊕ G1(x1), x1, x10) =
true when the chain was enqueued. This implies that there must have been a call
either to P(x0, x1) such that (x10, x11) was chosen uniformly in line 3 of R, or to
P−1(x10, x11) such that (x0, x1) was chosen uniformly in line 9 of R for some x11 ∈
{0, 1}n. This call to P or P−1 was made by the distinguisher or the simulator. If
(x1, x2, 1) /∈ CompletedChains, we claim that this call was made by the distinguisher.
This is because, by definition, the simulator queries P or P−1 only in the following
cases:
1. in a call to EvalFwdEnq or EvalBwdEnq
2. in a call to EvalFwdComp or EvalBwdComp
We first consider the case where the simulator queried P/P−1 during a call to
EvalFwdEnq(xk, xk+1, k,m) or EvalBwdEnq(xk, xk+1, k,m). If k ∈ {1, 9}, then
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the query to P/P−1 is such that the triple (↑, x10, x11) or (↓, x0, x1) is already in p.
This is because CheckFwd/CheckBwd must have returned true for these chains
to have been enqueued. If k = 5, then the partial chain resulting from a query to
P/P−1 is added to the set MidEquivChains and chains belonging to that set are not
enqueued by definition of the simulator.
In case 2, the partial chain (x1, x2, 1) resulting from a query to P/P
−1 is imme-
diately added to CompletedChains by definition of the simulator. So, if (x1, x2, 1) /∈
CompletedChains when it is dequeued, the call to P/P−1 is due to a query made by
the distinguisher. We also claim that there is a unique distinguisher query corre-
sponding to the chain (x1, x2, 1). Say this is not the case and there is another chain
(x′1, x
′
2, 1) that has been enqueued such that CheckFwd(x
′
2⊕G1(x′1), x′1, x′10) = true
due to the same distinguisher query. If D’s query was (↓, x0, x1) that returned
(x10, x11), we have that x
′




1) ⊕ x′2 = x2 ⊕ G1(x1), giving
x2 = x
′
2. If D’s query was (↑, x10, x11) that returned (x0, x1), we have the same
result again. So, there is a unique distinguisher query corresponding to the chain
(x1, x2, 1). Since D makes at most q queries, we have that there are most q such
partial chains dequeued.
The following can be proved similarly to Claim 3.7.
Claim 3.8. In H2, the simulator dequeues from the queue Qenq a partial chain of
the form (x9, x10, 9, `, g, b) such that (x9, x10, 9) /∈ CompletedChains at most q times
in total.
For a hashtable G we let |G| denote the number of entries in G.
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Claim 3.9. In H2, at most 90q
2 partial chains of the form (x5, x6, 5) are enqueued.
Proof. Before we bound the number of partial chains of the form (x5, x6, 5), we will
bound the size of |G5| and |G6|. The size of G5 can increase only in the following
ways: (a) the distinguisher queries F(5, ·), (b) during the completion of a (x9, x10, 9)
partial chain, (c) during the completion of a (x1, x2, 1) partial chain, or (d) during
the completion of a (x5, x6, 5) partial chain where x5 /∈ G5 and x5 ∈ Aj5.
There are at most q queries that the distinguisher makes. The simulator only
completes (x9, x10, 9) such that (x9, x10, 9) /∈ CompletedChains. By Claim 3.7, we
have that there are at most q such chains dequeued from Qenq and hence at most
q such chains can be dequeued from the queues Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10 and Qall. Similarly,
by Claim 3.8, we have that there are at most q completions of a partial chain of the
form (x1, x2, 1).
For the last case, a value x5 ∈ {0, 1}n gets added to Aj5 for j = 1, . . . , q




5 gives a bound on the number of
values x5 added to G5 due to a completion of a (x5, x6, 5) partial chain. A value
x5 ∈ {0, 1}n gets added to Aj5 for j = 1, . . . , q only in one of the following ways:
(a) the distinguisher queried F(5, x5) (b) the simulator made a call to EvalFwdEnq
or EvalBwdEnq during the completion of a (x9, x10, 9) chain where (x9, x10, 9) /∈
CompletedChains (c) the simulator made a call to EvalFwdEnq or EvalBwdEnq





5 ≤ 3q by Claims 3.7 and 3.8. So, putting everything together,
we have that |G5| ≤ 6q and by a similar argument, |G6| ≤ 6q.
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Now, the number of partial chains of the form (x5, x6, 5) that are enqueued in












6| and hence can
be bounded by 54q2. And, the number of partial chains of the form (x5, x6, 5) that
are enqueued in Qmid can be bounded by |G5| · |G6| and hence can be bounded by
36q2.
Claim 3.10. In H2, we have |Gi| ≤ 93q2 for all i.
Proof. The size of Gi can only increase in the following ways: (a) the distinguisher
queries F(i, ·), (b) during the completion of a (x9, x10, 9) partial chain, (c) during the
completion of a (x1, x2, 1) partial chain, or (d) during the completion of a (x5, x6, 5)
partial chain.
There are at most q distinguisher queries and at most q completions each of
partial chains of the form (x9, x10, 9) and (x1, x2, 1) by Claims 3.7 and 3.8. There
are at most 90q2 completions of a (x5, x6, 5) partial chain by Claim 3.9. So, |Gi| ≤
90q2 + 3q ≤ 93q2.
Claim 3.11. In H2, the simulator makes at most 644q
2 queries to R.P and R.P−1.
Proof. The simulator makes calls to R.P/R.P−1 only in procedures EvalFwdEnq,
EvalBwdEnq, EvalFwdComp, and EvalBwdComp. By the bounds on the
number of partial chains that are enqueued for completion given in Claims 3.7, 3.8,
and 3.9 and by definition of the simulator, the number of calls to P/P−1 is bounded
by 92q2 · 7 = 644q2.
Claim 3.12. In H2, the simulator makes at most 3, 166, 000q
6 queries to the proce-
dures R.CheckFwd and R.CheckBwd.
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Proof. The number of CheckFwd queries made by the simulator is bounded by∑q
j=1 |(G10 ∪ A
j




j=1 |(G2 ∪ A
j
2| × |G1| × |A
j
10|).
A value x10 ∈ {0, 1}n gets added to Aj10 for j = 1, . . . , q only in one of the fol-
lowing ways: (a) the distinguisher queried F(10, x10), (b) the simulator made a call to
EvalFwdEnq or EvalBwdEnq during the completion of a (x1, x2, 1) chain where
(x1, x2, 1) /∈ CompletedChains, or (c) the simulator made a call to EvalFwdEnq or
EvalBwdEnq during the completion of a (x5, x6, 5) chain.
There are at most q distinguisher queries, and by Claims 3.8 and 3.9, there
are at most q and 90q2 such calls to EvalFwdEnq and EvalBwdEnq. So,∑q
j=1A
j





90q2 + 2q ≤ 92q2. So, the number of CheckFwd queries made by the simulator is
bounded by 1582860q6. By a similar argument, the number of CheckBwd queries
made by the simulator is bounded by 1582860q6. Hence, there are at most O(q6)
queries to R.CheckFwd and R.CheckBwd.
Corollary 3.13. In H1.5 and H1, the simulator makes at most 3.2× 106q6 queries




Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists a distinguisher D
that makes at most q queries such that in H1.5 the simulator makes more than
3.2× 106q6 queries to P+ with probability greater than 1015q12
2n
· By Claims 3.11 and
3.12, the simulator makes at most 3, 166, 644q6 queries to R in H2. Now, consider
a distinguisher S ′ that consists of D and the simulator together. S ′ outputs 1 if D
and the simulator make more than 3.2 × (10q)6 queries. Then, S ′ issues at most
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which contradicts Theorem 3.3. Hence, the simulator makes
at most 3.2 × 106q6 queries to P+ except with probability 1015q12
2n
· Combining this
with Lemma 3.2, we get the result.
Lemma 3.14. The probability that D outputs 1 in H1 differs from the probability




Proof. By Lemma 3.2, we have that the distinguisher D outputs 1 in H1 and H1.5
with the same probability. Now, for the sake of contradiction, assume that D distin-
guishes H1.5 from H2 with advantage greater than
2·1015q12
2n
· We construct a distin-
guisher S ′ that consists of D and the simulator where S ′ makes at most 3.3× (10q)6
queries and distinguishes R from P+. S ′ works as follows: S ′ outputs 1 if the num-
ber of queries issued by D and the simulator exceeds 3.3 × (10q)6; otherwise, it
outputs whatever is output by D. By Corollary 3.13, the simulator makes at most
3.2 × (10q)6 queries in H1.5 except with probability 10
15q12
2n
and by Claims 3.11 and
3.12, the simulator makes at most 3, 166, 644q6 queries in H2. So, distinguisher S ′








which contradicts Theorem 3.3.
By extending the analysis, we also bound the overall running time of the
simulator.
Claim 3.15. In H2, the simulator runs in time O(q
6).
Proof. We analyze the running time of the procedures of Ŝ. Procedure FENQ runs
in time O(1) except for the run-time of procedure EnqNewChains. Procedures
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EvalFwdEnq and EvalBwdEnq run in time O(1) except for the run-time of pro-
cedure FENQ. Procedures EvalFwdComp and EvalBwdComp run in time O(1)
except for the run-time of procedure FCOMP. Procedure Adapt runs in time O(1)
except for the run-time of procedures FCOMP and EnqNewMidChains. Procedure
FCOMP runs in timeO(1) except for the run-time of procedure EnqNewMidChains.
Procedures CheckFwd, CheckBwd, and ForceVal run in time O(1).
Procedure EnqNewChains runs in time O(q4) by the bounds on |Gi| given




i | for i ∈ {1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10} derived in
Claims 3.9 and 3.12. Procedure EnqNewMidChains runs in time O(q2) by the
bounds on |G5| and |G6| derived in Claim 3.9.
Calls to FENQ are made either by a direct query by the distinguisher, or
in calls to EvalFwdEnq or EvalBwdEnq. There are at most O(q2) calls to
EvalFwdEnq and EvalBwdEnq by the bounds established on the number of
partial chains enqueued in Qenq given by Claims 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9. So, the maximum
number of calls to FENQ is bounded by O(q2). Calls to EnqNewChains are made
only during calls to FENQ. So, there are at most O(q2) calls to EnqNewChains.
Calls to CheckFwd and CheckBwd are only made in EnqNewChains - so there
are at most O(q6) calls to CheckFwd and CheckBwd.
There are at most O(q2) calls to EvalFwdComp, EvalBwdComp, and
Adapt by the bounds on the number of partial chains enqueued in Qenq and
Qmid given by Claims 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9. There are at most O(q
2) calls to FCOMP
since FCOMP is called only in EvalFwdComp, EvalBwdComp, Adapt, or as
a result of a direct distinguisher query. Calls to EnqNewMidChains are made
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only during calls to FCOMP and Adapt. So, there are at most O(q2) calls to
EnqNewMidChains. There are at mostO(q2) calls to ForceVal since ForceVal
is called only during Adapt. Putting all of this together, the simulator runs in
time O(q6).
Corollary 3.16. In H1.5 (and hence H1), the simulator runs for at most O(q
6)
steps and makes at most 3.2× (10q)6 queries except with probability at most 1015q12
2n
·
Proof. By Claims 3.11 and 3.12, the simulator makes at most 3.2× (10q)6 queries to
R in H2 and by Claim 3.15, runs in time at most r(q) ∈ O(q6) in H2. For the sake
of contradiction, assume that there exists a distinguisher D that makes at most q
queries such that in H1.5 the simulator runs in time greater than r(q) or makes more
than 3.2× (10q)6 queries to P+ with probability greater than 1015q12
2n
· Now, consider
a distinguisher S ′ which aims to distinguish P+ and R making only r′(q) queries.
The distinguisher S ′ consists of D and the simulator together. S ′ outputs 1 if the
simulator runs for more than r(q) steps or if D and the simulator make more than
3.3× (10q)6 queries. Then, S ′ issues at most 3.3× (10q)6 queries and distinguishes








Theorem 3.3. Combining this with Lemma 3.2, we get the result.
3.4.3 Properties of the Second Experiment
Before we define the third hybrid experiment, we introduce some definitions
and establish some properties of executions in the second experiment H2. The
definitions here follow closely along the lines of the definitions in [17]. A partial
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chain is a triple (xk, xk+1, k) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, . . . , 10}. If C = (xk, xk+1, k)
is a partial chain, we let C[1] = xk, C[2] = xk+1, and C[3] = k.
Definition 3. Fix tables G = Ŝ.G and p = R.p in an execution of H2, and let
C = (xk, xk+1, k) be a partial chain. We define functions next, prev, val
+, val−, and
val as follows:
1 procedure next(xk, xk+1, k):
2 if k < 10 then
3 if xk+1 /∈ Gk+1 then return ⊥
4 xk+2 := xk ⊕Gk+1(xk+1)
5 return (xk+1, xk+2, k + 1)
6 else if k = 10 then
7 if (↑, x10, x11) /∈ p then return ⊥
8 (x0, x1) := p(↑, x10, x11)
9 return (x0, x1, 0)
10 procedure prev(xk, xk+1, k):
11 if k > 0 then
12 if xk /∈ Gk then return ⊥
13 xk−1 := xk+1 ⊕Gk(xk)
14 return (xk−1, xk, k − 1)
15 else if k = 0 then
16 if (↓, x0, x1) /∈ p then return ⊥
17 (x10, x11) := p(↓, x0, x1)
18 return (x10, x11, 10)
19 procedure val+i (C):
20 while (C 6=⊥) ∧ (C[3] /∈ {i− 1, i}) do
21 C := next(C)
22 if C =⊥ then return ⊥
23 if C[3] = i then return C[1]
24 else return C[2]
25 procedure val−i (C):
26 while (C 6=⊥) ∧ (C[3] /∈ {i− 1, i}) do
27 C := prev(C)
28 if C =⊥ then return ⊥
29 if C[3] = i then return C[1]
30 else return C[2]
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31 procedure vali(C):
32 if val+i (C) 6=⊥ then return val+i (C)
33 else return val−i (C)
We say that ⊥ /∈ Gi for i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}. So, if vali(C) /∈ Gi, then either
vali(C) =⊥ or vali(C) 6=⊥ and vali(C) /∈ Gi.
Definition 4. For a given set of tables G, p, two partial chains C,D are equivalent
(denoted C ≡ D) if they are in the reflexive, transitive closure of the relations given
by next and prev.
So, two chains C and D are equivalent if C = D, or if D can be obtained by
applying next and prev finitely many times to C.
Definition 5. The set of table-defined chains contains all chains C for which
next(C) 6=⊥ and prev(C) 6=⊥.
Definition 6. A chain C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) is called an enqueued chain if
C is enqueued for completion. For such an enqueued chain, we define next(C)
as the procedure next applied to the partial chain (xk, xk+1, k), i.e., next(C) :=
next(xk, xk+1, k). The procedures prev, val
+, val−, and val on an enqueued chain
C are defined in a similar manner.
Definition 7. The set Q∗all contains chains that are enqueued in Qall but not in Q1,
Q5, Q6, or Q10.
Definition 8. We say that a uniform assignment to Gk(xk) occurs when the simu-
lator sets Gk(xk) through an assignment Gk(xk)← {0, 1}n, i.e., a uniform value is
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chosen from the set of n-bit strings and Gk(xk) is assigned that value.
A uniform assignment to Gk(xk) occurs in line 125 of the simulator’s execution.
In particular, if Gk(xk) is set through a ForceVal(xk, ·, k) call, then it is not a
uniform assignment.
Definition 9. We say that a uniform assignment to p occurs in a call to R.P(x0, x1)
if (↓, x0, x1) /∈ p when the call is made and p(↓, x0, x1) is set through the assignment
p(↓, x0, x1) := (x10, x11) where (x10, x11) is chosen uniformly from the set of 2n-bit
strings.
Similarly, it occurs in a call to R.P−1(x10, x11) if (↑, x10, x11) /∈ p when the
call is made and p(↑, x10, x11) is set through the assignment p(↑, x10, x11) := (x0, x1)
where (x0, x1) is chosen uniformly from the set of 2n-bit strings.
A uniform assignment to p(↓, x0, x1) occurs in line 4 of R in Figure 2 and a
uniform assignment to p(↑, x10, x11) occurs in line 10 of R in Figure 2.
In the remainder of the section, we let T = O(q2) be an upper bound on the
sizes of Gi and p as well as the upper bound on the number of enqueued chains and
hence the number of calls to the Adapt procedure in an execution of H2. A bound
on T is derived from Claims 3.7–3.11.
Bad executions. We define a set of “bad” events, and show that these occur
with negligible probability. Following that, we analyze execution of the experiment
assuming that none of these bad events occur.
Definition 10. We say that event BadP occurs in H2 if either:
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• Immediately after choosing (x10, x11) in a call to R.P(·, ·), either (↑, x10, x11) ∈ p
or x10 ∈ G10.
• Immediately after choosing (x0, x1) in a call to R.P−1(·, ·), either (↓, x0, x1) ∈ p
or x1 ∈ G1.
Lemma 3.17. The probability of event BadP in H2 is at most 2T
2/2n.
Proof. The proof follows exactly as in [17, Lemma 3.18].
Definition 11. We say that event BadlyHit+ occurs in H2 if either:
• Immediately after a uniform assignment to Gk(xk), there is a partial chain
(xk, xk+1, k) such that prev(prev(xk, xk+1, k)) 6=⊥.
• Immediately after a uniform assignment to Gk(xk), there is a partial chain
(xk−1, xk, k − 1) such that next(next(xk−1, xk, k − 1)) 6=⊥.
and the relevant partial chain is either table-defined or an enqueued chain in Qall.
Lemma 3.18. The probability of event BadlyHit+ in H2 is at most 40T
3/2n.
Proof. Consider the case where a uniform assignment to Gk(xk) occurs and immedi-
ately after the assignment, there exists an enqueued chain C = (xk, xk+1, k) in Qall
such that prev(prev(xk, xk+1, k)) 6=⊥. For this to occur, xk−1 := xk+1⊕Gk(xk) should
take one of T values (for k ∈ {2, . . . , 10}, xk−1 should be such that xk−1 ∈ Gk−1 and
for k = 1, (↓, xk−1, xk) should be in p). The probability of this is at most T/2n. The
analysis for the case where C is table-defined is exactly the same. There are at most
T enqueued chains and at most T options for xk+1 such that C is table-defined. So,
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the total probability of the first case is 2T 2/2n. The second case can be analyzed
in a similar fashion. So, the total probability of BadlyHit+ for a uniform assignment
Gk(xk) is 4T
2/2n. Since there can be at most 10T such assignments, the probability
of BadlyHit+ is 40T 3/2n.
Definition 12. We say that event BadlyCollide+ occurs in H2 if a uniform assign-
ment to Gi(xi) is such that there exist two partial chains C and D such that for
some ` ∈ {0, . . . , 11} and σ, ρ ∈ {+,−} all the following are true:
• Immediately before the assignment, C and D are not equivalent.
• Immediately before the assignment, valσ` (C) =⊥ or val
ρ
` (D) =⊥.
• Immediately after the assignment, valσ` (C) = val
ρ
` (D) 6=⊥.
and one of the following is true:
• Immediately after the assignment, C and D are table-defined.
• Immediately after the assignment, C is table-defined and D is a chain enqueued
in Qall.
• C and D are chains enqueued in Qall.
Lemma 3.19. The probability of event (BadlyCollide+∧¬BadlyHit+∧¬BadP) in H2
is at most 21160T 5/2n.
Proof. Let C and D be the partial chains in Definition 12.
Case 1: After the assignment C and D are table-defined. The proof for this
case follows exactly as in [17, Lemma 3.21].
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Case 2: C is a chain enqueued in Qall and D is table-defined after the assign-
ment. Consider the case that the enqueued chain C is of the form (xk, xk+1, k) where
xk ∈ Ajk and xk+1 ∈ A
j
k+1 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Let val
−
` (C) = val
−
` (D) =⊥ be-
fore the assignment and val−` (C) = val
−
` (D) 6=⊥ after the assignment. For val
−
` (C)
to change, we must have i = k. Since BadlyHit+ does not occur, we have that
val−`+1(C) = val
−
`+1(D) and `+ 1 = k. But, since C is not equivalent to D before the
assignment, it cannot be the case that val−` (C) = val
−
` (D) 6=⊥ after the assignment
and hence this case has probability 0.
Let val−` (C) =⊥ and val
−
` (D) 6=⊥ before the assignment and val
−
` (C) =
val−` (D) 6=⊥ after the assignment. For val
−
` (C) to change i = k. Since BadlyHit
+
does not occur and val−` (D) does not change due to the assignment, we have that
xk+1 ⊕Gk(val−k (C)) = val
−
k−1(D) where `+ 1 = k. The probability of this is 1/2
n.
Let val+` (C) = val
−
` (D) =⊥ before the assignment and val
+
` (C) = val
−
` (D) 6=⊥
afterward. For val+` (C) to change after the assignment, it must be the case that
` = k + 2 and i = k + 1 since BadlyHit+ does not occur. But for val−` (D) to change
when ` = k+2, we need i = k+3 since BadlyHit+ does not occur as D is table-defined
after the assignment. So, we see that val+` (C) cannot change in this case.
Let val+` (C) =⊥ and val
−
` (D) 6=⊥ before the assignment and val
+
` (C) =
val−` (D) 6=⊥ after the assignment. For val
+
` (C) to change i = k+ 1. Since BadlyHit
+
does not occur and val−` (D) does not change due to the assignment, we have that
xk ⊕Gk+1(val+k+1(C)) = val
−
k+2(D) where ` = k + 2. The probability of this is 1/2
n.
The remaining four cases follow similarly. The case for xk ∈ Gk, xk+1 ∈ Ajk+1,
and xk ∈ Ajk, xk+1 ∈ Gk+1, and xk ∈ Gk, xk+1 ∈ Gk+1 where C = (xk, xk+1, k) is the
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enqueued chain, follow in a similar fashion. So, the total probability of this event
can be bounded as follows. There are at most T enqueued chains and at most 11T 2
table-defined chains before the assignment and there are at most 2T chains that
were not table-defined before the assignment but were table-defined after. There
are at most 10T uniform assignments to Gi(xi) and there are at most 4 possibilities
for σ, ρ. Thus, the probability is at most 10T ·T · (11T 2 +2T ) ·4 ·4/2n ≤ 2080T 4/2n.
Case 3: C and D are chains enqueued in Qall. The proof follows similar to the
proof of Case 2.
Definition 13. We say that event BadlyCollideP occurs in H2 if either:
• A uniform assignment p(↓, x0, x1) := (x10, x11) is such that there exist partial
chains C and D such that for some σ, ρ ∈ {+,−} the following are all true:
– Immediately before the assignment, C and D are not equivalent.
– Immediately before the assignment, valσ10(C) =⊥ or val
ρ
10(D) =⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, valσ10(C) = val
ρ
10(D) = x10 6=⊥.
and one of the following conditions hold:
– Before the assignment, C and D are chains in Q∗all.
– Immediately after the assignment, C and D are table-defined.
– Before the assignment, C is a chain enqueued in Qall and immediately
after the assignment, D is table-defined.
• A uniform assignment p(↑, x10, x11) := (x0, x1) is such that there exist two
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partial chains C and D such that for some σ, ρ ∈ {+,−} the following are all
true:
– Immediately before the assignment, C and D are not equivalent.
– Immediately before the assignment, valσ1 (C) =⊥ or val
ρ
1(D) =⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, valσ1 (C) = val
ρ
1(D) = x1 6=⊥.
and one of the following conditions hold:
– Before the assignment, C and D are chains in Q∗all.
– Immediately after the assignment, C and D are table-defined.
– Before the assignment, C is a chain enqueued in Qall and immediately
after the assignment, D is table-defined.
Lemma 3.20. The probability of event BadlyCollideP in H2 is at most 314T
5/2n.
Proof. Consider the case that after a uniform choice of (x0, x1) leading to an assign-
ment p(↑, x10, x11) := (x0, x1), the event BadlyCollideP occurs. The value val−1 (C)
for a chain C does not change due to the assignment since it is a p(↑, x10, x11) as-
signment and val−1 (C) can change only due to a p(↓, x0, x1) assignment by definition
of val−(·).
Suppose that val+1 (C) =⊥ and val−1 (D) 6=⊥ before the assignment, and after
the assignment val+1 (C) = val
−
1 (D) = x1. The value val
−
1 (D) does not change due to






Suppose that val+1 (C) = val
+
1 (D) =⊥ before the assignment and after the
assignment val+1 (C) = val
+
1 (D) = x1. For this to happen, val10(C) = val10(D) = x10
and val11(C) = val11(D) = x11 implying that C and D are equivalent chains. So,
the probability of this event is 0.
Suppose that val+1 (C) =⊥ and val+1 (D) 6=⊥ before the assignment and after
the assignment val+1 (C) = val
+
1 (D) = x1. Now, the value of val
+
1 (D) stays the same
after the assignment (even if BadP occurs). So, the probability that val+1 (C) =
val+1 (D) = x1 is 2
−n.
The analysis for the other case follows similarly. There are at most T assign-
ments of the form p(↑, x10, x11) or p(↓, x0, x1). There are at most 11T 2 possibilities
for a chain to be table-defined before the assignment and T possibilities for a chain
to be table-defined after the assignment but not before. There are at most T chains




+T 2+T ·(11T 2+T ))·2
2n
.
Definition 14. We say that event BadlyHitFV occurs in H2 if in a uniform assign-
ment to Gs(xs) that occurs in a call to Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b), for
some s ∈ {g, b}, one of the following happens (where we let C = (x`−2, x`−1, `− 2)):
• s = `+ 2 and the following holds:
– Immediately before the assignment, val−`+1(C) =⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, val−`+1(C) 6=⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, y := val`−1(C)⊕ val−`+1(C) is such that
x′`+1 ⊕ x′`−1 = y for some x′`+1 ∈ G`+1 and x′`−1 ∈ G`−1.
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• s = `− 1 and the following holds:
– Immediately before the assignment, val+` (C) =⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, val+` (C) 6=⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, y := val`+2(C) ⊕ val+` (C) is such that
x′`+2 ⊕ x′` = y for some x′`+2 ∈ G`+2 and x′` ∈ G`.
Lemma 3.21. The probability of event BadlyHitFV in H2 is at most 2T
3/2n.
Proof. Consider the first case where s = `+2. Note that for a chain C with s = `+2
the “value” at the adapt position `+1 is set as val`+1(C) := val`+3(C)⊕Gs(vals(C))
where val`+3(C) 6=⊥ is one of the arguments to Adapt. Since the assignment to
Gs(xs) happens inside the Adapt call, val
−
`+1(C) =⊥ until the assignment and
val−`+1(C) 6=⊥ immediately after the assignment.
Now, y := val`−1(C) ⊕ val−`+1(C). Note that val`−1(C) 6=⊥ since val`−1(C) =
x`−1 is one of the arguments of the Adapt procedure. So, for y := val`−1(C) ⊕
val`+3(C) ⊕ Gs(vals(C)) to be such that y = x′`−1 ⊕ x′`+1, where x′`−1 ∈ G`−1 and
x′`+1 ∈ G`+1, the value y needs to take one of T 2/2n values. Note that there are at
most T such calls to Adapt by assumption. So, the probability of the first case is
at most T 3/2n.
The analysis for the second case is analogous.
Definition 15. We say that event BadlyCollideFV occurs in H2 if in a uniform
assignment to Gs(xs) that occurs in a call to Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b),
for some s ∈ {g, b}, the following happens (where we let C = (x`−2, x`−1, `− 2) and
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D is a chain in Q∗all):
• s = ` + 2, and for some (k, k′) ∈ {(` − 1, ` + 1), (` + 1, ` − 1)} the following
holds:
– Immediately before the assignment, val−`+1(C) =⊥ and valk(D) 6=⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, val−`+1(C) 6=⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, y := val`−1(C)⊕ val−`+1(C) is such that
x⊕ y = valk(D) for some x ∈ Gk′.
• s = `− 1, and for some (k, k′) ∈ {(`, `+ 2), (`+ 2, `)} the following holds:
– Immediately before the assignment, val+` (C) =⊥ and valk(D) 6=⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, val+` (C) 6=⊥.
– Immediately after the assignment, y := val`+2(C) ⊕ val+` (C) is such that
x⊕ y = valk(D) for some x ∈ Gk′.
Lemma 3.22. The probability of event BadlyCollideFV in H2 is at most 4T
3/2n.
Proof. Consider the first case where s = ` + 2. Note that during the Adapt call
the “value” at the adapt position `+1 is set as val`+1(C) := val`+3(C)⊕Gs(vals(C))
where val`+3(C) 6=⊥ is one of the arguments to Adapt. Since the assignment to
Gs(xs) happens inside the Adapt call, val
−
`+1(C) =⊥ until the assignment and
val−`+1(C) 6=⊥ immediately after the assignment.
Now, y := val`−1(C) ⊕ val−`+1(C). Note that val`−1(C) 6=⊥ since it is one of
the arguments of the Adapt procedure. Also note that if valk(D) 6=⊥ before the
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assignment, then valk(D) does not change due to the assignment. Say k = `−1 and
k′ = `+1. So, for y := val`−1(C)⊕val`+3(C)⊕Gs(xs) to be such that y = x⊕val`−1(D)
where x ∈ G`+1, the value y would have to take one of T 2/2n values. Similarly for
the case where k = ` + 1 and k′ = ` − 1. So, for a single call to Adapt where
s = ` + 2, we have that the probability that the event occurs is 2T 2/2n. There are
at most T calls to Adapt by assumption and hence, the probability of the first case
is at most 2T 3/2n.
The analysis for the second case is analogous.
We say that an execution of H2 is good if none of the events BadP, BadlyHit
+,
BadlyCollide+, BadlyCollideP, BadlyHitFV or BadlyCollideFV occur. Lemmas 3.17–
3.22 thus imply:
Lemma 3.23. The probability that an execution of H2 is good is at least 1 −
O(T 5)/2n.
Properties of good executions. We prove that during a good execution of H2,
every call to ForceVal(x, ·, a) is such that x /∈ Ga, i.e., a ForceVal call does not
“overwrite”.
Before we proceed with the proofs, we introduce some notation. For a chain
C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) that is enqueued for completion, the adapt positions are at
`, ` + 1. These positions are those where the simulator uses ForceVal(·, ·, `) and
ForceVal(·, ·, ` + 1) to force the values at G`(·) and G`+1(·). Also, for the chain
C, the “set uniform” positions are at `− 1, `+ 2. (These are the buffer zones that
surround the adapt positions.) One of these “set uniform” positions is adjacent to
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the query that caused the chain to be enqueued and this position is denoted by g and
referred to as the “good” set uniform position. The other “set uniform” position is
referred to as the “bad” set uniform position. Note that g, b ∈ {` − 1, ` + 2} and
g 6= b; Let a be the adapt position that is adjacent to a “bad” set uniform position.
So, if b = ` − 1, then a = `; else, if b = ` + 2, a = ` + 1. Consider a call
Adapt(x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b). If b = `− 1: if x`−1 ∈ G`−1, then xa is defined
as xa = x` := x`−2⊕G`−1(x`−1); else, xa is defined as xa = x` =⊥. Else if b = `+ 2:
if x`+2 /∈ G`+2, then xa is defined as xa = x`+1 := x`+3 ⊕ G`+2(x`+2); else, xa is
defined as xa = x`+1 =⊥.
Also, for a chain C enqueued in Qb we say adapting is safe if just before the call
to Adapt for C, we have xg /∈ Gg and xa /∈ Ga. Analogously, for a chain C in Q∗all or
Qmid we say adapting is safe if just before the call to Adapt for C, we have x`−1 /∈
G`−1 and x`+2 /∈ G`+2. Also, we loosely use the statement C ∈ CompletedChains
where C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) to mean that (xk, xk+1, k) ∈ CompletedChains.
To prove that ForceVal does not “overwrite,” we will prove that for every
call to Adapt that occurs during the completion of a chain C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b),
we have valg(C) /∈ Gg before the call and if C is enqueued in Qb, vala(C) /∈ Ga before
the call; else, valb(C) /∈ Gb before the call. I.e., every call to Adapt is “safe.” In
order to prove the above statements, we prove that at the time a chain C is enqueued
in Qall, valg(C) =⊥ and if C is a chain enqueued in Qb for some b ∈ {1, 5, 6, 10},
then valb(C) /∈ Gb; else, valb(C) =⊥ when C was enqueued. Similarly, if a chain C
is enqueued in Qmid, then we prove that valg(C) =⊥ and valb(C) =⊥ just before
the assignment that precedes C being enqueued occurs. We also need to prove
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properties of equivalent chains in order to prove that if a chain equivalent to C
has been completed before C, then C ∈ CompletedChains when it is dequeued.
All of this put together will help us prove that ForceVal does not “overwrite”
(Theorem 3.38). While the structure explained above is similar to the structure of
the proof in [17], the major difference is in how we prove the properties of chains
at the time they are enqueued. This is due to the fact that we separate enqueueing
from completion in our simulation.
Properties of Equivalent Chains
Claim 3.24. Consider a good execution of H2. Suppose that at some point in the
execution, two partial chains C and D are equivalent. Then there exists a sequence
of partial chains C1, . . . , Cr such that
• C = C1 and D = Cr, or else D = C1 and C = Cr,
• for r ≥ 2, Ci = next(Ci−1) and Ci−1 = prev(Ci) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , r},
• for r ≥ 3, C2, . . . , Cr−1 is table-defined,
• D = (valρj (C), val
ρ
j+1(C), j) where val
ρ
j (C) 6=⊥ and val
ρ
j+1(C) 6=⊥ for some
ρ ∈ {+,−},
• C = (valσk(D), valσk+1(D), k) where valσk(D) 6=⊥ and valσk+1(D) 6=⊥ for some
σ ∈ {+,−}.
Proof. By definition, C ≡ D implies that we can apply next and prev finitely many
times to get D from C. Since BadP does not occur, we have that the relation
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≡ is symmetric and hence, ≡ is an equivalence relation. The chains C1, . . . , Cr
represent the sequence where either next or prev is repeatedly applied to C or D to
derive the shortest sequence and since BadP does not occur, if Ci = next(Ci−1) then
Ci−1 = prev(Ci) and vice versa. Since each Ci for all i ∈ {2, . . . , r − 1} is such that
next(Ci) 6=⊥ and prev(Ci) 6=⊥, Ci is table-defined for all i ∈ {2, . . . , r−1}. The last
two bullet points follow from the definition of the procedures val+(·) and val−(·) and
the existence of the sequence of chains C1, . . . , Cr.
Claim 3.25. Consider some point in a good execution of H2 and assume that x 6∈ Gj
before every call to ForceVal(x, ·, j) prior to this point in the execution. Then, if
the partial chains C = (xk, xk+1, k) with k ∈ {1, 5, 9} and D = (x′m, x′m+1,m) with
m ∈ {1, 5, 9} are equivalent at this point in the execution, then C ∈ CompletedChains
if and only if D ∈ CompletedChains.
Proof. Consider the case where C has just been placed in CompletedChains after
being adapted. By Claim 3.24, the chains equivalent to C at this point are exactly
those chains (vali(C), vali+1(C), i) where i ∈ {0, . . . , 10}. Hence, if C and D are
equivalent and k,m ∈ {1, 5, 9}, then both C,D ∈ CompletedChains (by definition of
the simulator). Since BadP does not occur and ForceVal does not overwrite (by
assumption in the lemma), vali(C) does not change during a good execution of H2,
and hence this property continues to hold even after C,D ∈ CompletedChains.
Properties of Enqueued Chains
Recall that {1, 5, 6, 10} are “bad” set uniform positions.
58
Claim 3.26. Say a chain C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) is enqueued to be completed in Qb.
Then at the time C is enqueued, valg(C) =⊥ and valb(C) /∈ Gb.
Proof. Say C = (x5, x6, 5, 2, 4, 1) where g = 4 and b = 1. Such a chain C is
enqueued in Q1 only if x5 /∈ G5, by construction of the simulator. Otherwise,
EnqNewChains(5, x5) is not called. Since x5 /∈ G5 when enqueued, val−4 (C) =⊥
at the time C is enqueued.
Similarly, by construction of the simulator, a chain C is enqueued in Qb only
if valb(C) 6=⊥ and valb(C) /∈ Gb. So, we have val4(C) =⊥ and val1(C) /∈ G1 at the
time the chain C is enqueued. The other cases are analogous.
Effects of a Call to ForceVal
For the following claims, note that g, b ∈ {`− 1, `+ 2} and g 6= b.
Claim 3.27. In a good execution of H2, let x`−1 /∈ G`−1 (respectively x`+2 /∈ G`+2)
immediately before a call Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b). Then, before the
call to ForceVal(x`, ·, `) (respectively ForceVal(x`+1, ·, ` + 1)) in that Adapt
call, we have x` /∈ G` (respectively x`+1 /∈ G`+1).
Proof. The proof follows exactly as in Lemma [17, Lemma 3.26(a)].
Corollary 3.28. In a good execution of H2, consider a call to Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1,
x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b) and assume that adapting was safe for all chains C that were de-
queued from Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10, Q
∗
all, or Qmid before this Adapt call. Then, before
the call to ForceVal(x`, ·, `) and ForceVal(x`+1, ·, ` + 1) that occurs in the call
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Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b), we have x` /∈ G` and x`+1 /∈ G`+1 respec-
tively.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Claim 3.27.
Claim 3.29. In a good execution of H2, suppose that x`−1 /∈ G`−1 (resp., x`+2 /∈
G`+2) immediately before a call Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b). Then, if C
is a table-defined chain before the call to Adapt, vali(C) for i ∈ {1, . . . , 10} stays
constant during the call to ForceVal(x`, ·, `) (resp., ForceVal(x`+1, ·, `+ 1)).
Proof. The proof follows exactly as in Lemma [17, Lemma 3.26(b)].
Claim 3.30. Consider a good execution of H2. Suppose that x`−1 /∈ G`−1 (respec-
tively, x`+2 /∈ G`+2) immediately before a call Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1, x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b).
Then, if C is a chain enqueued in Qall, vali(C) for i ∈ {1, . . . , 10} stays constant
during the call to ForceVal(x`, ·, `) (respectively, ForceVal(x`+1, ·, ` + 1)) that
occurs in the Adapt call.
Proof. Consider the case that C is equivalent to the chain being adapted. If C is
equivalent to the chain being adapted, then vali(C) stays constant during the calls
to ForceVal by definition of the procedure.
Consider the case where the chain C is not equivalent to the chain being
adapted. Then vali(C) can change during the call to ForceVal(x`, ·, `) only if
valρ` (C) = x` for some ρ ∈ {+,−}. This implies that BadlyCollide+ occurred on the
uniform assignment to G`−1(x`−1) that happened in the Adapt call. This is because
C is a chain enqueued for completion in Qall, and C is not equivalent to the chain
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D = (x`−2, x`−1, ` − 2) by assumption. Now, before the assignment val+` (D) =⊥,
and after the assignment valρ` (C) = val
+
` (D) 6=⊥ and D is table-defined. A similar
argument works for the call to ForceVal(x`+1, ·, `+ 1) when x`+2 /∈ G`+2.
Claim 3.31. In a good execution of H2, consider a call to Adapt(Q, x`−2, x`−1,
x`+2, x`+3, `, g, b) for some Q ∈ {Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10}. Assume that adapting was safe
for all chains C that were dequeued from Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10 before this Adapt call. If
xa /∈ Ga and xg /∈ Gg (where a is the adapt position adjacent to the “bad” set uniform
position) before the Adapt call, then if C is a chain enqueued in Qall, vali(C) for
i ∈ {1, . . . , 10} stays constant during the call to ForceVal(xa, ·, a) that occurs in
the Adapt call.
Proof. Consider the case where C is equivalent to the chain being adapted. Then,
vali(C) stays constant during the call to ForceVal(xa, ·, a) by definition of the
procedure.
Consider a chain C that is not equivalent to the chain (x`−2, x`−1, `− 2) being
adapted. Assume the lemma has held until the Adapt call of the chain D currently
being adapted i.e. ForceVal(xa′ , ·, a′) did not affect vali(C) for any chain C such
that C is a chain enqueued in Qall and a
′ is the adapt position adjacent to the
“bad” set uniform b′ of a chain D′ enqueued in Qb′ and dequeued before the current
Adapt call.
Let D be the chain enqueued in Qb during whose completion the Adapt call
occurred. Now, by construction of the simulator, D is equivalent to (x`−2, x`−1, `−2)
and hence not equivalent to C. For vali(C) to change during the call to ForceVal(xa, ·, a)
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that occurs during the Adapt call, it must be the case that vala(C) = vala(D) = xa.
For a chain D enqueued in Qb, we have valb(D) /∈ Gb and valg(D) =⊥ when D was
enqueued by Claim 3.26. So, vala(D) =⊥ when chain D was enqueued.
Consider the case where just before the Adapt call of D, we have xb /∈ Gb.
Then, vala(D) =⊥ since xb /∈ Gb and xg /∈ Gg by assumption. So, if vala(C) =
vala(D) 6=⊥ before the call to ForceVal(xa, ·, a), then BadlyCollide+ occurred on
the uniform assignment to Gb(xb). Consider next the case where just before the
Adapt call of D, we have xb ∈ Gb. So, if vala(C) = vala(D) 6=⊥ before the
ForceVal call, then this occurred during the completion of a chain E that was
dequeued before D. Then, E was dequeued from Qb′ for some b
′ ∈ {1, 5, 6, 10}
by construction of the simulator. Consider the last assignment that happened be-
fore vala(C) = vala(D) 6=⊥ was true. As stated above, this assignment must have
happened during the completion of a chain E that was dequeued before D. This as-
signment can either be (a) a p(↑, x10, x11) or p(↓, x0, x1) assignment, but then BadP
occurred, (b) a ForceVal assignment, but by assumption that the lemma has held
so far and by Claim 3.30, this cannot be true, or (c) a uniform assignment to Gj(xj),
but then BadlyCollide+ occurred.
So, if C is a chain enqueued for completion in Qall, vali(C) for i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}
stays constant during the call to ForceVal(xa, ·, a).
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Additional Properties of Enqueued Chains
For the following claim, if a chain C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) is enqueued in
Qmid, then the assignment Gi(xi) that precedes C being enqueued happens either
in lines 125, 147, or 150 of the simulator’s execution.
Claim 3.32. In a good execution of H2, if at the time a chain C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b)
is enqueued in Qmid, no chain equivalent to C has been enqueued for completion and
adapting was safe for every chain dequeued from Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10 or Q
∗
all so far, then
valg(C) =⊥ and valb(C) =⊥ just before the assignment Gi(xi) that precedes C be-
ing enqueued. Also, val9(C) = val2(C) =⊥ just before the assignment Gi(xi) that
precedes C being enqueued.
Proof. Say a chain C = (x5, x6, 5, 2, 4, 1) is enqueued in Qmid with g = 4 and
b = 1. Then, the assignment G5(x5) that precedes the enqueueing of C is such
that x5 /∈ G5 before the assignment, by construction of the simulator. Otherwise,
EnqNewMidChains(5, x5) is not called. Hence, val
−
4 (C) =⊥ just before the as-
signment G5(x5) that precedes C being enqueued. Also, since val
−
4 (C) =⊥, we have
val−1 (C) =⊥.
Before we prove val+4 (C) =⊥ and val+1 (C) =⊥ (and hence, val4(C) =⊥ and
val1(C) =⊥), we make the following observation. If a partial chain (x5, x6, 5) is
enqueued in Qmid such that no equivalent chain has been enqueued previously, by
construction of the simulator, either (1) val5(D) = x5 for a chain D belonging to
Q∗all where val5(D) =⊥ when D was enqueued or (2) val6(E) = x6 for a chain E
enqueued in Q∗all where val6(E) =⊥ when E was enqueued or (3) both. In other
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words, either x5 /∈ G5 ∪ At5 or x6 /∈ G6 ∪ At6 or both when Qenq.Empty() = true in
line 6 of the simulator’s execution after D’s tth query.
Consider a chain C = (x5, x6, 5, 2, 4, 1) that was enqueued in Qmid such that
no chain equivalent to C was enqueued previously. Such a chain C is enqueued
in Qmid, when x6 ∈ G6, val5(C) = val5(D) = x5 and x5 ∈ G5 right before C was
enqueued (and not earlier) where D is a chain belonging to Q∗all and x5 ∈ G5 due to
the completion of D.
For val1(C) 6=⊥ at the time of the assignment that precedes the enqueueing of
C, we need val+1 (C) 6=⊥. Then, in particular, we have that x7 := val7(C) ∈ G7 and
x8 := val8(C) ∈ G8 (otherwise, val+9 (C) =⊥ implying that val+1 (C) =⊥).
Consider the partial chains C = (x5, x6, 5), C1 = (x6, x7, 6) and C2 = (x7, x8, 7).
For val+9 (C) 6=⊥ just before the assignment that precedes the enqueueing of C,
we need (1) C1 = next(C), C2 = next(C1) (and hence, x6 ∈ G6 and x7 ∈ G7),
(2) x5 = val5(D) for a chain D in Q
∗
all, and (3) x8 ∈ G8 or x8 = val8(E) for a chain
E enqueued in Qall. Note that this condition is not true at the time the simulator
finished enqueueing chains in Qall since we have either x5 /∈ G5∪At5 or x6 /∈ G6∪At6
or both. Hence, the conditions must have been met during the completion of chains
in Qall. Consider the last assignment that was made before all the above conditions
were met.
Consider the case when the last assignment (such that all the conditions listed
above were met immediately after this assignment) happened, the chain C1 was
already table-defined. Now, if the assignment was a P/P−1 assignment, then BadP
occurred. It cannot be a ForceVal assignment since ForceVal does not change
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the value of a chain enqueued in Qall by Claims 3.30 and 3.31. If it were a uniform
assignment to Gi(xi), then BadlyCollide
+ occurred.
Consider the case when the last assignment (such that all the conditions listed
above were met immediately after this assignment) happened, the chain C1 was not
table-defined before the assignment but table-defined immediately after. Recall that
if C1 = (x6, x7, 6) is table-defined then x6 ∈ G6 and x7 ∈ G7. So, the assignment
was either to G6(x6) or G7(x7).
Consider the case that the last assignment (such that all the conditions listed
above were met immediately after this assignment) set G7(x7). If this were a
uniform assignment to G7(x7), then BadlyCollide
+ occurred since C1(≡ C) and
E are not equivalent as no chain equivalent to C has been enqueued previously.
If this were a ForceVal assignment, then BadlyCollideFV occurred. This is be-
cause 7 is an adapt position only for partial chains that are either of the form
(a) X = (x9, x10, 9) such that (x9, x10, 9, 6, 8, 5) belongs to Q
∗
all, or (b) Y = (x1, x2, 1)
such that (x1, x2, 1, 7, 9, 6) is enqueued in Q6. For case (a), by assumption for chains
in Q∗all, we have val5(X) /∈ G5 before the Adapt call for such a chain. For case (b),
the adapt position 7 is adjacent to the “bad” set uniform position 6. By assump-
tion for chains enqueued in Q6, we have val9(Y ) /∈ G9 before the Adapt call for
such a chain. Hence, BadlyCollideFV occurred due to the assignment G5(val5(X)) or
G9(val9(Y )) that occurs in the Adapt call. The analysis for the case when G6(x6)
is set is similar. So, the above conditions are not met for a chain C to be enqueued
in Qmid. Hence, for such a chain C = (x5, x6, 5, 2, 4, 1), val
+
9 (C) =⊥ just before
the assignment that caused C to be enqueued. Since val+9 (C) =⊥ and val−4 (C) =⊥
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before the assignment, we have val4(C) =⊥, val9(C) =⊥ and val1(C) =⊥ just before
the assignment that precedes C being enqueued. The analysis for the case where
C = (x5, x6, 5, 8, 7, 10) is analogous.
Claim 3.33. Consider a good execution of H2. Just before the execution of line 27
during the simulator’s execution, if adapting was safe for every chain dequeued from
Q1,Q5,Q6,Q10, Q
∗
all or Qmid so far, then it holds that:
(i) if x9 ∈ G9, x10 ∈ G10, x1 ∈ G1 such that R.CheckBwd(x10, x9⊕G10(x10), x1) =
true, then (x9, x10, 9) ∈ CompletedChains.
(ii) if x1 ∈ G1, x2 ∈ G2, x10 ∈ G10 such that R.CheckFwd(x2⊕G1(x1), x1, x10) =
true, then (x1, x2, 1) ∈ CompletedChains.
(iii) if x5 ∈ G5, x6 ∈ G6, then (x5, x6, 5) ∈ CompletedChains.
Proof. We start by proving (i). For a triple (x9, x10, x1), we say that the “condition
holds” if (x9, x10, x1) is such that x9 ∈ G9, x10 ∈ G10, x1 ∈ G1 andR.CheckBwd(x10,
x9 ⊕G10(x10), x1) = true. Also, we refer to the partial chain (x9, x10, 9) as the par-
tial chain associated with the triple (x9, x10, x1). So, our aim is to prove that for
every triple (x9, x10, x1) such that the condition holds, the associated partial chain
(x9, x10, 9) ∈ CompletedChains. Assume the claim holds right before (and hence
immediately after) line 27 of the simulator’s execution while answering the distin-
guisher’s (t − 1)th query to F(·, ·). Let the distinguisher ask its tth query F(k, x).
The aim is to prove that at line 27 of the simulator’s execution while answering
the distinguisher’s tth query to F(·, ·), if a triple T ∗ = (x9, x10, x1) is such that the
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condition holds, then the partial chain C∗ = (x9, x10, 9) associated with the triple
is such that C∗ ∈ CompletedChains. Note that the distinguisher could have made
queries to P/P−1 between the (t− 1)th and tth queries to F(·, ·); but if those queries
resulted in the condition holding, then BadP occurred.
Suppose that there exists a triple T ∗ such that the condition holds at line 27
of the simulator’s execution while answering the distinguisher’s tth query. If the
condition held at the end of simulator’s execution while answering the previous
distinguisher query, then by the assumption that the claim has held so far, the
partial chain C∗ associated with the triple T ∗ is such that C∗ ∈ CompletedChains. If
the condition held at the end of the simulator’s execution of the current query t (and
not at the end of the previous query), we differentiate cases where the associated
partial chain C∗ was enqueued for completion during the simulator’s execution while
answering the tth query and when it was not.
Consider the case where a chain equivalent to C∗ was enqueued in Qall during
the simulator’s execution while answering the distinguisher’s current query. If C∗ =
(x9, x10, 9) was enqueued during the t
th query, then (x9, x10, 9) ∈ CompletedChains
by construction of the simulator. Note also that chains in MidEquivChains are not
enqueued for completion by the simulator. By definition of the set MidEquivChains,
these chains are such that they are equivalent to a chain of the form (x5, x6, 5)
that has been enqueued for completion. Since BadP does not occur and ForceVal
does not overwrite, the equivalence holds when (x5, x6, 5) ∈ CompletedChains and
hence, by Claim 3.25, such a chain in MidEquivChains is placed in CompletedChains
as well. By the same argument, if a chain equivalent to C∗ has been enqueued for
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completion, then C∗ ∈ CompletedChains by the end of the simulator’s execution of
the current query. So, if a chain equivalent to C∗ was enqueued for completion or
was in MidEquivChains during the simulator’s execution while answering the current
query t, then C∗ ∈ CompletedChains.
Consider the case where no chain equivalent to C∗ was enqueued in Qall and
C∗ /∈ MidEquivChains during the simulator’s execution while answering the dis-
tinguisher’s current query. We differentiate between the cases where (1) C =
next(C∗) 6=⊥ and next(C) 6=⊥ when Qenq.Empty() = true in line 6 of the simu-
lator’s execution when answering the distinguisher’s tth query and (2) when this is
not the case.
Consider the case when C = next(C∗) 6=⊥ and next(C) 6=⊥ at the time the
simulator stops enqueueing chains in Qall, i.e., when Qenq.Empty() = true in line 6
of the simulator’s execution when answering the distinguisher’s tth query. This
implies that x10 ∈ G10 and (↑, x10, x11) ∈ P , where x11 := x9 ⊕G10(x10), and hence
C = (x10, x11, 10) is table-defined at the time the simulator stops enqueueing chains
in Qall. Since the triple T
∗ is such that the associated partial chain C∗ = (x9, x10, 9)
was not enqueued for completion and not in MidEquivChains, we have that either
(a) x9 /∈ G9 ∪ At9 or (b) x1 /∈ G1 ∪ At1 when Qenq.Empty() = true in line 6. For
the condition to hold, we need x1 ∈ G1 and x9 ∈ G9, and hence we have that
the condition does not hold for the triple T ∗ when Qenq.Empty() = true in line 6.
Consider the case where x1 /∈ G1 ∪ At1. For x1 ∈ G1 to be true by the end of the
simulator’s execution while answering the distinguisher’s tth query, it must be the
case that val1(D) = val1(C) = x1 at some point for a chain D that has been enqueued
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in Qall or Qmid. Before analyzing the case that val1(D) = val1(C) = x1 occurs, we
make the following observations. First, C and D are not equivalent as C ≡ C∗
and no chain equivalent to C∗ (including itself) has been enqueued. Second, for
all chains D that have been enqueued in Qall, val1(D) 6= x1 when D was enqueued
since x1 /∈ G1 ∪ At1. Now, if val1(D) 6= x1 and val1(D) 6=⊥, it cannot be that
val1(D) = x1 at a later point since ForceVal does not overwrite and BadP does
not occur. Hence, if val1(D) = x1 at a later point, then val1(D) =⊥ when enqueued.
Similarly, for all chains D that have been enqueued in Qmid it holds that val1(D) =⊥
just before the assignment that precedes the enqueueing of D by Claim 3.32. Since
BadlyHit+ and BadlyHitFV do not occur, val1(D) =⊥ at the time D is enqueued.
Now, if val1(D) = val1(C) = x1, then this is during the completion of some chain
E during the simulator’s execution while answering the distinguisher’s tth query.
Consider the last assignment before val1(D) = val1(C) = x1 was true. This cannot
be a uniform assignment to Gi(xi) since then BadlyCollide
+ occurred. This cannot
be due to a uniform assignment to P since then BadP or BadlyCollideP occurred.
This cannot be a ForceVal assignment since that would contradict Claims 3.29,
3.30 or 3.31. The analysis for the case where x9 /∈ G9 ∪ At9 when the simulator
stops enqueueing chains in Qall is analogous. So, if C was table-defined when the
simulator stops enqueueing chains in Qall, then the condition does not hold for the
triple T ∗ at the end of the simulator’s execution of the current query.
Consider next the case when either next(C∗) =⊥, or C = next(C∗) 6=⊥ and
next(C) =⊥ at the time the simulator stops enqueueing chains in Qall, i.e., when
Qenq.Empty() = true in line 6 of the simulator’s execution when answering the dis-
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tinguisher’s tth query. Now if the triple T ∗ = (x9, x10, x1) is such that the condition
holds by the end of the simulator’s execution of the current query, then it must be
the case that next(C∗) 6=⊥ and next(next(C∗)) 6=⊥ by the end of the simulator’s exe-
cution. In particular, this means that the partial chain next(C∗) = C = (x10, x11, 10)
where x11 := x9 ⊕ G10(x10) is table-defined (with val1(C) = x1) by the end of the
simulator’s execution. Note that at the moment C becomes table-defined either
x1 /∈ G1 or x9 /∈ G9 as otherwise either BadP or BadlyHit+ occurred. Furthermore,
immediately before the assignment that causes C to be table-defined, we have ei-
ther val1(C) =⊥ or val9(C) =⊥ and immediately after the assignment, we have
val9(C) 6=⊥ and val1(C) 6=⊥ by definition. Say val1(C) =⊥ immediately before the
assignment that caused C to be table-defined and val1(C)(= x1) 6=⊥ immediately
after. For x1 ∈ G1 to be true by the end of the simulator’s execution while answer-
ing the distinguisher’s tth query, it must be the case that val1(D) = val1(C) = x1
at some point for a chain D that has been enqueued in Qall or Qmid. Consider the
last assignment before val1(D) = val1(C) = x1 was true. The rest of the analysis
proceeds similarly to the analysis above. The case when val9(C) =⊥ immediately
before the assignment that caused C to be table-defined and val9(C)(= x9) 6=⊥
immediately after follows in a similar fashion. So, if next(C∗) =⊥ or if next(C∗) 6=⊥
and next(next(C∗)) =⊥ when the simulator stops enqueueing chains in Qall, then the
condition also does not hold for the triple T ∗ at the end of the simulator’s execution
of the current query. Summarizing, if a chain equivalent to C∗ was not enqueued in
Qall and C
∗ /∈ MidEquivChains during the simulator’s execution while answering the
distinguisher’s current query, then the condition does not hold for the triple T ∗ at
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the end of the simulator’s execution of the current query.
The proof of (ii) follows exactly along the lines of the proof of (i) given above.
The proof of (iii) is as follows. Let D ask its tth query F(k, x). Just before the
simulator returns Gk(x) in line 27, let the lemma be false and let this be the first
time that the lemma does not hold implying that there exist x5 ∈ G5 and x6 ∈ G6
such that (x5, x6, 5) /∈ CompletedChains.
If the lemma has held so far, in particular it has held right before (and imme-
diately after) line 27 of the simulator’s execution while answering D’s (t−1)th query
to F(·, ·). Note that the distinguisher could have made queries to P/P−1 between
the (t− 1)th and tth queries to F(·, ·), but those queries cannot result in x5 ∈ G5 or
x6 ∈ G6.
So, x5 ∈ G5, x6 ∈ G6 are such that (x5, x6, 5) /∈ CompletedChains hap-
pened during the simulator’s execution while answering D’s tth query. Now, if
(x5, x6, 5) were enqueued for completion during the t
th query then (x5, x6, 5) ∈
CompletedChains. If a chain equivalent to (x5, x6, 5) were enqueued for completion
during the tth query, then (x5, x6, 5) ∈ CompletedChains. This is because equiv-
alent chains are placed in CompletedChains simultaneously, since BadP does not
occur and ForceVal does not overwrite. So, for x5 ∈ G5, x6 ∈ G6 to be such
that (x5, x6, 5) /∈ CompletedChains, the simulator did not enqueue this partial chain.
(Note that chains of the type (x5, x6, 5) are not added to MidEquivChains.)
Let x6 ∈ G6, and say an assignment occurs such that before the assignment
x5 /∈ G5, but after the assignment x5 ∈ G5 leading to the creation of a partial chain
of the form (x5, x6, 5) with x5 ∈ G5, x6 ∈ G6. (The analysis for the other case is
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analogous.) Such an assignment can happen only by completion of a chain in Q1,
Q5, Q6, Q10 or completion of a chain in Q
∗
all. We analyze these next.
Case 1: An assignment happens to G5(x5) during the completion of a chain C
enqueued in Qb where b ∈ {1, 5, 6, 10} and x6 ∈ G6 before this assignment. Now, if
x6 ∈ G6 before the assignment causing x5 ∈ G5, then either x6 ∈ G6 before D’s t-th
query or x6 ∈ G6 due to the completion of a chain D enqueued in Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10
and dequeued before C. Again, by construction of the simulator, chains C that are
enqueued in Qb are such that either val5(C) ∈ At5 or val5(C) ∈ G5 at the time C
was enqueued and similarly, chains D that are enqueued in Qb are such that either
val6(D) ∈ At6 or val6(D) ∈ G6 at the time D was enqueued. Since BadP does not
occur and ForceVal does not overwrite, val5(C) = x5 ∈ At5 (since x5 /∈ G5 before
this assignment) and val6(D) = x6 ∈ G6 ∪ At6. Thus, (x5, x6, 5) is enqueued for
completion by construction of the simulator.
Case 2: An assignment happens to G5(x5) during the completion of a chain C in
Q∗all and x6 ∈ G6 before this assignment. If x6 ∈ G6 ∪ At6 and x5 ∈ At5 when the
simulator enqueues chains in Qall, then (x5, x6, 5) is enqueued for completion in Qall.
Else, (x5, x6, 5) is enqueued for completion in Qmid.
This completes the proof.
Claim 3.34. Consider a good execution of H2. If a chain C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b)
belongs to Q∗all such that at the time C is enqueued, adapting was safe for every chain
dequeued from Q1,Q5,Q6,Q10, Q
∗
all or Qmid so far, then valb(C) =⊥ and valg(C) =⊥
at the time C is enqueued.
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Proof. Say C = (x9, x10, 9, 3, 2, 5) is enqueued where the query preceding the chain’s
enqueueing is G1(x1) where val1(C) = x1. Then, by definition of the simulator,
x1 /∈ G1 as otherwise, EnqNewChains(1, x1) is not called. So, val+2 (C) =⊥. Now,
we claim that val−5 (C) /∈ G5. This is because if val−5 (C) ∈ G5, then val−6 (C) ∈ G6
since otherwise, val−5 (C) =⊥. This implies that the partial chain (x5, x6, 5), where
x5 = val
−
5 (C) and x6 = val
−
6 (C), is such that x5 ∈ G5 and x6 ∈ G6. Hence, by
Lemma 3.33, we have that (x5, x6, 5) ∈ CompletedChains since no newGi assignments
have been issued between the moment the simulator returned the answer (in line 27
of its execution) and the moment when chain C is enqueued in Qall. However, since
BadP does not occur, this means that x1 ∈ G1 contradicting the first statement.
Thus, we have that val−5 (C) /∈ G5. Now, val+5 (C) =⊥ since val+2 (C) =⊥. So,
val5(C) /∈ G5.
Since C is not enqueued in Q1,Q5,Q6,Q10, we have val5(C) =⊥ when C is
enqueued. So val2(C) =⊥ and val5(C) =⊥, where g = 2 and b = 5. The other cases
are analogous.
ForceVal(x, ·, j) does not Overwrite Gj(x)
Lemma 3.35. Consider a good execution of H2. Let C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) be a
partial chain enqueued in Q1,Q5,Q6, or Q10. At the moment C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b)
is dequeued, assume that adapting was safe for every chain C ′ in Q∗all or Qmid de-
queued so far. Then,
• At the moment C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) is dequeued, C ∈ CompletedChains, or
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• Just before the call to Adapt for C, valg(C) /∈ Gg and vala(C) /∈ Ga (where a
is the adapt position adjacent to the “bad” set uniform position b).
Proof of Lemma 3.35. Assume the lemma has held until the moment that some
chain C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) is dequeued. Note that if the lemma has held until
now we have that for every call to ForceVal(x, ·, j) so far, x /∈ Gj by Corollary 3.28.
Consider the case that at the moment C was dequeued there is a chain D
equivalent to C that was dequeued before C. Now, if D was dequeued before
C, then D ∈ CompletedChains by construction of the simulator. If C and D are
equivalent chains such that D ∈ CompletedChains, then C ∈ CompletedChains by
Claim 3.25.
Next consider the case where no chain equivalent to C was dequeued before C
was dequeued. Say C /∈ CompletedChains when dequeued. If we prove valg(C) /∈ Gg
and vala(C) /∈ Ga at the time C was dequeued, we have that valg(C) /∈ Gg and
vala(C) /∈ Ga just before the call to Adapt for C since otherwise BadP or BadlyHit+
occurred.
By Claim 3.26, we have that valg(C) =⊥ at the time C was enqueued. If
valg(C) ∈ Gg at the time C was dequeued, then this was due to the completion
of a chain D which was enqueued in Qb′ where b
′ ∈ {1, 5, 6, 10} due to the same
distinguisher query as C and dequeued(and completed) before C such that valg(C) =
valg(D) 6=⊥.
Consider the last assignment that was made before valg(C) = valg(D) 6=⊥ was
true. This cannot have been a uniform assignment to Gi(xi) since that implies that
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BadlyCollide+ occurred. This is because C and D are not equivalent(by assumption)
and C and D are both enqueued for completion in Qall and either valg(C) =⊥ or
valg(D) =⊥ before the assignment(otherwise this is not the last assignment before
valg(C) = valg(D) 6=⊥) and valg(C) = valg(D) 6=⊥ after the assignment.
The assignment cannot have been of the form p(↓, x0, x1) = (x10, x11) or
p(↑, x10, x11) = (x0, x1) since then BadP occurred. The assignment cannot have
been a ForceVal query. This is because from Claims 3.31 and 3.30 we have that
ForceVal does not change vali(C) for a chain C enqueued in Qall (including those
enqueued in Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10) during completion of chains in Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10.
Now, consider the argument for vala(C) /∈ Ga when C is dequeued. By
Claim 3.26, we have that valb(C) /∈ Gb and valg(C) =⊥ at the time C was enqueued,
implying that vala(C) =⊥ when C was enqueued (where a is the adapt position
adjacent to “bad” set uniform position). The argument for this case follows similar
to the one above for valg(C).
Lemma 3.36. Consider a good execution of H2. Let C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) be a
partial chain in Q∗all. At the moment C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) is dequeued, assume
that adapting was safe for every chain C ′ in Qmid dequeued so far. Then,
• At the moment C is dequeued, C ∈ CompletedChains or,
• Just before the call to Adapt for C, val`−1(C) /∈ G`−1 and val`+2(C) /∈ G`+2.
Proof. Recall that g, b ∈ {`− 1, `+ 2} and g 6= b. Assume the lemma has held until
the moment that some chain C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) is dequeued. Note that if the
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lemma has held until now we have that for every call to ForceVal(x, ·, j) so far,
x /∈ Gj by Lemma 3.35 and Corollary 3.28.
Consider the case that at the moment C was dequeued, a chain D equiv-
alent to C was dequeued before C. Now, if D was dequeued before C, then
D ∈ CompletedChains by construction of the simulator. If C and D are equivalent
chains such that D ∈ CompletedChains, then C ∈ CompletedChains by Claim 3.25.
Consider the case that no chain equivalent to C was dequeued before C was
dequeued. Note also that if we prove val`−1(C) /∈ G`−1 and val`+2(C) /∈ G`+2 at the
time C was dequeued, we have that val`−1(C) /∈ G`−1 and val`+2(C) /∈ G`+2 just
before the call to Adapt for C since otherwise BadP or BadlyHit+ occurs.
From Claim 3.34, we have that val`−1(C) =⊥ and val`+2(C) =⊥ at the time the
chain C is enqueued. Let us consider the case where val`−1(C) ∈ G`−1 at the time C
was dequeued. If val`−1(C) ∈ G`−1 at the time C was dequeued, then this was due to
the completion of a chain D which was enqueued in Qall (including Q1,Q5,Q6,Q10)
as a result of the same distinguisher query as C and was dequeued(and completed)
before C such that val`−1(C) = val`−1(D) 6=⊥ at the time C was dequeued.
Consider the last assignment that was made before val`−1(C) = val`−1(D) 6=⊥
was true. This cannot have been a uniform assignment to Gi(xi) since that implies
that BadlyCollide+ occurred. This is because C and D are not equivalent(by assump-
tion) and either val`−1(C) =⊥ or val`−1(D) =⊥ before the assignment(otherwise
this is not the last assignment before val`−1(C) = val`−1(D) 6=⊥) and val`−1(C) =
val`−1(D) 6=⊥ after the assignment.
The assignment cannot have been of the form p(↓, x0, x1) = (x10, x11) or
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p(↑, x10, x11) = (x0, x1) since then BadP or BadlyCollideP occurred. The assign-
ment cannot have been a ForceVal assignment since ForceVal does not change
vali(C) for a chain C enqueued in Qall during completion of chains in Q1,Q5,Q6,Q10
by Claims 3.31 and 3.30 and 3.35. Similarly, ForceVal that occurs during the
completion of chains in Qall does not change vali(C) for a chain C enqueued in Qall
by Claim 3.30 as the lemma has held thus far.
The argument for val`+2(C) /∈ G`+2 when C was dequeued is analogous.
Lemma 3.37. Consider a good execution of H2. Let C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) be a
partial chain enqueued in Qmid. Then,
• At the moment C is dequeued, C ∈ CompletedChains, or
• Just before the call to Adapt for C, val`−1(C) /∈ G`−1 and val`+2(C) /∈ G`+2.
Proof. Again, we assume the lemma has held until the moment that some chain
C = (xk, xk+1, k, `, g, b) is dequeued. Note that if the lemma has held until now we
have that for every call to ForceVal(x, ·, j) so far, x /∈ Gj by Lemmas 3.35, 3.36
and Corollary 3.28.
Case 1: Consider the case that when a chain C is enqueued in Qmid, there is an
equivalent chain that has been enqueued previously. We analyze two subcases. First,
consider the case that when a chain C is enqueued in Qmid, there is an equivalent
chain D enqueued previously and D ∈ CompletedChains when C is enqueued. If
C equivalent to D and D ∈ CompletedChains, then by Claim 3.25, we have that
C ∈ CompletedChains.
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Consider the case that when a chain C is enqueued in Qmid, no equivalent
chain belongs to CompletedChains but there is a chain D equivalent to C that has
been enqueued in Qall or Qmid. Now, if C and D are equivalent when C is enqueued,
then there exists a sequence of chains C1, . . . , Cr given by Claim 3.24. Since BadP
does not occur and ForceVal does not overwrite until the moment C is dequeued,
we have that C and D are equivalent when D is placed in CompletedChains. So, by
Claim 3.25, C ∈ CompletedChains and hence, C ∈ CompletedChains at the moment
it is dequeued.
Case 2: Consider the case that no chain equivalent to C was enqueued before
C was enqueued. Note also that if we prove val`−1(C) /∈ G`−1 and val`+2(C) /∈ G`+2
at the time C was dequeued, we have that val`−1(C) /∈ G`−1 and val`+2(C) /∈ G`+2
just before the call to Adapt for C since otherwise BadP or BadlyHit+ occurs.
Since no chain equivalent to C was enqueued previously, from Claim 3.32, we
have that val`−1(C) =⊥ and val`+2(C) =⊥ immediately before the assignment that
caused the chain C is enqueued. Let us consider the case where val`−1(C) ∈ G`−1
at the time C was dequeued. This could not have happened at the time C was
enqueued since then BadlyHit+ or BadlyHitFV occurred. If val`−1(C) ∈ G`−1 at the
time C was dequeued, then this was due to the completion of a chain D which
was enqueued before C was enqueued and dequeued(and completed) after C was
enqueued. By construction of the simulator, this means that D has to be enqueued
in Qall (but not in Q1,Q5,Q6,Q10) or Qmid. Note also that C and D have to be such
that val`−1(C) = val`−1(D) 6=⊥ at the time C was dequeued.
Consider the last assignment that was made before val`−1(C) = val`−1(D) 6=⊥
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was true. This cannot have been a uniform assignment to Gi(xi) since that implies
that BadlyCollide+ occurred. This is because C and D are not equivalent(by assump-
tion) and either val`−1(C) =⊥ or val`−1(D) =⊥ before the assignment(otherwise
this is not the last assignment before val`−1(C) = val`−1(D) 6=⊥) and val`−1(C) =
val`−1(D) 6=⊥ after the assignment.
The assignment cannot have been of the form p(↓, x0, x1) = (x10, x11) or p(↑
, x10, x11) = (x0, x1) since then BadP or BadlyCollideP occurred. The assignment
cannot have been a ForceVal query since ForceVal does not change vali(C) for
a table-defined chain C by Claim 3.29.
The argument for val`+2(C) /∈ G`+2 when C was dequeued is analogous.
Theorem 3.38 (No overwrites). In a good execution of H2, we have x /∈ Gj before
any call to ForceVal(x, ·, j).
Proof. Combining the result of Lemmas 3.35, 3.36 and 3.37 with Corollary 3.28, we
have that for every call to ForceVal(x, ·, j), x /∈ Gj before the call.
As in Coron et al. [17], the distinguisher completes all chains, if, at the end of
the execution, it emulates a call to EvalFwdComp(x0, x1, 0, 10) for all queries to
P(x0, x1) or to (x0, x1) = P
−1(x10, x11) that it made during the execution.
Lemma 3.39. Consider a good execution of H2 in which the distinguisher completes
all chains. Suppose that during the execution P(x0, x1), respectively P
−1(x10, x11), is
queried by the simulator or the distinguisher. Then, p(↓, x0, x1) = (val+10(x0, x1, 0),
val+11(x0, x1, 0)), respectively p(↑, x10, x11) = (val−0 (x10, x11, 10), val−1 (x10, x11, 10)) at
the end of the execution.
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Proof. The simulator queries P/P−1 either (1) when it is enqueueing chains in Qall
or (2) when it is completing chains in Q1, Q5, Q6, Q10, Q
∗
all and Qmid. In the second
case, when the simulator has completed the chain, we have the result and it holds
even at the end of the execution as ForceVal does not overwrite by Theorem 3.38
and BadP does not occur. In the first case, where the simulator queries P/P−1 when
it is enqueueing chains in Qall, the simulator either enqueues the chain in Qall or
places it in MidEquivChains. If the simulator enqueues the chain in Qall, at the time
the simulator completes the chain, the lemma holds and we have the result at the
end of the execution as well since BadP does not occur and ForceVal does not
overwrite. If the simulator places the chain in MidEquivChains, then an equivalent
chain C was enqueued for completion in Qall. Again, since BadP does not occur and
ForceVal does not overwrite by Theorem 3.38, we have that the equivalence holds
until C ∈ CompletedChains and so the lemma holds at the end of the execution as
well.
Consider the case where the query P(x0, x1) was made by the distinguisher.
Since the distinguisher completes all chains, it eventually queries x5 and x6 cor-
responding to the Feistel evaluation of (x0, x1, 0) at some point. This implies that
x5 ∈ G5 and x6 ∈ G6 at the end of the execution. One of these two values are queried
later by the distinguisher, say x6, and at the moment if (x5, x6, 5) /∈ CompletedChains,
it is enqueued and completed by the simulator and again, by the argument above,
the lemma holds. If (x5, x6, 5) ∈ CompletedChains, then the lemma holds right after
that completion as BadP does not occur and ForceVal does not overwrite.
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In the following lemma, we make the randomness p used by R explicit. The
randomness p is a list containing 2 · 22n strings of length 2n. Then R runs deter-
ministically given p. So, whenever the procedure R.P(x0, x1) is queried, R checks if
(↓, x0, x1) ∈ p and if so, answers accordingly. Otherwise, R reads (x10, x11) := p(↓
, x0, x1), and then (↓, x0, x1) as well as (↑, x10, x11) are added to p, mapping to each
other. The procedure R.P−1(x10, x11) is implemented analogously.
Lemma 3.40. Consider a good execution of H2 in which the distinguisher completes
all chains. Then, the number of calls to Adapt by the simulator equals the number
of queries to p(·, ·, ·) made by R.
Proof. The number of queries to p(·, ·, ·) equals half the number of entries in the table
P since BadP does not occur. And for each call to Adapt, there is a corresponding
entry in p that was read while evaluating forward/backward; also two calls to Adapt
procedure can’t share the same entry as otherwise BadP occurred or ForceVal has
overwritten contradicting Theorem 3.38.
For a query in p(·, ·, ·), consider the case that the query was made in a call
to P by the simulator. Then, this call was either made while the simulator was
completing a chain, in which case we consider the Adapt call that was made right
after this query, or, this call was made while the simulator was enqueueing a chain
C in Qall. For this case, consider the chains equivalent to C from this moment until
a chain D equivalent to C is dequeued for completion where D is the first chain
equivalent to C to be dequeued. Since no value is overwritten and BadP does not
occur, we can associate the Adapt call that is called during the completion of chain
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D to the p query.
Consider the case that the distinguisher made a query to p(·, ·, ·). Since the
distinguisher completes all chains, it eventually makes the corresponding queries to
the Feistel and say x5 and x6 are the corresponding Feistel queries. One of them
has to be queried last by the distinguisher and at this moment consider the chain
(x5, x6, 5). If (x5, x6, 5) ∈ CompletedChains, then consider the first chain equivalent
to (x5, x6, 5) that was dequeued and we associate the p query to the Adapt call
that occurred during the completion of this chain. If (x5, x6, 5) /∈ CompletedChains,
then at the moment (x5, x6, 5) is dequeued, consider the first chain equivalent to
(x5, x6, 5) that was dequeued and we associate the p query to the Adapt call that
occurred during the completion of this chain.
3.4.4 Indistinguishability of the Second and Third Experiments
We now describe experiment H3. Here, we explicitly consider the random-
ness z where z is a table containing an independent uniform bitstring of length
n for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and xi ∈ {0, 1}n. Whenever the Feistel construction
needs to query the i-th round function on x, it uses the value z(i, x) instead. In
H3(z), the two-sided random function is replaced by the 10-round Feistel construc-
tion Feistel(z), and the distinguisher D interacts with (Feistel(z), Ŝ(z)Feistel+(z)). The
construction Feistel+(z) defined below contains additional procedures CheckFwd
and CheckBwd that the simulator has access to. Note that the randomness z
used by Feistel and Ŝ is the same and the simulator answers queries to the round
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functions by running the procedure Ŝ.F(i, x) and whenever it needs to set Gj(xj) to
a random value, it uses the value z(j, xj) instead. The Feistel construction Feistel(z)
is defined as follows:
1 procedure P(x0, x1):
2 for i := 2 to 11 do
3 xi := xi−2 ⊕ z(i− 1, xi−1)
4 p(↓, x0, x1) := (x10, x11)
5 p(↑, x10, x11) := (x0, x1)
6 return (x10, x11)
7 procedure P−1(x10, x11):
8 for i := 9 to 0 do
9 xi := xi+2 ⊕ z(i+ 1, xi+1)
10 p(↓, x0, x1) := (x10, x11)
11 p(↑, x10, x11) := (x0, x1)
12 return (x0, x1)
The construction Feistel+(z) that the simulator has access to contains the
following CheckFwd and CheckBwd procedures in addition to the procedures
Feistel.P and Feistel.P−1.
1 procedure CheckFwd(x0, x1, x10):
2 if (↓, x0, x1) ∈ p then
3 (x′10, x
′





6 procedure CheckBwd(x10, x11, x1):
7 if (↑, x10, x11) ∈ p then
8 (x′0, x
′





Mapping randomness of H2 to randomness of H3. Before we describe the
mapping, we make the randomness r used by R explicit. The randomness r is a
list containing 2 · 22n strings of length 2n. Then R runs deterministically given r.
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With regard to the simulator, let f be a table containing an independent uniform
bitstring of length n for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and xi ∈ {0, 1}n. Then whenever the
simulator Ŝ needs to set Gi(xi) to a random value, it uses the value f(i, xi) instead.
We define a map τ which maps a pair of tables (f, r) where f is the randomness
used by the simulator Ŝ and r is the randomness used by the random two-sided
function R either to the symbol λ in case (f, r) does not lead to a good execution
of H2, or to a partial table z. The description of the map follows along the lines
of the map in [17]. A partial table z : {1, . . . , 10} × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n ∪ {⊥} either
has an actual entry for a pair (i, x), or a symbol ⊥ which indicates that the entry
is unused. This map will be such that H2(f, r) and H3(τ(f, r)) have “exactly the
same behaviour” for good (f, r) (where a “good” (f, r) leads to a good execution of
H2). Whenever we refer to executions of H2(f, r) and H3(z) below, we assume that
they are executed for the same distinguisher.
Definition 16. The function τ(f, r) is defined as follows: If (f, r) is good, run a
simulation of H2 in which the distinguisher completes all chains. Consider the tables
G at the end of this execution, and for any i and x let z(i, x) := Gi(x) in case x ∈ Gi
and z(i, x) :=⊥ otherwise. If (f, r) is not good, let τ(f, r) := λ.
Lemma 3.41. The probability that a distinguisher D outputs 1 in H2 differs at most
by O(q10)/2n from the probability that it outputs 1 in H3.
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows exactly along the lines of the proof of [17,
Lemma 3.37]. So, the probability that a distinguisher D outputs 1 in H2 differs from
the probability that it outputs 1 in H3 by twice the probability that an execution
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of H2 is not good. By Lemma 3.23, this is given by O(q
10)/2n.
3.4.5 Indistinguishability of the Third and Fourth Experiments
In H3, the distinguisher accesses the random functions through the simulator.
In experiment H4, the distinguisher can instead access them directly.
Lemma 3.42. Suppose that in H3(z) the simulator Ŝ(z) eventually answers a query
F(i, x). Then that query is answered with z(i, x).
Proof. The proof follows exactly as in [17, Lemma 3.38].
Lemma 3.43 (Indistinguishability of H3 and H4). The probability that a distin-
guisher outputs 1 in H3 differs by at most by O(q
10)/2n from the probability that it
outputs 1 in H4.
Proof. The proof follows exactly along the lines of [17, Lemma 3.38].
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Chapter 4: Indifferentiability of 5-Round Iterated Even-Mansour
In this chapter, we prove that the 5-round iterated Even-Mansour (IEM) con-
struction with a trivial key-schedule, i.e., where all round keys are equal,1 is indif-
ferentiable from an ideal cipher. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this implies that the
5-round iterated Even-Mansour construction with a non-idealized key schedule is
indifferentiable from an ideal cipher.
Our 5-round feasibility result improves both on the 5-round result of Andreeva
et al. [2] for the IEM construction with an idealized key-schedule and on the 12-
round feasibility result of Lampe and Seurin [43] for the IEM construction with
the trivial key-schedule. Our simulator runs in time O(q5) and makes O(q5) ideal
cipher queries. We remark that the security bound presented in this chapter can be
improved with a more fined-grained analysis of “bad events” (see [21]).
1Actually we consider a slight variant of the trivial key-schedule where the first and last round
keys are omitted, but both our negative and positive results are straightforward to extend to the




Our 5-round simulator follows the traditional “chain detection/completion”
paradigm, pioneered by Coron et al. [17,18,37] for proving indifferentiability of the
Feistel construction, which has since then been used for the IEM construction as
well [2, 43]. (See Section 3.1 for an overview of their techniques.) However, our
simulator is, in a sense, conceptually simpler and more “systematic” than previous
simulators for the IEM construction (something we pay for by a more complex “ter-
mination” proof). In a nutshell, our new 5-round simulator detects and completes
any path of length three, where a path is a sequence of adjacent (round) permu-
tation queries “chained” by the same key as in the IEM construction (and which
might wrap around the ideal cipher). In contrast, the 12-round simulator of Lampe
and Seurin [43] used a much more parsimonious chain detection strategy (inherited
from [17,18,37,53]) which allowed for a much simpler termination argument.
The proof that our new 5-round simulator remains consistent with the ideal
cipher(IC) roughly follows the same ideas as in previous indifferentiability proofs.
In short, since the simulator completes all paths of length three, this means that at
the moment the distinguisher makes a permutation query, only incomplete paths of
length at most two can exist. Hence any incomplete path has three “free” adjacent
positions, two of which (the ones on the edge) will be sampled at random, while
the middle one will be adapted to match the IC. The most delicate part consists
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in proving that no path of length three can appear “unexpectedly” and remain
unnoticed by the simulator (which will therefore not complete it), which ultimately
relies on excluding a (large) number of “bad events.”
The most innovative part of the proof lies in the “termination argument,” i.e.,
in proving that the simulator is efficient and that the recursive chain detection/-
completion process does not “chain react” beyond a fixed polynomial bound. As
in many previous termination arguments [17,18,37,53] the proof is “bootstrapped”
by proving that certain types of paths (namely those that wrap around the IC)
will be detected and completed only if the distinguisher made the corresponding IC
query. Hence, assuming the distinguisher makes at most q queries, at most q such
paths will be completed. In virtually all previous indifferentiability proofs, this fact
easily allows to upper bound the size of permutations “history” for all other “detect
zones” used by the simulator, and hence to upper bound the total number of paths
that will ever be detected and completed. This is not the case for our 5-round sim-
ulator, since the “at most q wrapping paths” trick only allows us to upper bound
the size of the middle permutation P3, which by itself is not sufficient to upper
bound the number of other detected paths. In order to push the argument further,
we need to prove a structural property of the history of adjacent permutations P2
and P4. In more detail, this property is that the table maintaining answers of the
simulator for P2 (respectively, P4) never contains four distinct input/output pairs
(x(i), y(i)), 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, such that
⊕
1≤i≤4(x
(i) ⊕ y(i)) = 0. It is rather straightforward
to prove that such input/output pairs are unlikely to exist if the simulator sets an-
swers at random, but answers are sometimes “adapted” when completing a path,
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which makes the proof much more complicated.
4.1.2 Related Work
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Andreeva et al. [2] and Lampe and Seurin [43]
showed that the 5-round IEM construction with an idealized key-schedule, and the
12-round IEM construction with the trivial key-schedule, respectively, are indiffer-
entiable from an ideal cipher. Several papers have studied security properties of
the IEM construction that are stronger than pseudorandomness yet weaker than
indifferentiability, such as resistance to related-key [14, 31], known-key [3, 15], or
chosen-key attacks [14,35]. A recent preprint shows that the 3-round IEM construc-
tion with a (non-invertible) idealized key-schedule is indifferentiable from an ideal
cipher [36].
4.2 Preliminaries
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the iterated Even-Mansour construction EM for
a trivial key-schedule is defined as follows: for an input x ∈ {0, 1}n and a key
k ∈ {0, 1}n,
EMP(k, x) = k ⊕ Pr(k ⊕ Pr−1(· · ·P2(k ⊕ P1(k ⊕ x)) · · · )).
where Pi is a permutation over {0, 1}n. See Fig. 2.2 for an illustration of a 5-round
iterated Even-Mansour construction.
Indifferentiability. We recall the standard definition of indifferentiability pre-
sented in Definition 1 and for clarity, we state it directly for the IEM construction.
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Definition 17. We say that EM is indifferentiable from an ideal cipher if there
exists a simulator S and a polynomial t such that for all distinguishers D making at
most q = poly(n) queries, S runs in time t(q) and
|Pr[DEMP,P(1n) = 1]− Pr[DIC,S IC(1n) = 1]|
is negligible, where P consists of random, independent permutations over {0, 1}n
and IC is an ideal cipher with key space {0, 1}n and message space {0, 1}n.
Recall that Definition 1 and hence Definition 17 allows the simulator S to
depend on the number of queries q. In fact, the simulator that we show in the
pseudocode (cf. Figs. 4.1 and 4.2) does not depend on q, but this simulator is efficient
only with high probability, as will become clear in the proof. In Theorem 4.44, we
discuss an optimized implementation of this simulator that, among other things,
uses knowledge of q to abort whenever its runtime exceeds the limit of a “good”
execution, thus ensuring that the simulator is efficient with probability 1.
4.3 Our Simulator
In this section, we describe our simulator for proving indifferentiability of the
5-round IEM construction from an ideal cipher.
4.3.1 Informal Description
We start with a high-level overview of how the simulator S works, deferring
the formal description in pseudocode to Section 4.3.2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, the
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simulator maintains a pair of tables Pi and P
−1
i with 2
n entries containing either
an n-bit value or a special symbol ⊥, allowing the simulator to keep track of values
that have already been assigned internally for the i-th permutation. Initially, these
tables are empty, meaning that Pi(x) = P
−1
i (y) = ⊥ for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n. The
simulator sets Pi(x) ← y, P−1i (y) ← x to indicate that the i-th permutation maps
x to y. The simulator never overwrites entries in Pi or P
−1
i , and always keeps
these two tables consistent, so that Pi always encodes a “partial permutation” of
{0, 1}n. We sometimes write x ∈ Pi (resp. y ∈ P−1i ) to mean that Pi(x) 6= ⊥ (resp.
P−1i (y) 6= ⊥).
The simulator offers a public interface Query(i, δ, z) allowing the distinguisher
to request the value Pi(z) when δ = + or P
−1
i (z) when δ = − for input z ∈ {0, 1}n.
Upon reception of a query (i, δ, z), the simulator checks whether P δi (z) has already
been defined, and returns the corresponding value if this is the case. Otherwise, it
marks query (i, δ, z) as “pending” and starts a “chain detection/completion” mecha-
nism, called a query cycle in the following, in order to maintain consistency between
its answers and the IC as we now explain. (We stress that some of the wording
introduced here is informal and that all notions will be made rigorous in the next
sections.)
We say that a triple (i, xi, yi) is table-defined if Pi(xi) = yi and P
−1
i (yi) = xi
(that is, the simulator internally decided that xi is mapped to yi by permutation
Pi). Let us informally call a tuple of j − i + 1 ≥ 2 table-defined permutation
queries at adjacent positions ((i, xi, yi), . . . , (j, xj, yj)) (indices taken mod 5) such
that xi′+1 = y
′
i ⊕ k if i′ 6= 5 and xi′+1 = IC−1(k, y′i) if i′ = 5 for all i′ ∈ {i, . . . , j} a
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“k-path of length j + i− 1” (hence, paths might “wrap around” the IC).
The very simple idea at the heart of the simulator is that, before answering
any distinguisher’s query to some simulated permutation, it ensures that any path
of length three (or more) has been preemptively extended to a “complete” path
of length five ((1, x1, y1), . . . , (5, x5, y5)) compatible with the ideal cipher (i.e., such
that IC(k, x1) = y5). For this, assume that at the moment the distinguisher makes
a permutation query (i, δ, z) which is not table-defined yet (otherwise the simulator
just returns the answer that was preemptively set), any path of length three is
complete. This means that any existing incomplete path has length at most two.
These length-2 paths will be called (table-defined2) 2chains in the main body of the
proof, and will play a central role. For ease of the discussion to come, let us call the
pair of adjacent positions (i, i+ 1) of the table-defined queries constituting a 2chain
the type of the 2chain. (Note that as any path, a 2chain can “wrap around”, i.e.,
consists of two table-defined queries (5, x5, y5) and (1, x1, y1) such that IC(k, x1) = y5,
so that possible types are (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 5), and (5, 1)). Let us also call the
direct input to permutation Pi+2 and the inverse input to permutation Pi−1 when
extending the 2chain in the natural way the resp. right and left endpoint of the
2chain.3
The “pending” permutation query (i, δ, z) asked by the distinguisher, once
2While the difference between a table-defined and table-undefined 2chain will be important in
the formal proof, we ignore this subtlety for the moment.
3Again, there is a slight subtlety for the left endpoint of a (1, 2)-2chain and the right endpoint
of a (4, 5)-2chain since this involves the ideal cipher, but we ignore it here.
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answered by the simulator, might create new incomplete paths of length three when
combined with adjacent 2chains, that is, 2chains at position (i−2, i−1) for a direct
query (i,+, xi) or 2chains at position (i + 1, i + 2) for a inverse query (i,−, yi).
Hence, just after having marked the initial query of the distinguisher as “pending”,
the simulator immediately detects all 2chains that will form a length-3 path with this
pending query, and marks them as “triggered”. Following the high-level principle of
completing any length-3 path, any triggered 2chain should (by the end of the query
cycle) be extended to a complete path, which might create new incomplete length-3
paths.
To ease the discussion, let us slightly change the notation and assume that
the distinguisher’s query that initiated the query cycle was either a direct query
(i+2,+, xi+2) or an inverse query (i−1,−, yi−1). In both cases, adjacent 2chains that
might get “triggered” are of type (i, i+ 1). For each 2chain which was triggered by
the initial query of distinguisher, the simulator computes its endpoint opposite to the
initial query, and marks it as pending as well. Note that if the distinguisher’s query
was (i+ 2,+, xi+2), then all these new pending queries are of the form (i− 1,−, ·),
while if it was (i−1,−, yi−1), all the new pending queries are of the form (i+2,+, ·).
For each of these new pending queries, the simulator recursively detects whether they
form a length-3 path with other (i, i+1)-2chains, and triggers these 2chains. Hence,
if the initiating query of the distinguisher was of the form (i+ 2,+, ·) or (i−1,−, ·),
any triggered 2chain will be of type (i, i + 1). For this reason, we say such a query
cycle is of type (i, i + 1). Note also that all pending queries will be of the form
(i+ 2,+, ·) or (i− 1,−, ·) The recursive detection process continues until there is no
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Table 4.1: The five types of (i, i+ 1)-query cycles of the simulator.
Type Initiating query/ReadTape call type Adapt at
(i, i+ 1) (i− 1,−) and (i+ 2,+) i+ 3
(1,2) (5,−) and (3,+) 4
(2,3) (1,−) and (4,+) 5
(3,4) (2,−) and (5,+) 1
(4,5) (3,−) and (1,+) 2
(5,1) (4,−) and (2,+) 3
new (i, i+ 1)-2chain to detect and trigger. Note that the simulator can completely
determine which 2chains should be triggered before starting the completion process
itself.
Once all 2chains that must eventually be completed have been detected and
“triggered”, the simulator starts the completion process. First, it randomly samples
all “pending” queries (which are necessarily of the form (i+2,+, ·) or (i−1,−, ·) for
a query cycle of type (i, i+1)). This “all-at-the-same-time” randomness sampling is
reminiscent of the simulator in [28]. Finally, for all triggered 2chains, it adapts the
corresponding path by computing the corresponding input xi+3 and output yi+3 at
position i + 3 and “forcing” Pi+3(xi+3) = yi+3. In case some collision occurs when
trying to assign a value for some permutation, the simulator aborts. All important
characteristics of an (i, i+ 1)-query cycle are summarized in Table 4.1.
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4.3.2 Formal Description
We now give the full pseudocode for the simulator. The simulator has access to
the ideal cipher, that we formally capture with two interfaces Enc(k, x) and Dec(k, y)
for encryption and decryption respectively. In the ideal world, cipher queries are
answered by an ideal cipher IC. We make the randomness of IC explicit through two
random tapes ic, ic−1 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that for any k ∈ {0, 1}n,
ic(k, ·) is a uniformly random permutation and ic−1(k, ·) is its inverse. Hence, in the
ideal world, a query Enc(k, x), resp. Dec(k, y), is simply answered with ic(k, x), resp.
ic−1(k, y). The randomness used by the simulator for lazily sampling permutations
P1, . . . , P5 when needed is also made explicit in the pseudocode through uniformly
random permutations tapes p = (p1, p
−1
1 , . . . , p5, p
−1
5 ). By random permutation
tapes, we mean that pi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a uniformly random permutation and
p−1i is its inverse.
In the pseudocode and more generally throughout this chapter, the result of
arithmetics on positions is automatically wrapped into the range {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. For
any table or tape T and δ ∈ {+,−}, we let T δ be T if δ = + and be T −1 if δ = −.
Given a list L, L ←↩ x means that x is appended to L. If the simulator aborts
(line 58), we assume it returns a special symbol ⊥ in response to the distinguisher’s
query being processed.
Note that tables Pi and P
−1
i are modified only by procedure Assign. The table
entries are never overwritten, due to the check at line 58.
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1 Variables:
2 Tables of defined permutation queries Pi, P
−1
i , i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
3 Ordered list of pending queries Pending
4 Ordered list of triggered paths Triggered
5 public procedure SimQuery(i, δ, z):
6 if P δi (z) = ⊥ then
7 Pending← ((i, δ, z)), Triggered← ∅
8 forall (i, δ, z) in Pending do FindNewPaths(i, δ, z)
9 forall (i, δ, z) in Pending do ReadTape(i, δ, z)
10 forall (i, i+ 1, yi, xi+1, k) in Triggered do AdaptPath(i, i+ 1, yi, xi+1, k)
11 return P δi (z)
12 private procedure FindNewPaths(i, δ, z):
13 case (δ = +):
14 xi ← z
15 forall (xi−2, xi−1) in (Pi−2, Pi−1) do
16 yi−2 ← Pi−2(xi−2), yi−1 ← Pi−1(xi−1)
17 if i = 2 then k ← yi−1 ⊕ xi
18 else k ← yi−2 ⊕ xi−1
19 C ← (i− 2, i− 1, yi−2, xi−1, k)
20 if C ∈ Triggered then continue
21 case i ∈ {1, 2}:
22 if ¬Check(k, x1, y5) then
23 continue
24 case i ∈ {3, 4, 5}:
25 if Next(i− 1, yi−1, k) 6= xi then
26 continue
27 Triggered←↩ C
28 yi−3 ← Prev(i− 2, xi−2, k)
29 if (i− 3,−, yi−3) /∈ Pending then
30 Pending←↩ (i− 3,−, yi−3)
31 case (δ = −):
32 yi ← z
33 forall (xi+1, xi+2) in (Pi+1, Pi+2) do
34 yi+1 ← Pi+1(xi+1), yi+2 ← Pi+2(xi+2)
35 if i = 4 then k ← yi ⊕ xi+1
36 else k ← yi+1 ⊕ xi+2
37 C ← (i+ 1, i+ 2, yi+1, xi+2, k)
38 if C ∈ Triggered then continue
39 case i ∈ {4, 5}:
40 if ¬Check(k, x1, y5) then
41 continue
42 case i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
43 if Prev(i+ 1, xi+1, k) 6= yi then
44 continue
45 Triggered←↩ C
46 xi+3 ← Next(i+ 2, yi+2, k)
47 if (i+ 3,+, xi+3) /∈ Pending then
48 Pending←↩ (i+ 3,+, xi+3)
49 private procedure ReadTape(i, δ, z):
50 if δ = + then Assign(i, z, pi(z)) else Assign(i, p
−1
i (z), z)
51 private procedure AdaptPath(i, i+ 1, yi, xi+1, k):
52 yi+1 ← Pi+1(xi+1), xi+2 ← Next(i+ 1, yi+1, k), yi+2 ← Pi+2(xi+2)
53 xi+3 ← Next(i+ 2, yi+2, k)
54 xi ← P−1i (yi), yi−1 ← Prev(i, xi, k), xi−1 ← P−1i−1(yi−1)
55 yi−2 ← Prev(i− 1, xi−1, k)
56 Assign(i+ 3, xi+3, yi−2) \\ subscripts are equal because of the wrapping
Figure 4.1: Pseudocode of the simulator.
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57 private procedure Assign(i, xi, yi):
58 if Pi(xi) 6= ⊥ or P−1i (yi) 6= ⊥ then abort
59 Pi(xi)← yi, P−1i (yi)← xi
60 private procedure Next(i, yi, k):
61 if i = 5 then return Dec(k, yi)
62 else return yi ⊕ k
63 private procedure Prev(i, xi, k):
64 if i = 1 then return Enc(k, xi)
65 else return xi ⊕ k
66 private procedure Check(k, x1, y5):
67 return Enc(k, x1) = y5 \\ G1
68 return T (k, x1) = y5 \\ G2,G3,G4
Figure 4.2: Pseudocode of the simulator (contd.)
4.4 Proof of Indifferentiability
Our main result is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. The probability that a distinguisher D making at most q queries
outputs 1 in an interaction with (IC,S IC) and the probability that it outputs 1 in an
interaction with (EMP,P) differ by at most O(q38/2n). Moreover, S runs in time
polynomial in O(q5).
Furthermore, the bounds hold even if the distinguisher is allowed to make q
permutation queries in each position (i.e., it can call Query(i, ∗, ∗) q times for each
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) and make q cipher queries (i.e., Enc and Dec can be called q times
in total).
The proof of the theorem is given in the rest of the chapter, with the indiffer-
entiability simulator being the one described in Section 4.3.
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4.4.1 Proof Overview
Our proof uses a sequence of games G1, G2, G3 and G4 as described in Figure 4.3,
with G1 being the simulated world and G4 being the real world. We fully describe
the intermediate worlds that will be used in the indifferentiability proof. The distin-
guisher D has access to the public interface Query(i, δ, z), which in the ideal world
is answered by the simulator, and to the ideal cipher/IEM construction interface,
that we (as mentioned earlier) formally capture with two interfaces Enc(k, x) and
Dec(k, y) for encryption and decryption respectively. We will refer to queries to any
of these two interfaces as cipher queries, by opposition to permutation queries made
to interface Query(·, ·, ·). In the ideal world, cipher queries are answered by an ideal
cipher IC. As mentioned previously, we make the randomness of IC explicit through
two random tapes ic, ic−1 : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n such that for any k ∈ {0, 1}n,
ic(k, ·) is a uniformly random permutation and ic−1(k, ·) is its inverse. Hence, in
the ideal world, a query Enc(k, x), resp. Dec(k, y), is simply answered with ic(k, x),
resp. ic−1(k, y). The randomness used by the simulator for lazily sampling per-
mutations P1, . . . , P5 when needed has also been made explicit in the pseudocode
through uniformly random permutations tapes p = (p1, p
−1
1 , . . . , p5, p
−1
5 ). Hence,
randomness in game G1 is fully captured by ic and p.
Since we will use two intermediate games, the real world will be denoted by G4.
In this world, queries to Query(i, δ, z) are simply answered with the corresponding
value stored in the random permutation tapes p, while queries to Enc or Dec are
answered by the IEM construction based on random permutations p. Randomness
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in G4 is fully captured by p.
Intermediate Games. The indifferentiability proof relies on two intermediate
games G2 and G3. In game G2, the Check procedure used by the simulator (cf.
Fig. 4.2) to detect new external chains is modified such that it does not make
explicit queries to the ideal cipher; instead it first checks to see if the entry exists
in a table T recording cipher queries and if not, returns false. In game G3, the ideal
cipher is replaced with the 5-round IEM construction that uses the same random
permutation tapes p as the simulator (and hence both the distinguisher and the
simulator interact with the 5-round IEM construction instead of the IC).
Summing up, randomness is fully captured by ic and p in games G1 and G2, and
by p in games G3 and G4 (since the ideal cipher is replaced by the IEM construction
EMp when transitioning from G2 to G3).
The pseudocode for the public (i.e., accessible by the distinguisher) procedures
Query, Enc, and Dec is given in Fig. 4.3, together with helper procedures that
capture the changes from games G1 to G4. Lines commented with “\\Gi” apply only
to game Gi. In the pseudocode, the result of arithmetics on positions is automatically
wrapped into the range {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. For any table or tape T and δ ∈ {+,−}, we
let T δ be T if δ = + and be T −1 if δ = −.
Tables T and T−1 are used to record the cipher queries that have been issued
(by the distinguisher or the simulator).
Throughout the proof we will fix an arbitrary information-theoretic distin-
guisher D with q queries, meaning that D has unlimited computation power and
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69 Game Gi(ic,p), i = 1, 2 / Gi(p), i = 3, 4
70 Variables:
71 Tables of cipher queries T, T−1
72 Tables of defined permutation queries Pi, P
−1
i , i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
73 Ordered list of pending queries Pending
74 Ordered list of triggered paths Triggered
75 public procedure Query(i, δ, z):
76 return SimQuery(i, δ, z) \\ G1,G2,G3
77 return pδi (z) \\ G4
78 public procedure Enc(k, x1):
79 if T (k, x1) = ⊥ then
80 y5 ← ic(k, x1) \\ G1,G2
81 y5 ← EM(k, x1) \\ G3,G4
82 T (k, x1)← y5, T−1(k, y5)← x1
83 return T (k, x1)
84 public procedure Dec(k, y5):
85 if T−1(k, y5) = ⊥ then
86 x1 ← ic−1(k, y5) \\ G1,G2
87 x1 ← EM−1(k, y5) \\ G3,G4
88 T (k, x1)← y5, T−1(k, y5)← x1
89 return T−1(k, y5)
90 private procedure EM(k, x1):
91 for i = 1 to 4 do
92 xi+1 = pi(xi)⊕ k
93 return p5(x5)
94 private procedure EM−1(k, y5):
95 for i = 5 to 2 do
96 yi−1 = p
−1
i (yi)⊕ k
97 return p−11 (y1)
98 private procedure Check(k, x1, y5):
99 return Enc(k, x1) = y5 \\ G1
100 return T (k, x1) = y5 \\ G2,G3,G4
Figure 4.3: Public procedures Query, Enc, and Dec for games G1 - G4, and helper
procedures EM, EM−1, and Check. This set of procedures captures all changes from
game G1 to G4.
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can issue a limited number of queries. Using a trick in [23], we allow the distinguisher
D to make q cipher queries and q permutation queries in each position, as described
in Theorem 4.1. This trick allows us to obtain a better security bound, even though
the distinguisher can make more queries than usual.4 We can assume without loss of
generality that D is deterministic, as any distinguisher can be derandomized using
the “optimal” random tape and achieve at least the same advantage.
Without loss of generality, we assume that D outputs 1 with higher probability
in the simulated world G1 than in the real world G4. We define the advantage of D
in distinguishing between Gi and Gj by
∆D(Gi,Gj) := Pr
Gi
[DQuery,Enc,Dec = 1]− Pr
Gj
[DQuery,Enc,Dec = 1].
Our goal is to upper bound ∆D(G1,G4).
Our proof starts with discussions about the game G2, which will be the start-
ing point of the transitions. As usual, there are bad events that might cause the
simulator to fail. We will prove that bad events are unlikely, and show properties
of good executions in which bad events don’t occur. The proof of efficiency of the
simulator (in good executions of G2) is the most interesting and technical part of
this paper, which is given in Section 4.4.3. During the proof of efficiency we also
obtain upper bounds on the sizes of the tables and on the number of calls to each
procedure, which will be a crucial component for the transitions.
4In the randomness mapping, we will need to convert an arbitrary distinguisher to one that
“completes all paths”. If the distinguisher is allowed q queries in total, the number of queries will
become 6q; if D is allowed q queries in each position, it only increases from q to 2q. Moreover, the
proof works almost the same for the stronger version of distinguishers.
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For the G1-G2 transition, note that the only difference between the two games
is in Check. If the simulator is efficient, the probability that the two executions
diverge in a call to Check is negligible. Therefore, if an execution of G2 is good, it
is identical to the G1-execution with the same random tapes except with negligible
probability (cf. Lemma 4.42). In particular, this implies that an execution of G1 is
efficient with high probability.
For the G2-G3 transition, we use a standard randomness mapping argument.
We will map the randomness of good executions of G2 to the randomness of non-
aborting executions of G3, so that the G3-executions with the mapped randomness
are identical to the G2-executions with the preimage randomness.
We will show that if a G3-execution has a preimage, then the answers of the
permutation queries output by the simulator must be compatible with the random
permutation tapes (cf. Lemma 4.51). Thus the G3-execution is identical to the G4-
execution with the same random tapes, where the permutation queries are answered
by the corresponding entries of the random tapes. This enables a transition directly
from G2 to G4 using the randomness mapping, which is a small novelty of our proof.
Termination Argument. Since the termination argument—i.e., the fact that our
simulator does not run amok with excessive path completions, except with negligible
probability—is one of the more novel aspects of our proof, we provide a separate
high-level overview of this argument here.
To start with, observe that at the moment when an (i, i+ 1)-path is triggered,
3 queries on the path are either already in existence or already scheduled for future
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existence regardless of this event: the queries at position i and i + 1 are already
defined, while the pending query that triggers the path was already scheduled to
become defined even before the path was triggered; hence, each triggered path only
“accounts” for 2 new queries, positioned either at i+2, i+3 or at i−1, i−2 (= i+3),
depending on the position of the pending query.
A second observation is that...
– (1, 2)-2chains triggered by pending queries of the form (5,−, ·), and
– (4, 5)-2chains triggered by pending queries of the form (1,+, ·), and
– (5, 1)-2chains triggered by either pending queries of the form (2,+, ·) or (4,−, ·)
...all involve a cipher query (equivalently, a call to Check, in G2) to check the trigger
condition, and one can argue that this query must have been made by the distin-
guisher itself. (Because when the simulator makes a query to Enc/Dec that is not for
the purpose of detecting paths, it is for the purpose of completing a path.) Hence,
because the distinguisher only has q cipher queries, only q such path completions
should occur in total. Moreover, these three types of path completions are exactly
those that “account” for a new (previously unscheduled) query to be created at
P3. Hence, and because the only source of new queries are path completions and
queries coming directly from the distinguisher, the size of P3 never grows more than
q + q = 2q, with high probability.
Of the remaining types of 2chain completions (i.e., those that do not involve
the presence of a previously made “wraparound” cipher query), those that contribute
a new entry to P2 are the following:
103
– (3, 4)-2chains triggered by pending queries of the form (5,+, ·)
– (4, 5)-2chains triggered by pending queries of the form (3,−, ·)
We can observe that either type of chain completion involves values y3, x4, y4, x5
that are well-defined at the time the chain is detected. We will analyze both types
of path completion simultaneously, but dividing into two cases according to whether
(a) the distinguisher ever made the query Query(5,+, x5), or else received the value
x5 as an answer to a query of the form Query(5,−, y5), or (b) the query P5(x5) is
being defined / is already defined as the result of a path completion. (Crucially, (a)
and (b) are the only two options for x5.)
For (a), at most q such values of x5 can ever exist, since the distinguisher
makes at most q queries to Query(5, ·, ·); moreover, there are at most 2q possibilities
for y3, as already noted; and we have the relation
y3 ⊕ x5 = x4 ⊕ y4 (4.1)
from the fact that y3, x4, y4 and x5 lie on a common path. One can show that, with
high probability,
x4 ⊕ y4 6= x′4 ⊕ y′4








4 and such that x4 6= x′4.5
Hence, with high probability (4.1) has at most a unique solution x4, y4 for each y3,
5Probabilistically speaking, this trivially holds if P4 is a random partial permutation defined at
only polynomially many points, though our proof is made more complicated by the fact that P4
also contains “adapted” queries.
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x5, and scenario (a) accounts for at most 2q
2 path completions (one for each possible
left-hand side of (4.1)) of either type above.







whose right endpoint is x5. (This is the case if x5 is part of a previously completed
path, and is also the case if (5,+, x5) became a pending query during the current
query cycle without being the initiating query.) The relation
y′3 ⊕ x′4 ⊕ y′4 = y3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ y4
(both sides are equal to x5) implies
y3 ⊕ y′3 = x4 ⊕ y4 ⊕ x′4 ⊕ y′4 (4.2)
and, similarly to (a), one can show that (with high probability)
x4 ⊕ y4 ⊕ x′4 ⊕ y′4 6= X4 ⊕ Y4 ⊕X ′4 ⊕ Y ′4









4)}. Thus, we have (modulo the ordering of (x4, y4) and (x′4, y′4)6) at most
one solution to the RHS of (4.2) for each LHS; hence, scenario (b) accounts for at
most 4q2 path completions7 of either type above, with high probability.
Combining these bounds, we find that P2 never grows to size more than 2q +
2q2+4q2 = 6q2+2q with high probability, where the term of 2q accounts for (the sum
of) direct distinguisher queries to Query(2, ·, ·) and “wraparound” path completions
6As argued within the proof, this ordering issue does not actually introduce an extra factor of
two into the bounds.
7Or more exactly, to at most 2q(2q−1) path completions, which leads to slightly better bounds
used in the proof.
105
involving a distinguisher cipher query. Symmetrically, one can show that P4 also
has size at most 6q2 + 2q, with high probability.
One can now easily conclude the termination argument; e.g., the number of
(2, 3)- or (3, 4)-2chains that trigger path completions is each at most 2q · (6q2 + 2q)
(the product of the maximum size of P3 with the maximum size of P2/P4); or,
e.g., the number of (1, 2)-2chains triggered by a pending query (3,+, ·) is at most
2q · (6q2 + 2q) (the product of the maximum size of P3 with the maximum size of
P2), and so forth.
4.4.2 Properties of the Second Experiment
In this section, we will define a set of bad events that may occur in G2. We
will refer to executions of G2 where these events do not occur as good executions.
Later on, we will establish some properties of these good executions. In particular,
we will prove that the simulator does not abort and runs in polynomial time in good
executions of G2.
Notation. Before we define the bad events, we introduce some notation and defi-
nitions.
Queries and 2chains. The central notion for reasoning about the simulator is
the notion of 2chain, that we develop below.
Definition 1. A permutation query is a triple (i, δ, z) where 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, δ ∈ {+,−}
and z ∈ {0, 1}n. We call i the position of the query, δ the direction of the query,
and the pair (i, δ) the type of the query.
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Definition 2. A cipher query is a triple (δ, k, z) where δ ∈ {+,−} and k, z ∈ {0, 1}n.
We call δ the direction and k the key of the cipher query.
Definition 3. A permutation query (i, δ, z) is table-defined if P δi (z) 6= ⊥, and table-
undefined otherwise. Similarly, a cipher query (δ, k, z) is table-defined if T δ(k, z) 6=
⊥, and table-undefined otherwise.
For permutation queries, we sometimes omit i and δ when they are clear from
the context and simply say that xi, resp. yi, is table-(un)defined to mean that
(i,+, xi), resp. (i,−, yi), is table-(un)defined.
Note that if (i,+, xi) is table-defined and Pi(xi) = yi, then necessarily (i,−, yi)
is also table-defined and P−1i (yi) = xi. Indeed, tables Pi and P
−1
i are only modified
in procedure Assign, where existing entries are never overwritten due to the check
at line 58. Thus the two tables always encode a partial permutation and its inverse,
i.e., Pi(xi) = yi if and only if P
−1
i (yi) = xi. Hence, we often say that a triple
(i, xi, yi) is table-defined as a shorthand to mean that both (i,+, xi) and (i,−, yi)
are table-defined with Pi(xi) = yi and P
−1
i (yi) = xi.
Similarly, if a cipher query (+, k, x) is table-defined and T (k, x) = y, then
necessarily (−, k, y) is table-defined and T−1(k, y) = x. Indeed, these tables are
only modified by calls to Enc/Dec, and always according to the IC tape ic, hence
these two tables always encode a partial cipher and its inverse, i.e. T (k, x) = y
if and only if T−1(k, y) = x. Hence, we often say that a triple (k, x, y) is table-
defined as a shorthand to mean that both (+, k, x) and (−, k, y) are table-defined
with T (k, x) = y and T−1(k, y) = x.
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Definition 4 (2chain). An inner 2chain is a tuple (i, i + 1, yi, xi+1, k) such that
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, yi, xi+1 ∈ {0, 1}n, and k = yi ⊕ xi+1. A (5,1)-2chain is a tuple
(5, 1, y5, x1, k) such that y5, x1, k ∈ {0, 1}n. A (i, i + 1)-2chain refers either to an
inner or a (5, 1)-2chain, and is denoted generically (i, i+1, yi, xi+1, k), i ∈ {1, . . . , 5},
the second element i+1 being taken mod 5. We call (i, i+1) the type of the 2chain.
Remark 4.2. Note that for a 2chain of type (i, i + 1) with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, given yi
and xi+1, there is a unique key k such that (i, i + 1, yi, xi+1, k) is a 2chain (hence
k is “redundant” in the notation), while for a 2chain of type (5, 1), the key might
be arbitrary. This convention allows to have a unified notation independently of the
type of the 2chain. See also Remark 4.3 below.
Definition 5. An inner 2chain (i, i + 1, yi, xi+1, k) is said table-defined if both
(i,−, yi) and (i+1,+, xi+1) are table-defined permutation queries, and table-undefined
otherwise. A (5,1)-2chain (5, 1, y5, x1, k) is said table-defined if both (5,−, y5) and
(1,+, x1) are table-defined permutation queries and T (k, x1) = y5, and table-undefined
otherwise.
Remark 4.3. Our definitions above ensure that whether a tuple (i, i+ 1, yi, xi+1, k)




fact that a 2chain is table-defined or not depends on these tables.
Definition 6 (endpoints). Let C = (i, i + 1, yi, xi+1, k) be a table-defined 2chain.
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The right endpoint of C, denoted r(C) is defined as
r(C) = Pi+1(xi+1)⊕ k if i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5}
= T−1(k, P5(x5)) if i = 4 and (−, k, P5(x5)) is table-defined
= ⊥ if i = 4 and (−, k, P5(x5)) is table-undefined.
The left endpoint of C, denoted `(C) is defined as
`(C) = P−1i (yi)⊕ k if i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}
= T (k, P−11 (y1)) if i = 1 and (+, k, P
−1
1 (y1)) is table-defined
= ⊥ if i = 1 and (+, k, P−11 (y1)) is table-undefined.
We say that an endpoint is dummy when it is equal to ⊥, and non-dummy
otherwise. Hence, only the right endpoint of a 2chain of type (4, 5) or the left
endpoint of a 2chain of type (1, 2) might be dummy.
When this is clear from the context, we sometimes identify the right and left
(non-dummy) endpoints of an (i, i+1)-2chain C with the corresponding permutation
queries (i + 2,+, r(C)) and (i − 1,−, `(C)). In particular, when we say that r(C),
resp. `(C) is table-defined, this implicitly means that it is non-dummy and the
corresponding permutation query is table-defined. More importantly, when we say
that one of the endpoints of C is table-undefined, we also implicitly mean that it
is non-dummy. (Hence, an endpoint must be either dummy, or table-undefined, or
table-defined).
Definition 7. A complete path with key k is a 5-tuple of table-defined permutation
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queries ((1, x1, y1), . . . , (5, x5, y5)) such that
yi ⊕ xi+1 = k for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and T (k, x1) = y5. (4.3)
The five table-defined queries (i, xi, yi) and the five table-defined 2chains (i, i +
1, yi, xi+1, k), i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, are said to belong to the complete path.
When a 2chain C belongs to a complete path, we sometimes simply say that C
is complete. Note that if a 2chain C is complete, then r(C) and `(C) are non-dummy
and table-defined. We also have the following simple but important observation.
Lemma 4.4. In any execution of G2, any 2chain belongs to at most one complete
path.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that tables Pi/P
−1
i always encode a partial
permutation and that tables T/T−1 always encode a partial cipher.
Query Cycles. When the distinguisher makes a permutations query (i, δ, z)
which is already table-defined, the simulator returns the answer immediately. The
definition below introduces some vocabulary related to what happens within the sim-
ulator when the distinguisher makes a permutation query which is table-undefined.
Definition 8 (query cycle). A query cycle is the period of execution between when
the distinguisher issues a permutation query (i0, δ0, z0) which is table-undefined and
when the answer to this query is returned by the simulator. We call (i0, δ0, z0) the
initiating query of the query cycle.
A query cycle is called an (i, i+1)-query cycle if the initiating query is of type
(i− 1,−) or (i+ 2,+) (see Lemma 4.5 (a) and Table 4.1).
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The portion of the query cycle consisting of calls to FindNewPaths at line 8 is
called the detection phase of the query cycle; the portion of the query cycle consisting
of calls to ReadTape at line 9 and to AdaptPath at line 10 is called the completion
phase of the query cycle.
During a query cycle, we say that a permutation query (i, δ, z) is pending (or
simply that z is pending when i and δ are clear from the context) if it is appended
by the simulator to list Pending at line 7, 30, or 48. We say that a 2chain C =
(i, i + 1, yi, xi+1, k) is triggered if the simulator appends C to the list Triggered at
line 27 or 45.
The lemma below gives some basic properties of query cycles that will be used
throughout the indifferentiability proof. Part (a) justifies the name “(i, i+ 1)-query
cycle”.
Lemma 4.5. During an (i, i+ 1)-query cycle whose initiating query was (i0, δ0, z0),
the following properties always hold:
(a) Only 2chains of type (i, i+ 1) are triggered.
(b) Only permutations queries of type (i− 1,−) or (i+ 2,+) are pending.
(c) Any 2chain that is triggered was table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle.
(d) At the end of the detection phase, any pending query is either the initiating
query, or the endpoint of a triggered 2chain.
(e) If a 2chain C is triggered during the query cycle, and the simulator does not
abort, then C is complete at the end of the query cycle.
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Proof. The proof of (a) and (b) proceeds by inspection of the pseudocode: note
that calls to FindNewPaths(i − 1,−, ·) can only add 2chains of type (i, i + 1) to
Triggered and permutations queries of type (i + 2,+) to Pending, whereas calls to
FindNewPaths(i + 2,+, ·) can only add 2chains of type (i, i + 1) to Triggered and
permutations queries of type (i − 1,−) to Pending. Hence, if the initiating query
is of type (i − 1,−) or (i + 2,+), only 2chains of type (i, i + 1) will ever be added
to Triggered, and only permutation queries of type (i− 1,−) or (i + 2,+) will ever
be added to Pending. The proof of (c) also follows easily from inspection of the
pseudocode. The sole subtlety is to note that for a (5, 1)-query cycle (where calls
to FindNewPaths are of the form (2,+, ·) and (4,−, ·)), for a (5, 1)-2chain to be
triggered one must obviously have x1 ∈ P1 and y5 ∈ P−15 , but also T (k, x1) = y5
since otherwise the call to Check(k, x1, y5) would return false. The proof of (d) is
also immediate, since for a permutation query to be added to Pending, it must be
either the initiating query, or computed at line 28 or line 46 as the endpoint of a
triggered 2chain. Finally, the proof of (e) follows from the fact that, assuming the
simulator does not abort, all values computed during the call to AdaptPath(C) form
a complete path to which C obviously belongs.
The following lemma analyzes how tables T/T−1 are modified during a query
cycle and will be helpful for the proof.
Lemma 4.6. In any execution of G2, the following properties hold:
(a) During a (1, 2)-query cycle, tables T/T−1 are only modified during the detection
phase by calls to Enc(·, ·) resulting from calls to Prev(1, ·, ·) at line 28.
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(b) During a (2, 3)-query cycle, tables T/T−1 are only modified during the comple-
tion phase by calls to Enc(·, ·) resulting from calls to Prev(1, ·, ·) at line 55.
(c) During a (3, 4)-query cycle, tables T/T−1 are only modified during the comple-
tion phase by calls to Dec(·, ·) resulting from calls to Next(5, ·, ·) at line 53.
(d) During a (4, 5)-query cycle, tables T/T−1 are only modified during the detection
phase by calls to Dec(·, ·) resulting from calls to Next(5, ·, ·) at line 46.
(e) During a (5, 1)-query cycle, tables T/T−1 are not modified.
Proof. This follows by inspection of the pseudocode. The only non-trivial point
concerns (1, 2)-, resp. (4, 5)-query cycles, since Prev(1, ·, ·), resp. Next(5, ·, ·) are
also called during the completion phase, but a moment of thinking should make it
clear that they are always called with arguments (x1, k), resp. (y5, k) which were
previously used during the detection phase, so that this cannot modify tables T/T−1
any more.
We also introduce the following helper lemma.
Lemma 4.7. Consider any execution of G2. Assume that two table-defined (i, i+1)-
2chains C = (i, i+1, yi, xi+1, k) and C
′ = (i, i+1, y′i, x
′
i+1, k
′) have the same key and
a common non-dummy endpoint, i.e., are such that k = k′ and r(C) = r(C ′) 6= ⊥
or `(C) = `(C ′) 6= ⊥. Then C = C ′.
Proof. We show the result for the case where k = k′ and r(C) = r(C ′), the case
where `(C) = `(C ′) is similar. Consider first the case where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5}. By






i+1 since Pi+1 always encodes a partial permutation. It follows that yi =
xi+1 ⊕ k = x′i+1 ⊕ k′ = y′i if i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and yi = T (k, xi+1) = T (k′, x′i+1) = y′i if
i = 5, and hence C = C ′. Consider now the case i = 4, and let C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k)
and C ′ = (4, 5, y′4, x
′
5, k
′). By assumption, r(C) = r(C ′) 6= ⊥. Then, by definition
of the right endpoint, P5(x5) = T (k, r(C)) = T (k
′, r(C ′)) = P5(x
′
5), which implies
that x5 = x
′
5 since P5 always encodes a partial permutation. It follows that y4 =
x5 ⊕ k = x′5 ⊕ k′ = y′4 and hence C = C ′.
Bad Events. We now define some bad events that may happen during an execution
of G2.
Definition 9. Consider a permutation query (i0, δ0, z0) or a cipher query (δ0, k0, z0)
made by the distinguisher. Let H′ be the multiset of all n-bit strings appearing
in the list of table-defined permutation or cipher queries and of all keys and non-
dummy endpoints of any table-defined 2chain when the query occurs. That is, write
the list of all table-defined permutation queries (i, xi, yi), all table-defined cipher
queries (δ, k, z), all keys and non-dummy endpoints of all table-defined 2chains, and
count each n-bit string as many times as it appears in this list. Then we define the
“history” with respect to a permutation query (i0, δ0, z0) made by the distinguisher
as the multiset
H := H′ ∪ {z0},
and the “history” with respect to a cipher query (δ0, k0, z0) made by the distinguisher
as the multiset
H := H′ ∪ {k0, z0}.
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When we talk of the history with respect to a query cycle, we mean the history
with respect to its initiating permutation query.
Remark 4.8. The sets in the above definition are time-dependent and do not include
the values added to the tables during the query cycle or due to the distinguisher’s
cipher query (except z0 for a permutation query and k0 and z0 for a cipher query).
Note also that keys and non-dummy endpoints of table-defined 2chains can always be
expressed as the xor of at most three n-bit values appearing in the list of table-defined
permutation of cipher queries, so that strictly speaking the set H′ could consist of
these values only. However, the current definition of the history simplifies the dis-
cussion along the proof.
Definition 10. Given a query cycle, we denote P the multiset of random values
read by ReadTape on tapes (p1, p
−1
1 , . . . , p5, p
−1
5 ) in the current query cycle. Given
a query cycle or a distinguisher’s cipher query, we denote C the multiset of random
values read by Enc and Dec on tapes ic or ic−1.8
We note that P and C are multisets because two randomly sampled values might
turn out to be equal. However, this is unlikely to occur (and it is a “bad event” as
defined below).
Definition 11. Let H⊕i be the set of values equal to the exclusive-or of exactly
i distinct elements in H, and let H⊕0 := {0}. The sets P⊕i and C⊕i are defined
similarly.9
8For a query cycle, these Enc/Dec queries are made by the simulator, while for a distinguisher’s
cipher query, a single call to Enc or Dec is made by the distinguisher.
9Since H, P, and C are multisets, two distinct elements may be equal.
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Definition 12. BadPerm is the event that the exclusive-or of i distinct elements of
P equals the exclusive-or of j distinct elements of H, i.e. P⊕i∩H⊕j 6= ∅, with i ≥ 1,
j ≥ 0, and i+ j ≤ 8.
Definition 13. BadIC is the event that the exclusive-or of i distinct elements of C
equals the exclusive-or of j distinct elements of H, i.e. C⊕i ∩ H⊕j 6= ∅, with i ≥ 1,
j ≥ 0, and i+ j ≤ 2.
Note that P⊕i and C⊕i are random sets built from values read from tapes
(p1, p
−1
1 , . . . , p5, p
−1
5 ) and ic/ic
−1 respectively, while H⊕j is fixed and determined by
the history H.
We have used a coarse definition for the bad events, which is easy to remember
and convenient to use. It is possible to refine the definition and further reduce the
probability of bad events.
Definition 14 (Good Executions). An execution of G2 is said to be good if neither
BadPerm nor BadIC occurs in the execution.
The Simulator Does not Abort in Good Executions. Our goal in this section
is to prove that during a good execution of G2, the simulator never aborts. This
is a two-step process: we first show that this holds under a natural assumption on
query cycles (namely, that they are safe, see definition below); then we show that
all query cycles are indeed safe.
Definition 15 (safe query cycle). A query cycle is said to be safe if for any 2chain
C triggered during the query cycle, both endpoints of C were dummy or table-
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undefined10 at the beginning of the query cycle.
Informally, the assumption that a query cycle is safe is more or less equivalent
to the assumption that at the beginning of the query cycle, no incomplete path of
length 3 exists (but we do not need to formalize this further).
As just explained, our first step will be to prove that the simulator does not
abort during a safe query cycle. The simulator can only abort in procedure Assign
which is only called during the completion phase. Moreover, this completion phase
can be split into two sub-phases: first, the simulator calls ReadTape(i, δ, z) for each
pending query (i, δ, z), and then it calls AdaptPath(C) for each triggered 2chain C.
We will consider each sub-phase in turn, showing that for a safe query cycle, the
simulator aborts in neither of them.
Consider a query cycle during which a 2chain C is triggered. By Lemma 4.5 (c),
C must be table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle, hence, by definition of
the history H, any endpoint of C which was non-dummy at the beginning of the
query cycle is in H. The following lemma clarifies the situation in case a triggered
2chain has a dummy endpoint at the beginning of the query cycle.
Lemma 4.9. In any execution of G2, if a 2chain triggered during a query cycle had
a dummy endpoint at the beginning of the query cycle, then this endpoint is non-
dummy when the completion phase starts and moreover it is in C, the set of values
read on tapes ic or ic−1 during the query cycle.
10Recall that when we say that an endpoint is table-undefined, this implicitly means it is non-
dummy.
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Proof. Recall that only the right, resp. left endpoint of a (4, 5)-, resp. (1, 2)-
2chain can be dummy. We consider the case of the right endpoint of a triggered
(4, 5)-2chain, the other case follows by symmetry. A table-defined (4, 5)-2chain
C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k) can be triggered either during a call to FindNewPaths(3,−, ·) or
to FindNewPaths(1,+, ·) in a (4, 5)-query cycle. We first consider the case where
it is triggered during a call to FindNewPaths(3,−, ·). Inspection of the pseudocode
then shows that right after C has been triggered, a call to Dec(k, y5) resulting
from a call to Next(5, y5, k) at line 46 will make C’s right endpoint non-dummy,
and moreover r(C) = ic−1(k, y5) ∈ C. Next, we consider the case where a (4, 5)-
2chain C was triggered during a call to FindNewPaths(1,+, ·). Note that during a
call to FindNewPaths(1,+, x1), the simulator triggers a table-defined 2chain C =
(4, 5, y4, x5, k) only if Check(k, x1, y5), where y5 = P5(x5), is true, which can never be
if r(C) = ⊥. This implies that C had a non-dummy right endpoint at the beginning
of the query cycle. This is because by Lemma 4.6, we know that in a (4, 5)-query
cycle the entries in tables T/T−1 are modified only during the detection phase by
calls to Dec(·, ·) resulting from calls to Next(5, ·, ·) at line 46. By inspection of the
pseudocode, this call occurs right after a (4, 5)-2chain C ′ has been triggered. If this
call changed the right endpoint of C from dummy to non-dummy, we have C = C ′ by
Lemma 4.7 since C and C ′ share a key and a non-dummy endpoint and C ′ will not
be triggered again in the query cycle by the check at line 20 in the pseudocode.
We are now ready to prove that for a safe query cycle, the simulator does not
abort during the calls to ReadTape.
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Lemma 4.10. Consider a safe query cycle in a good execution of G2. Then the
simulator does not abort during the calls to ReadTape occurring during the query
cycle.
Proof. Let τ0 denote the beginning of the query cycle. Assume towards a contradic-
tion that the simulator aborts in a call to ReadTape during a safe (i, i + 1)-query
cycle. By Lemma 4.5 (b), ReadTape can only be called for permutation queries
of type (i − 1,−) or (i + 2,+). Assume that the simulator aborts in a call to
ReadTape(i + 2,+, xi+2) (the case of a call to ReadTape(i − 1,−, yi−1) is similar).
This means that we have either xi+2 ∈ Pi+2 or pi+2(xi+2) ∈ P−1i+2 (where pi+2 is
the random permutation tape) when the call occurs. Assume first that xi+2 ∈ Pi+2
when the call to ReadTape occurs. We first show that xi+2 is table-undefined (i.e.,
xi+2 /∈ Pi+2) just before the completion phase starts. Procedure ReadTape is only
called on pending queries, hence, by Lemma 4.5 (d), xi+2 is either the initiating
query, or the endpoint of some triggered 2chain. If this is the initiating query, then
it was table-undefined at τ0 (otherwise the simulator would have returned immedi-
ately), and since permutation tables are not modified by the detection phase, it is
still table-undefined when the completion phase starts. If this is the endpoint of a
triggered 2chain C, then, by the assumption that the query cycle is safe, this end-
point was either dummy or table-undefined at τ0. If it was table-undefined at τ0, then
xi+2 is still table-undefined when the completion phase starts since permutation ta-
bles are not modified by the detection phase. Otherwise, if it was dummy at τ0, then
by Lemma 4.9, xi+2 = r(C) is non-dummy when the completion phase starts and is
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in C. If xi+2 is table-defined when the completion phase starts, then it was already
table-defined at τ0, so that C∩H 6= ∅ and BadIC happens, contradicting the assump-
tion that the execution is good. In all cases, we see that xi+2 is table-undefined just
before the completion phase starts. Hence, if xi+2 ∈ Pi+2 when the call to ReadTape
occurs, this can only be due to another call to ReadTape(i+ 2,+, xi+2) in the same
query cycle. Yet this is impossible since any permutation query is added at most
once to Pending in a given query cycle due to the checks at lines 29 and 47. Assume
now that pi+2(xi+2) ∈ P−1i+2 when the call to ReadTape occurs. If pi+2(xi+2) ∈ P−1i+2
at the beginning of the query cycle, then pi+2(xi+2) ∈ P ∩ H and BadPerm occurs.
Otherwise, this can only happen due to another call to ReadTape(i+ 2,+, x′i+2) in
the same query cycle, where x′i+2 6= xi+2 since any permutation query is added at
most once to Pending in a given query cycle. But again this is impossible since pi+2
encodes a permutation, so that x′i+2 6= xi+2 implies pi+2(x′i+2) 6= pi+2(xi+2). Hence,
the simulator does not abort in a call to ReadTape.
Now that we proved that during a safe query cycle, the simulator does not
abort during calls to ReadTape, we know that it will try to “adapt” each triggered
2chain C by calling AdaptPath(C). The lemma below shows that the values used
in the “adaptation” call to Assign when completing a 2chain are random in some
precise sense.
Lemma 4.11. Consider a safe (i, i+ 1)-query cycle in a good execution of G2. Let
C = (i, i + 1, yi, xi+1, k) be a triggered 2chain, and assume that AdaptPath(C) is
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called during the completion phase.11 Consider the resulting call to Assign(i+ 3,
xi+3, yi+3)
12 at line 56. Then
• if i 6= 3, xi+3 = pi+2(r(C))⊕ k where pi+2(r(C)) ∈ P and k ∈ H;
• if i = 3, xi+3 = x1 = ic−1(k, p5(r(C))) ∈ C;
• if i 6= 2, yi+3 = p−1i−1(`(C))⊕ k where p−1i−1(`(C)) ∈ P and k ∈ H;
• if i = 2, yi+3 = y5 = ic(k, p−11 (`(C))) ∈ C.
Proof. We only prove the result for xi+3, the result for yi+3 follows by symmetry. For
the case i 6= 3, the expression of xi+3 follows directly from the fact that the simulator
does not abort during the calls to ReadTape (Lemma 4.10) and inspection of the
pseudocode. Note that k is the key of C which is table-defined at the beginning
of the query cycle (since it is triggered), hence by definition k ∈ H. Consider now
the case i = 3, i.e., the completion of a (3, 4)-2chain C = (3, 4, y3, x4, k) during a
(3, 4)-query cycle. By Lemma 4.10, the simulator does not abort during the call to
Assign(5, x5, y5) resulting from the call to ReadTape(5,+, x5), where x5 = P4(x4)⊕k
and y5 = p5(x5) ∈ P . Hence, when the call to AdaptPath(C) occurs, by inspection
of the pseudocode, a call to Next(5, y5, k) occurs at line 53, resulting in a call to
Dec(k, y5). We argue that the cipher query (−, k, y5) is table-undefined when this call
occurs. If it is table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle, then by definition
y5 ∈ H, so that P ∩ H 6= ∅ and BadPerm occurs, contradicting the assumption
11The only reason why this call might not occur is because the simulator aborts before the call,
which we cannot assume does not happen at this point of the proof.
12We denote the third argument yi+3 rather than yi−2 for clarity.
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that the execution is good. If y5 is table-undefined when the query cycle begins,
but table-defined when the call to AdaptPath(C) occurs, then, since by Lemma 4.6,
tables T/T−1 are not modified during the detection phase in a (3, 4)-query cycle,
this can only be due to a call to AdaptPath(C ′) for another triggered 2chain C ′
which caused a call to Dec(k, y5). But this would mean that C and C
′ have the
same key and r(C) = r(C ′) = y5 6= ⊥, which by Lemma 4.7 implies C = C ′, which
is impossible since a 2chain is triggered at most once in a query cycle because of
the checks at lines 20 and 38. Hence, (−, k, y5) is table-undefined when the call to
Dec(k, y5) occurs and hence x1 = ic
−1(k, y5) ∈ C.
We are now ready to prove that the simulator does not abort during the calls
to AdaptPath in a safe query cycle.
Lemma 4.12. Consider a safe query cycle in a good execution of G2. Then the
simulator does not abort during the calls to AdaptPath occurring during the query
cycle.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that the simulator aborts in a call to AdaptPath
during a safe (i, i+1)-query cycle. Let C = (i, i+1, yi, xi+1, k) be the corresponding
2chain. Consider the resulting call to Assign(i+ 3, xi+3, yi+3). The simulator aborts
only if xi+3 ∈ Pi+3 or if yi+3 ∈ P−1i+3. Let us consider the case where xi+3 ∈ Pi+3
when Assign(i + 3, xi+3, yi+3) is called (the case where yi+3 ∈ P−1i+3 is similar). We
distinguish the case i 6= 3 and i = 3.
Consider first the case i 6= 3. Then, by Lemma 4.11, we have xi+3 = pi+2(xi+2)⊕
k, where xi+2 = r(C), pi+2(xi+2) ∈ P , and k ∈ H. If xi+3 ∈ Pi+3 at the be-
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ginning of the query cycle, then by definition xi+3 ∈ H, so that P ∩ H⊕2 6= ∅,
which means BadPerm occurs. If xi+3 /∈ Pi+3 at the beginning of the query cy-
cle, xi+3 ∈ Pi+3 before the call to Assign(i + 3, xi+3, yi+3) only due to another
call to AdaptPath(C ′) for a distinct 2chain C ′ = (i, i + 1, y′i, x
′
i+1, k
′) and a result-




i+3 = xi+3. By Lemma 4.11, we have
x′i+3 = pi+2(x
′
i+2)⊕ k′, where x′i+2 = r(C ′). Hence, x′i+3 = xi+3 implies
pi+2(xi+2)⊕ pi+2(x′i+2) = k ⊕ k′. (4.4)
Observe that we cannot have xi+2 = x
′
i+2 (i.e., r(C) = r(C
′)), as otherwise
k = pi+2(xi+2)⊕ x3 = pi+2(x′i+2)⊕ x′3 = k′
which by Lemma 4.7 implies C = C ′; but this is impossible since a 2chain is triggered
at most once in a query cycle because of the checks at lines 20 and 38. Hence,
xi+2 6= x′i+2 and Eq. (4.4) implies that P⊕2 ∩H⊕2 6= ∅, i.e., BadPerm occurs.
Consider now the case i = 3, i.e., we are in a (3,4)-query cycle, the 2chain
for which AdaptPath is called is C = (3, 4, y3, x4, k) and the resulting assignment
is Assign(1, x1, y1). Then, by Lemma 4.11, we have x1 = ic
−1(k, y5) ∈ C, where
y5 = p5(r(C)). If x1 ∈ P1 at the beginning of the query cycle, then by definition
x1 ∈ H, so that C ∩ H 6= ∅, which means BadIC occurs. If x1 /∈ P1 at the beginning
of the query cycle, x1 ∈ P1 before the call to Assign(1, x1, y1) only due to another
call to AdaptPath(C ′) for a distinct 2chain C ′ = (3, 4, y′3, x
′
4, k
′) and a resulting call




1 = x1. By Lemma 4.11, we have x
′
1 = ic
−1(k′, y′5) ∈ C,
where y′5 = p5(r(C
′)). Hence, x′1 = x1 implies
ic−1(k, y5) = ic
−1(k′, y′5). (4.5)
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Observe that we cannot have (k, y5) = (k
′, y′5) since this would imply r(C) =





′), which by Lemma 4.7 would imply C = C ′; but this
is impossible since a 2chain is triggered at most once in a query cycle. Hence,
(k, y5) 6= (k′, y′5) and Eq. (4.5) implies that C⊕2 ∩H⊕0 6= ∅, i.e., BadIC occurs.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.13. In a good execution of G2, the simulator does not abort during a safe
query cycle.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 4.10 and 4.12 since the simulator can only
abort during calls to ReadTape and AdaptPath.
It remains now to show that all query cycles in a good execution are safe.
The key observation for this is that the simulator ensures that, at the end of the
completion phase, any table-defined 2chain with a table-defined endpoint (one can
think of it as a “3chain”) necessarily belongs to a complete path as per Definition 7.
We show that this property is preserved by any distinguisher’s cipher query (a direct
consequence of Lemma 4.14) and by any query cycle (Lemmas 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17),
and deduce that this holds at the beginning of any query cycle (Lemma 4.19). We
also show that a 2chain which is complete at the beginning of a query cycle cannot
be triggered (Lemma 4.21). From this we are able to deduce that any query cycle
is safe.
The lemma below says that a cipher query made by the distinguisher cannot
switch the state of a 2chain from table-undefined to table-defined, nor switch an
endpoint from dummy to table-defined.
124
Lemma 4.14. Consider a cipher query made by the distinguisher in a good execution
of G2 that modifies tables T/T
−1. Let C be a 2chain. Then the following two
properties hold:
(a) If C is table-undefined before the query, then C is still table-undefined after the
query has been answered.
(b) If C is table-defined and one of its endpoints is dummy before the query and non-
dummy after the query has been answered, then this endpoint is table-undefined
after the query has been answered.
Proof. We first prove (a). The result is obvious for an (i, i + 1)-2chain for i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4} since whether such a 2chain is table-defined or not is independent from
tables T/T−1. So we only need to consider (5, 1)-2chains. Assume towards a contra-
diction that this is false, i.e., there exists a (5, 1)-2chain C = (5, 1, y5, x1, k) which
is table-undefined just before the query and table-defined just after the query has




5 are not modified by the query, this
necessarily means that (1,+, x1) and (5,−, y5) are table-defined before the query,
T (k, x1) = ⊥ before the query, and T (k, x1) = y5 after the query. Thus, the distin-
guisher’s cipher query was necessarily an encryption query (k, x1) or a decryption
query (k, y5), and in both cases we see that the random value read from ic was in H,
which means C ∩ H 6= ∅ and BadIC happens, a contradiction with the assumption
that the execution is good.
We then prove (b). We prove it in the case of the right endpoint of a (4, 5)-
2chain (the case of the left endpoint of a (1, 2)-2chain follows by symmetry). Let
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C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k) be a table-defined (4, 5)-2chain, let y5 = P5(x5), and assume
that C’s right endpoint is dummy before the cipher query and table-defined after the
query has been answered. Then T−1(k, y5) = ⊥ before the query, and after the query
T−1(k, y5) = x1 where (1,+, x1) is table-defined. Thus, the distinguisher’s cipher
query was necessarily an encryption query (k, x1) or a decryption query (k, y5),
and in both cases we see that the random value read from ic was in H, which
means C ∩H 6= ∅ and BadIC happens, a contradiction with the assumption that the
execution is good.
Lemmas 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 below say, informally, that if a new “3chain”
(i.e., a table-defined 2chain with at least one table-defined endpoint) is created
during a query cycle, then it is necessarily complete at the end of the query cycle.
Unfortunately, the only way to prove this important result seems to be through a
delicate case analysis. Since there are many ways to “create a 3chain”, we phrase it
in three distinct lemmas depending on the state of the 2chain at the beginning of the
query cycle. In the three lemmas, we say that “a complete path has been triggered”
if any of the five 2chains belonging to the complete path has been triggered. Note
also that the three lemmas assume a safe query cycle, which by Lemma 4.13 implies
that the simulator does not abort, which by Lemma 4.5 (e) implies that any triggered
2chain is complete at the end of the query cycle.
Lemma 4.15. Consider a safe query cycle in a good execution of G2. Let C be a
2chain which is table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle and such that one
of its endpoints is dummy at the beginning of the query cycle and non-dummy at the
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end of the query cycle. Then, at the end of the query cycle, C belongs to a complete
path which was triggered during the query cycle.
Proof. We consider the case of the right endpoint of a (4, 5)-2chain. The case of the
left endpoint of a (1, 2)-2chain follows by symmetry. Let τ0 denote the beginning of
the query cycle and τ1 denote its end. Let C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k) be a (4, 5)-2chain such
that r(C) = ⊥ at τ0 and r(C) = x1 6= ⊥ at τ1. Let y5 = P5(x5). This means that
T−1(k, y5) = ⊥ at τ0 and T−1(k, y5) = x1 at τ1. We consider the five possibilities for
the type of query cycle.
• Case of a (1, 2)- or (2, 3)-query cycle. By Lemma 4.6, the simulator only calls
Enc during such query cycles. This means that y5 = ic(k, x1) must have been
read during the query cycle, and since y5 ∈ H, C ∩ H 6= ∅ and BadIC occurs,
contradicting the assumption that the execution is good.
• Case of a (3, 4)-query cycle. By Lemma 4.6, the simulator only calls Dec dur-
ing the completion phase in this case. Moreover, it is easy to check from
the pseudocode that the call Dec(k, y5) can only occur during the call to
AdaptPath(D), where D = (3, 4, y3, x4, k) with x4 = P
−1
4 (y4) and y3 = x4⊕ k.
By Lemma 4.5 (e), D is necessarily complete at τ1, and it is easy to check that
C belongs to the same complete path as D at τ1.
• Case of a (4, 5)-query cycle. By Lemma 4.6, the simulator only calls Dec
during the detection phase in this case. Moreover, it is easy to check from the
pseudocode that the call to Dec(k, y5) can only occur just after C has been
triggered. Hence, by Lemma 4.5 (e), C is necessarily complete at τ1.
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• Case of a (5, 1)-query cycle. By Lemma 4.6, tables T/T−1 are not modified
during a (5, 1)-query cycle. Hence, r(C) cannot become non-dummy during
the query cycle.
Lemma 4.16. Consider a safe query cycle in a good execution of G2. Let C be
a 2chain which is table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle and such that
one of the endpoints of C is table-undefined at the beginning of the query cycle and
table-defined at the end of the query cycle. Then, at the end of the query cycle, C
belongs to a complete path which was triggered during the query cycle.
Proof. Assume that the query cycle we consider is an (i, i + 1)-query cycle. Let τ0
denote the beginning of the query cycle and τ1 denote its end. We consider each
possible type for the 2chain C.
Case of an (i, i+1)-2chain C = (i, i+1, yi, xi+1, k). We consider the case where
this is the right endpoint of C which goes from non-dummy and table-undefined to
table-defined during the query cycle (the case of the left endpoint follows by symme-
try). Since r(C) is non-dummy and table-undefined at τ0, necessarily (i+2,+, r(C))
became pending during the query cycle (otherwise it would still be table-undefined at
τ1). Since C is table-defined at τ0, C was necessarily triggered (either during the call
to FindNewPaths(i+2,+, r(C)), or during the call the FindNewPaths(i−1,−, `(C))
which then made r(C) pending). Hence, by Lemma 4.5 (e), C is complete at τ1.
Case of an (i+1, i+2)-2chain C = (i+1, i+2, yi+1, xi+2, k). First, note that since
Pi/P
−1
i are not modified during the query cycle, the left endpoint of C cannot go
from non-dummy and table-undefined to table-defined during the query cycle, hence
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this is necessarily the right endpoint of C which does. Since r(C) is non-dummy at
τ0, then by definition xi+3 := r(C) is in H. The only way xi+3 can become table-
defined during the query cycle is because of a call to Assign(i + 3, x′i+3, y
′
i+3) with
x′i+3 = xi+3 resulting from a call to AdaptPath(C




has been triggered during the query cycle. By Lemma 4.11, if i 6= 3 we have
x′i+3 = pi+2(r(C
′))⊕k′ where k′ ∈ H and pi+2(r(C ′)) is read during the query cycle,
so that P ∩ H⊕2 6= ∅ and BadPerm happens, whereas if i = 3 then x′i+3 = x′1 =
ic−1(k′, p5(r(C
′))) is read during the query cycle, so that C ∩ H 6= ∅ and BadIC
happens. In all cases this contradicts the assumption that the execution is good.
Case of an (i + 2, i + 3)-2chain C = (i + 2, i + 3, yi+2, xi+3, k). First, note
that since Pi+1/P
−1
i+1 are not modified during the query cycle, the left endpoint
of C cannot go from non-dummy and table-undefined to table-defined during the
query cycle, hence this is necessarily the right endpoint of C which does. Note that
since xi+4 = xi−1 := r(C) is non-dummy at τ0, by definition xi−1 ∈ H. The only
way xi−1 can become table-defined during the (i, i + 1)-query cycle is because of a
call to Assign(i− 1, p−1i−1(yi−1), yi−1) with xi−1 = p−1i−1(yi−1) resulting from a call to
ReadTape(i− 1,−, yi−1). This implies that P ∩H 6= ∅ and hence BadPerm occurs,
contradicting the assumption that the execution is good.
Other cases. The case of an (i− 2, i− 1)-, resp. of an (i− 1, i)-2chain, can be
deduced by symmetry from the case of an (i+2, i+3)-, resp. (i+1, i+2)-2chain.
Lemma 4.17. Consider a safe query cycle in a good execution of G2. Let C be a
2chain such that
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(i) at the beginning of the query cycle, C is table-undefined;
(ii) at the end of the query cycle, C is table-defined and at least one of its two
endpoints is table-defined.
Then, at the end of the query cycle, C belongs to a complete path which was triggered
during the query cycle.
Proof. Assume that the query cycle we consider is an (i, i + 1)-query cycle. Let τ0
denote the beginning of the query cycle and τ1 denote its end. We consider each
possible type for the 2chain C.





are not modified during an (i, i+1)-query cycle, and moreover tables T/T−1 are not
modified during a (5, 1)-query cycle by Lemma 4.6, C cannot be table-undefined
before the query cycle and table-defined after, hence this case is impossible.
Case of an (i+ 1, i+ 2)-2chain C = (i+ 1, i+ 2, yi+1, xi+2, k). First, note that
since tables Pi+1/P
−1
i+1 are not modified during the query cycle, yi+1 must necessarily
be table-defined at τ0 (so that in particular yi+1 ∈ H) for C to be table-defined at
τ1.
We start by showing that xi+2 was necessarily table-undefined at τ0. This is
clear for i 6= 4 (i.e., when C is an inner 2chain) since otherwise C would be table-
defined already at τ0. If i = 4, i.e., we are considering a (4, 5)-query cycle and a
(5, 1)-2chain C = (5, 1, y5, x1, k), and if x1 is already table-defined at τ0, then C
could become table-defined because of an assignment to T/T−1 due to a simulator
call to Next(k, y5) at line 46. Yet this would mean that x1 = ic
−1(k, y5), so that
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C ∩ H 6= ∅ and BadIC occurs, contradicting the assumption that the execution is
good. In all cases, we see that xi+2 was necessarily table-undefined at τ0.
We now distinguish two cases depending on which endpoint of C is table-
defined at τ1. Assume first that this is the left endpoint, and let yi be the value
of `(C) at τ1. Since tables Pi/P
−1
i are not modified during the query cycle, yi was
already table-defined at τ0. Let xi+1 = P
−1
i+1(yi+1) and D = (i, i+1, yi, xi+1, k). Then
D was table-defined at τ0, its right endpoint was either dummy or equal to xi+2 and
hence table-undefined at τ0, and at τ1 its right endpoint is table-defined since C
is table-defined. Hence, by Lemmas 4.15 and 4.16, D belongs to a complete path
which was triggered during the query cycle, and it is easy to check that C belongs
to the same complete path as D at τ1.
Assume now that this is the right endpoint of C which is table-defined at τ1 and
let xi+3 denote the value of r(C) at τ1. Since xi+2 was table-undefined at τ0 and we
are considering an (i, i+ 1)-query cycle, xi+2 necessarily became pending during the
query cycle and a call to Assign(i+2, xi+2, pi+2(xi+2)) occurred. By Lemma 4.5 (d),
xi+2 is either the initiating query, in which case it is in H by definition, or the
endpoint of some triggered (i, i+ 1)-2chain D, in which case it is in H by definition
if r(D) is non-dummy at τ0, or in C if r(D) is dummy at τ0 by Lemma 4.9, which
might only happen when i = 4. We now distinguish three sub-cases depending on i:
• Case i ∈ {1, 2, 5}. Then C is neither a (4, 5)- nor a (5, 1)-2chain and its
right endpoint is given by xi+3 = pi+2(xi+2) ⊕ k = pi+2(xi+2) ⊕ yi+1 ⊕ xi+2.
Assume first that xi+3 was table-defined already at τ0, so that xi+3 ∈ H.
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Then pi+2(xi+2) = xi+3 ⊕ k = xi+3 ⊕ yi+1 ⊕ xi+2 ∈ H⊕3 (recall xi+2 ∈ H if
i 6= 4), so P ∩ H⊕3 6= ∅ and BadPerm happens, contradicting the assumption
that the execution is good. Assume now that xi+3 was table-undefined at
τ0. Then it can only become table-defined during the query cycle because




i+3 = xi+3 resulting from a call to
AdaptPath(C ′), where C ′ = (i, i+ 1, y′i, x
′
i+1, k
′) has been triggered during the
query cycle. By Lemma 4.11, we have x′i+3 = pi+2(x
′
i+2) ⊕ k′ where x′i+2 =
r(C ′), pi+2(x
′
i+2) ∈ P and k′ ∈ H. Hence, x′i+3 = xi+3 implies that
pi+2(xi+2)⊕ pi+2(x′i+2) = yi+1 ⊕ xi+2 ⊕ k′.




k = pi+2(xi+2)⊕ x3 = pi+2(x′i+2)⊕ x′3 = k′,
and one can check that C belongs to the same completed path as C ′ at τ1.
• Case i = 3. Then we are considering a (3, 4)-query cycle, C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k)
is a (4, 5)-2chain, and its right endpoint at τ1 is given by xi+3 = x1 =
T−1(k, p5(x5)). If (−, k, p5(x5)) was already table-defined at τ0, then p5(x5) ∈
H, so that P ∩ H 6= ∅ and BadPerm occurs. Hence, (−, k, p5(x5)) became
table-defined during the query cycle, which implies that at τ1, the 2chain
(5, 1, p5(x5), x1, k) belongs to a complete path that was triggered during the
query cycle. It is easy to see that C belongs to the same complete path at τ1.
• Case i = 4. Then we are considering a (4, 5)-query cycle, C = (5, 1, y5, x1, k) is
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a (5, 1)-2chain, and its right endpoint at τ1 is given by xi+3 = x2 = p1(x1)⊕k.
If (−, k, y5) was table-undefined at τ0, then it became table-defined during the
query cycle, so that C belongs to a complete path which was triggered during
the query cycle. Assume now that T−1(k, y5) = x1 already at τ0, so that
k ∈ H. First, if x2 was table-defined already at τ0, then since p1(x1) = x2 ⊕ k
one has P ∩ H⊕2 6= ∅ and BadPerm happens. If x2 was table-undefined at
τ0, then it can only become table-defined during the query cycle because of a




2 = x2 resulting from a call to AdaptPath(C
′),
where C ′ = (4, 5, y′4, x
′
5, k
′) has been triggered during the query cycle. By
Lemma 4.11, we have x′2 = p1(x
′
1) ⊕ k′ where x′1 = r(C ′), p1(x′1) ∈ P , and
k′ ∈ H. Hence, x′2 = x2 implies that p1(x1) ⊕ p1(x′1) = k ⊕ k′. Hence, if
x1 6= x′1, then P⊕2 ∩H⊕2 6= ∅ and BadPerm occurs, whereas if x1 = x′1, then
k = p1(x1)⊕ x2 = p1(x′1)⊕ x′2 = k′,
and one can check that C belongs to the same completed path as C ′ at τ1.
Case of an (i + 2, i + 3)-2chain C = (i + 2, i + 3, yi+2, xi+3, k). Assume first
that the left endpoint of C is table-defined at τ1 and denote yi+1 the value of `(C)
at τ1. Since tables Pi+1/P
−1
i+1 are not modified during an (i, i + 1)-query cycle, yi+1
is already table-defined at τ0. Let D = (i + 1, i + 2, yi+1, xi+2, k), where xi+2 is the
value of P−1i+2(yi+2) at τ1. Then either D is table-undefined at τ0 and table-defined
with a table-defined right endpoint at τ1, in which case we can apply the conclusion
of the analysis for the case of a (i+ 1, i+ 2)-2chain, or D is table-defined at τ0 and
its right endpoint becomes table-defined during the query cycle, in which case we
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can apply Lemmas 4.15 and 4.16. In all cases we can conclude that D belongs to
a complete path that was triggered during the query cycle, and C belongs to the
same complete path.
Assume now that the right endpoint of C is table-defined at τ1 and denote
xi−1 = xi+4 the value of r(C) at τ1. Since C is table-defined at τ1, let yi+3 =
Pi+3(xi+3).
• Case i ∈ {1, 4, 5}. Then C is neither a (4, 5)- nor a (5, 1)-2chain, hence its
right endpoint is given by xi−1 = yi+3 ⊕ k with k = yi+2 ⊕ xi+3, hence
yi+2 ⊕ xi+3 ⊕ yi+3 ⊕ xi−1 = 0. (4.6)
We will distinguish all possible sub-cases depending on whether yi+2, xi+3,
yi+3, and xi−1 are table-defined at τ0 (in which case these values are in H) or
not. Note that at least one of the two queries yi+2 and xi+3 is table-undefined
at τ0 since C is table-undefined at τ0 (and is not a (5, 1)-2chain). Moreover,
since we are considering an (i, i+ 1)-query cycle, then
– if yi+2 was table-undefined at τ0, then it became table-defined because of
a call to ReadTape(2,+, xi+2) and hence yi+2 = pi+2(xi+2) ∈ P
– if xi+3 (and hence yi+3) was table-undefined at τ0, then it became table-
defined because of a call to Assign(i+3, xi+3, yi+3) resulting from a call to
AdaptPath(C ′), where C ′ = (i, i+1, y′i, x
′
i+1, k
′) has been triggered during
the query cycle. By Lemma 4.11, we have xi+3 = pi+2(x
′




i+2) ∈ P , and k′ ∈ H, and yi+3 = p−1i−1(y′i−1) ⊕ k′
where y′i−1 = `(C
′) and p−1i−1(y
′
i−1) ∈ P .
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– if xi−1 was table-undefined at τ0, then it became table-defined because of
a call to ReadTape(i− 1,−, y′′i−1) and xi−1 = p−1i−1(y′′i−1) ∈ P .
Finally, note that for the case where xi+3 was table-undefined at τ0, we can
assume that xi+2 6= x′i+2 since otherwise k = k′ and C belongs to the same
completed path as C ′ at τ1. Hence, we see that when substituting all pos-
sibilities in (4.6) with at least yi+2 or xi+3 table-undefined at τ0 (and hence
involving an element of P), we always end up with an equation implying that
P⊕i ∩ H⊕j 6= ∅ for some 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and some 0 ≤ j ≤ 4. (For example, if we
assume yi+2, xi+3, yi+3, and xi−1 were all table-undefined at τ0, then Eq. (4.6)
yields
pi+2(xi+2)⊕ pi+2(x′i+2)⊕ p−1i−1(y′i−1)⊕ p−1i−1(y′′i−1) = 0
and hence P⊕4∩H⊕0 6= ∅ or P⊕2∩H⊕0 6= ∅ depending on whether y′i−1 = y′′i−1.)
• Case i = 2. Then we are considering a (2, 3)-query cycle, C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k) is
a (4, 5)-2chain, and its right endpoint at τ1 is given by xi+4 = x1 = T
−1(k, y5)
where y5 = P5(x5). If the cipher query (−, k, y5) was table-undefined at τ0,
then it became table-defined during the query cycle, which implies that at
τ1, the 2chain (5, 1, y5, x1, k) belongs to a complete path which was triggered
during the query cycle, and C belongs to the same complete path. Assume now
that the cipher query (k, x1, y5) was table-defined at τ0, so that k, x1, y5 ∈ H.
If x1 was table-undefined at τ0, then it became table-defined because of a call
ReadTape(1,−, y1) and hence x1 = p−11 (y1) ∈ P , so that P ∩ H 6= ∅ and
BadPerm happens. Since C is table-undefined at τ0, either y4 or x5 is table-
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undefined at τ0. Assume first that x5 was table-undefined at τ0. Then it could
only become table-defined because of a call to Assign(5, x5, y5) resulting from
a call to AdaptPath(C ′) where C ′ was triggered during the query cycle. By
Lemma 4.11, we have y5 ∈ C, so that C ∩ H 6= ∅ and BadIC happens. Finally,
assume that x5 was table-defined but y4 was table-undefined at τ0 (hence
x5 ∈ H). Then y4 became table-defined because of a call ReadTape(4,+, x4)
and hence y4 = p4(x4) ∈ P . Moreover, y4 = x5 ⊕ k where k ∈ H, so that
P ∩H⊕2 6= ∅ and BadPerm happens.
• Case i = 3. Then we are considering a (3, 4)-query cycle, C = (5, 1, y5, x1, k)
is a (5, 1)-2chain, and its right endpoint at τ1 is given by xi+4 = x2 = y1 ⊕ k
where y1 = P1(x1). If the cipher query (k, x1, y5) was table-undefined at τ0,
then it became table-defined during the query cycle, which implies that at
τ1, C belongs to a complete path which was triggered during the query cycle.
Assume now that the cipher query (k, x1, y5) was table-defined at τ0, so that
k, x1, y5 ∈ H. Assume that y5 was table-undefined at τ0. Then y5 became
table-defined because of a call ReadTape(5,+, x5), so that y5 = p5(x5) ∈ P .
Hence, P ∩ H 6= ∅ and BadPerm occurs. Assume now that x1 was table-
undefined at τ0. Then it could only become table-defined because of a call to
Assign(1, x1, y1) resulting from a call to AdaptPath(C
′) where C ′ was triggered
during the query cycle. By Lemma 4.11, we have x1 ∈ C, so that C ∩ H 6= ∅
and BadIC happens. Finally, assume that y1 was table-defined and x2 was
table-undefined at τ0 (so that y1 ∈ H). Then x2 became table-defined because
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of a call ReadTape(2,−, y2) and hence x2 = p−12 (y2) ∈ P . Since x2 = y1 ⊕ k
where k ∈ H, one has P ∩H⊕2 6= ∅ and hence BadPerm occurs.
Other cases. The case of an (i− 2, i− 1)-, resp. of an (i− 1, i)-2chain, can be
deduced by symmetry from the case of an (i+2, i+3)-, resp. (i+1, i+2)-2chain.
We collect Lemmas 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 under a simpler to grasp form in the
following lemma. To state it more concisely, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 16. We say a 2chain C induces a 3chain if C is table-defined and at
least one of its endpoints is table-defined.
Lemma 4.18. Consider a safe query cycle in a good execution of G2. Let C be
a 2chain which does not induce a 3chain at the beginning of the query cycle, but
induces a 3chain at the end of the query cycle. Then, at the end of the query cycle,
C belongs to a complete path which was triggered during the query cycle.
Proof. Note that the opposite of “C induces a 3chain” is “C is table-defined and
its two endpoints are dummy or table-undefined, or C is table-undefined”. Hence,
Lemmas 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 cover all possible cases for a 2chain to not induce a
3chain at the beginning of a query cycle and induce a 3chain at the end of the query
cycle.
Lemma 4.19. Consider a point τ0 in a good execution of G2 which is either the
beginning of a query cycle, or the end of the execution, and assume that all query
cycles until τ0 were safe. Let C be a 2chain. Assume that at τ0, C is table-defined
and at least one of the two endpoints of C is table-defined. Then C is complete at τ0.
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Proof. Let C be a 2chain which induces a 3chain at time τ0. Recall that the opposite
of “C induces a 3chain” is “C is table-defined and its two endpoints are dummy or
table-undefined, or C is table-undefined”. Consider the last assignment to a table
before C induces a 3chain. This cannot have been an assignment to T/T−1 due to a
cipher query made by the distinguisher; indeed, by Lemma 4.14, such an assignment
cannot switch the state of a 2chain from table-undefined to table-defined, nor switch
the endpoint of a table-defined 2chain from dummy to table-defined (and besides
it is clear that it cannot switch an endpoint from non-dummy and table-undefined
to table-defined). Hence this can only have happened during a query cycle that
occurred before τ0 (which was necessarily safe by the assumption that all query
cycles before τ0 were safe). But according to Lemma 4.18, at the end of this previous
query cycle, C was complete, and this still holds at τ0, hence the result.
Lemma 4.20. Consider an (i, i+ 1)-query cycle with initiating query (i0, δ0, z0) in
a good execution of G2. Then, if an (i, i+ 1)-2chain C is triggered during the query
cycle, there exists a sequence of (i, i+ 1)-2chains (C0, . . . , Ct) triggered in this order
such that Ct = C, and, at the beginning of the query cycle, either z0 = r(C0) 6= ⊥,
`(C1) = `(C0) 6= ⊥, r(C2) = r(C1) 6= ⊥, etc. if (i0, δ0) = (i + 2,+), or `(C0) = z0,
r(C1) = r(C0) 6= ⊥, `(C2) = `(C1) 6= ⊥, etc. if (i0, δ0) = (i− 1,−).
Proof. The existence of sequence (C0, . . . , Ct) follows easily from inspection of the
pseudocode, the only non-trivial point to prove is that all endpoints are already
non-dummy at the beginning of the query cycle. But this follows easily from the
fact that a (4, 5)-2chain with a right dummy endpoint cannot be triggered by a call
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to FindNewPaths(1,+, ·), and that if a (4, 5)-2chain C with a right dummy endpoint
is triggered by a call to FindNewPaths(3,−, ·), then by Lemma 4.9 its right endpoint
r(C) is in C after getting non-dummy, and hence the call to FindNewPaths(1,+, r(C))
cannot trigger any 2chain unless C ∩H 6= ∅ and BadIC happens (and from the sym-
metric observations for a (1, 2)-2chain with a dummy left endpoint).
Lemma 4.21. Consider an (i, i + 1)-query cycle in a good execution of G2, and
assume that all previous query cycles were safe. Then, if an (i, i + 1)-2chain is
complete at the beginning of the query cycle, it cannot be triggered during this query
cycle.
Proof. Let τ0 denote the beginning of the query cycle. Assume towards a contradic-
tion that there exists an (i, i+ 1)-2chain C which is complete at τ0 and is triggered
during the query cycle. Denote (i0, δ0, z0) the initiating query of the query cycle. By
Lemma 4.20, there exists a sequence (C0, . . . , Ct) of triggered (i, i+ 1)-2chains such
that Ct = C, and, at τ0, either r(C0) = z0, `(C1) = `(C0) 6= ⊥, r(C2) = r(C1) 6= ⊥,
etc., or `(C0) = z0, r(C1) = r(C0) 6= ⊥, `(C2) = `(C1) 6= ⊥, etc.
By definition of a complete 2chain, r(C) and `(C) are non-dummy and table-
defined at τ0. Hence, since C and Ct−1 have a common endpoint, Ct−1 is table-
defined and has one of its endpoints non-dummy and table-defined at τ0, which by
Lemma 4.19 and the assumption that all previous query cycles were safe implies
that Ct−1 is complete at τ0. By recursion, it follows that C0 is complete at τ0, which
implies that the initiating query was table-defined at the beginning of the query
cycle, a contradiction.
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Lemma 4.22. Any query cycle in a good execution of G2 is safe.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that this is false, and consider the first query
cycle for which this does not hold (hence, all previous query cycles were safe). This
means that during this query cycle, some 2chain C was triggered such that C had a
table-defined endpoint at the beginning of the query cycle. Since by Lemma 4.5 (c),
any triggered 2chain is table-defined before the query cycle begins, this implies that
when the query cycle started, C was table-defined and one of its endpoints was
table-defined. But according to Lemma 4.19, since all previous query cycles were
safe, this implies that C was complete at the beginning of the query cycle, which
by Lemma 4.21 (and again the fact that all previous query cycles were safe) implies
that C cannot be triggered during the query cycle, a contradiction.
The main result of this section now follows easily.
Lemma 4.23. The simulator does not abort in a good execution of G2.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4.13 and 4.22.
4.4.3 Efficiency of the Simulator
Now that we have established that the simulator does not abort in good exe-
cutions of G2, we prove that it also runs in polynomial time. For this, we first prove
some additional properties of good executions of G2 below.
2chain-Cycles. In this section, we establish some additional properties of good
executions in G2 which would be used to prove the efficiency of the simulator in
140
Section 4.4.3. From Lemma 4.22, we know that any query cycle in a good execution
is safe i.e. for any 2chain C triggered during the query cycle, the endpoints of the
2chain were either table-undefined or dummy at the beginning of the query cycle.
Moreover, by Lemma 4.23, we know that the simulator does not abort in a good
execution. Throughout this section, when we assume a good execution of G2, we
will use these properties (without repeatedly referring to Lemmas 4.22 or 4.23).
We start by introducing the notions of 2cycle and 4cycle.
Definition 17 (2cycle). We say that 2 table-defined 2chains





(j)), j ∈ {1, 2},
form a 2cycle at (i, i+ 1) if they satisfy the following conditions:
1. C1 6= C2;
2. both endpoints of 2chains C1 and C2 are non-dummy and table-undefined;
3. `(C1) = `(C2), r(C2) = r(C1).
Definition 18 (4cycle). We say that 4 table-defined 2chains





(j)), j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
form a 4cycle at (i, i+ 1) if they satisfy the following conditions:
1. C1 6= C2, C2 6= C3, C3 6= C4, C4 6= C1;
2. both endpoints of all 2chains are non-dummy and table-undefined;
3. `(C1) = `(C2), r(C2) = r(C3), `(C3) = `(C4), r(C4) = r(C1).
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In the next few lemmas, we will prove that at the end of a query cycle in a
good execution of G2, there does not exist a 2cycle or a 4cycle at (4, 5) or at (1, 2).
In order to do so, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.24. In a good execution of G2, if (k, x1, y5) was table-defined through a
cipher query made by the simulator in a query cycle, then the 2chain (5, 1, y5, x1, k)
is table-defined at the end of the query cycle.
Proof. Let us consider the various query cycles in which the cipher query (k, x1, y5)
could get table-defined.
(1, 2)-query cycle. By Lemma 4.6, a query (k, x1, y5) can get table-defined
only through a call Prev(1, x1, k) at line 28. Then, by inspection of the pseudocode
(5,−, y5) is a pending query (where Prev(1, x1, k) returned y5 by assumption) and
(1, x1, y1) is table-defined. Since the simulator does not abort in a good execution of
G2 by Lemma 4.23, the pending query is table-defined at the end of the query cycle.
Hence, the 2chain (5, 1, y5, x1, k) is table-defined at the end of the query cycle.
(2, 3)-query cycle. By Lemma 4.6, a query (k, x1, y5) can get table-defined
only through a call Prev(1, x1, k) at line 55. Since the simulator does not abort in
a good execution of G2 by Lemma 4.23, the call to Assign(5, ·, y5) leads to (5, ·, y5)
being table-defined. One can also verify from the pseudocode that Prev(1, x1, k) is
called at line 55 in a (2, 3)-query cycle only if (1, x1, y1) is table-defined through
ReadTape(1,−, y1). Hence, the 2chain (5, 1, y5, x1, k) is table-defined at the end of
the query cycle.
The cases of a (3, 4) and (4, 5)-query cycles are analogous to those of (2, 3)
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and (1, 2)-query cycles respectively. In a (5, 1)-query cycle, by Lemma 4.6, no new
cipher queries get table-defined. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 4.25. In a good execution of G2, a 4cycle never appears at (4, 5) or at (1, 2)
due to a cipher query by the distinguisher.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that in a good execution of G2 table-defined





(j)) due to a ci-
pher query made by the distinguisher i.e. the 4cycle did not appear before the
distinguisher’s cipher query.
We know that in a cipher query (δ, k, z) by the distinguisher, the only query
that can get table-defined is the cipher query itself. If (δ, k, z) was already table-
defined, then no new queries are table-defined and the 4cycle cannot be formed.
If (δ, k, z) was not table-defined, for the 4cycle to appear, the cipher query should
cause (−, k(j), y(j)5 ) to be table-defined for some j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Without loss of
generality assume the new cipher query defined T−1(k(1), y
(1)
5 ) to be x
(1)
1 which leads








Let (δ, k, z) = (−, k(1), y(1)5 ). Then, x
(1)
1 ∈ C. Since the cipher query was the
only one to be defined, we have x
(4)




1 = 0 where
x
(1)
1 ∈ C and x
(4)
1 ∈ H. On the other hand if (δ, k, z) = (+, k(1), x
(1)
1 ). Then, y
(1)
5 ∈ C.
Since C1 is table-defined, we also have y
(1)







5 ∈ C and y
(1)
5 ∈ H. Thus BadIC occurs regardless of the direction of the
cipher query as we have H⊕1 ∩ C⊕1 6= ∅.
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By a similar case analysis, we can show that in a good execution of G2 a 4cycle
does not appear at (1, 2) due to a cipher query made by the distinguisher.
Lemma 4.26. If a 4cycle does not exist at (4, 5) or at (1, 2) at the beginning of a
query cycle in a good execution of G2, then a 4cycle does not exist at (4, 5) or at
(1, 2) at the end of that query cycle.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that at the end of a query cycle in a good






(j)). Let r(Cj) = T
−1(k(j), y
(j)
5 ) = x
(j)
1 6=⊥ since the endpoints of
the 2chains are not dummy by Definition 18. By the same definition, the endpoint
queries of the 2chains are table-undefined.
For the analysis, we consider the last assignment that was made to the tables
immediately after which the 4cycle appeared and distinguish between two cases:
(i) the last assignment was a cipher query getting table-defined and (ii) the last
assignment was due to a permutation query getting table-defined.
Let us consider case (i) first. Here, we assume that the 4cycle formed imme-




5 ) that was table-defined in the query cycle
for some j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. (Note that in a query cycle, cipher queries are made only






table-defined. In particular, this implies that the right endpoint of Cj r(Cj) = x
(j)
1
is table-defined which contradicts our assumption.
Next we consider case (ii) i.e. the 4cycle formed immediately after a permuta-








5 ) was table-defined. Then, for j = 1, 2, 3, 4 the
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cipher queries T (k(j), x
(j)
1 ) = y
(j)
5 are table-defined at the beginning of the query cy-
cle; this is because if they are table-defined during the query cycle, by Lemma 4.24,
the right endpoint r(Cj) gets table-defined contradicting our assumption that a 4cy-
cle is formed in the query cycle. Hence, we have k(j) ∈ H, x(j)1 ∈ H, y
(j)
5 ∈ H for
j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.
(1, 2)-query cycle. Let the query cycle be a (1, 2)-query cycle. From Table 4.1,
we can see that in a (1, 2)-query cycle, calls to ReadTape(5,−, ·) occur and adapta-
tion occurs at position 4.




4 ) were table-
defined at the beginning of the query cycle. Then, for the 4cycle to form at least one




5 ) should get table-defined. In a (1, 2)-query cycle, this
occurs in a call to ReadTape(5,−, y(j)5 ) which implies that x
(j)
5 ∈ P . Now, for the




4 ⊕k(j). As observed above, k(j) ∈ H and by assumption
that all permutation queries at position 4 for the 2chains Cj are table-defined at
the beginning of the query cycle, we also have y
(j)
4 ∈ H. This implies that BadPerm
occurs since x
(j)




4 ⊕ k(j) ∈ H⊕2. So, P ∩H⊕2 6= ∅.















′) for some triggered 2chain C ′ =
(1, 2, y′1, x
′
2, k




If `(C ′) = y
(j)
5 , then at the end of the query cycle Cj will be such that its
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right endpoint r(Cj) = x
′
1 which is table-defined. Hence, this will not form a
4cycle. If `(C ′) 6= y(j)5 , let `(C ′) = y′5. Then, Assign(5, x′5, y′5) occurs in a call
to ReadTape(5,−, y′5) leading to x′5 ∈ P . Now, we have





In the equation above, k′, k(j) ∈ H, x′5 ∈ P . Also, x
(j)





5 ) could either be table-defined as a left endpoint of a 2chain C̃ 6= C ′
in the current query cycle or could have been table-defined at the beginning of the
query cycle itself. Then, either H⊕3∩P 6= ∅ or H⊕2∩P⊕2 6= ∅ and BadPerm occurs.
(2, 3)-query cycle. Let the query cycle be a (2, 3)-query cycle. From Table 4.1,
we can see that in a (2, 3)-query cycle, calls to ReadTape(4,+, ·) occur and adapta-
tion occurs at position 5.





table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle. Then, for the 4cycle to form at




5 ) should get table-defined. In a (2, 3)-query




5 ) called during AdaptPath(C
′) for
some triggered chain C ′ in the query cycle. Since all query cycles in a good execution
are safe by Lemma 4.22, using Lemma 4.11, we have y
(j)
5 ∈ C. However, since all




5 ) are table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle,
we have y
(j)
5 ∈ H. Hence, H ∩ C 6= ∅ and BadIC occurs. So for a 4cycle to form in




5 ) need to be table-defined at
the beginning of the query cycle.






is table-defined during the query cycle. In a (2, 3)-query cycle, this occurs in a call
to ReadTape(4,+, x
(j)
4 ) which implies that y
(j)










5 ) need to be table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle. We also





5 ⊕ k(j) ∈ H⊕2 implying that P ∩H⊕2 6= ∅ and hence BadPerm occurs.
(3, 4)-query cycle. Let the query cycle be a (3, 4)-query cycle. From Table 4.1,
we can see that in a (3, 4)-query cycle, calls to ReadTape(5,+, ·) occur and no new
permutation query of the form (4, ·, ·) gets table-defined. So for a 4cycle to form in




4 ) need to be table-defined at









5 ) gets table-defined in a (3, 4)-query cycle,
then y
(j)




5 ) are table-defined at
the beginning of the query cycle, we have y
(j)
5 ∈ H. Hence, H∩P 6= ∅ and BadPerm
occurs.
(4, 5)-query cycle. In a (4, 5)-query cycle, no new permutation queries of the
form (4, ·, ·) and (5, ·, ·) get table-defined. As shown before, in a good execution of
G2, all cipher queries of the 4cycle need to be table-defined at the beginning of the
query cycle. Hence, a 4cycle at (4, 5) cannot form in a (4, 5)-query cycle.
(5, 1)-query cycle. Let the query cycle be a (5, 1)-query cycle. From Table 4.1,
we can see that in a (5, 1)-query cycle, calls to ReadTape(4,−, ·) occur and no new
permutation query of the form (5, ·, ·) gets table-defined.
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4 ) needs to be table-defined during the query cycle. Without loss of gen-
erality, let j = 1. Then, x
(1)





4 ) is table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle or not.




4 ) is table-defined at the be-
ginning of the query cycle. By definition of a 4cycle, `(C1) = `(C2). Hence,
x
(1)
4 ⊕ k(1) = x
(2)
4 ⊕ k(2). Here, k(1), k(2), x
(2)
4 ∈ H and x
(1)
4 ∈ P . Hence, P ∩H⊕3 6= ∅
and BadPerm occurs.




4 ) is table-defined during the query
cycle. Then, x
(2)
4 ∈ P since we are considering a (5, 1)-query cycle. By definition









5 and C1 = C2 which violates the definition of a 4cycle (Definition 18).
Then, `(C1) = `(C2) implies that
x
(1)











4 . Hence, P⊕2 ∩ H⊕2 6= ∅
and BadPerm occurs.
By a similar case analysis, we can show that in a good execution of G2 a 4cycle
does not appear at (1, 2) at the end of a query cycle.
Lemma 4.27. At the end of a query cycle in a good execution of G2, a 4cycle does
not exist at (4, 5) or at (1, 2).
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemmas 4.25 and 4.26.
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Corollary 4.28. At the end of a query cycle in a good execution of G2, there does
not exist a 2cycle at (4, 5) or at (1, 2).
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that at the end of a query cycle in a good
execution of G2 there exists a 2cycle at (say) (4, 5) consisting of table-defined 2chains
C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k) and C
′ = (4, 5, y4, x5, k). Then, by definition of a 2cycle C and
C ′ are such that C 6= C ′, both endpoints of C and C ′ are non-dummy and table-
undefined and `(C) = `(C ′) and r(C ′) = r(C).
Then there exists a 4cycle at (4, 5) consisting of chains Cj for j = 1, . . . , 4,
where Cj = C if j = 1, 3 and Cj = C
′ if j = 2, 4. This is because we have
Cj 6= Cj+1 (where Cj+1 = C1 when j = 4) for all j since C 6= C ′. We know
that both endpoints of C and C ′ are non-dummy and table-undefined. Finally,
`(Cj) = `(Cj+1) if j = 1, 3 since `(C) = `(C
′) and r(Cj) = r(Cj+1) if j = 2, 4 since
r(C ′) = r(C). This contradicts Lemma 4.27 which says that no 4cycle appears at
(4, 5) in a good execution of G2.
Lemma 4.29. In a good execution of G2, for i ∈ {2, 4}, there do not exist two




i) such that xi ⊕ yi = x′i ⊕ y′i.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exist distinct table-defined queries




i) where i ∈ {2, 4} such that xi⊕yi = x′i⊕y′i in a good execution
of G2. We first analyze the case where i = 2. Here we distinguish between two cases:
(i) the queries were table-defined in different query cycles and (ii) the queries were
table-defined in the same query cycle.




defined in an earlier query cycle. We consider the query cycle in which (2, x2, y2)
was table-defined. Then, x′2, y
′
2 ∈ H. In the query cycle, the permutation query
(2, x2, y2) can get table-defined only in one of the following ways: (a) in a call
to ReadTape(2,+, x2) or ReadTape(2,−, y2) (b) in a call to Assign(2, x2, y2) that
occurs in AdaptPath(C) for a 2chain C triggered in the query cycle.
If (2, x2, y2) was table-defined in a call to ReadTape(2,+, x2), then we have
y2 ∈ P and x2 ∈ H. The former is due to the fact that in a good execution of
G2 all query cycles are safe by Lemma 4.22. The latter is because by inspection of
the pseudocode, we can see that ReadTape(2,+, x2) is called only when (2,+, x2)
is a pending query and by Lemma 4.5(d), (2,+, x2) is pending only if it were the
initiating query or the endpoint of a triggered 2chain. Note also that an endpoint
at position 2 cannot be dummy by definition. Hence, by definition, history H
contains all non-dummy endpoints and the initiating query. Thus, x2 ∈ H. By
a similar analysis, we can show that when (2, x2, y2) is table-defined in a call to
ReadTape(2,−, y2), we have x2 ∈ P and y2 ∈ H. Thus, if (2, x2, y2) was table-
defined in a call to ReadTape(2, ·, ·) and x2 ⊕ y2 = x′2 ⊕ y′2, we have H⊕3 ∩ P 6= ∅.
This implies that BadPerm occurs which contradicts our assumption that this is a
good execution of G2.
Next, we consider the sub-case where (2, x2, y2) is table-defined in a call to
Assign(2, x2, y2) that occurs in AdaptPath(C) for a 2chain C = (i, i + 1, yi, xi+1, k)
triggered in the query cycle. From Table 4.1, we know that 2 is an adapt position
only for a (4, 5)-query cycle. Hence, from Lemma 4.11, we can deduce that x2⊕y2 ∈
P⊕2. This is because x2 ⊕ y2 = (p1(r(C)) ⊕ k) ⊕ (p−13 (`(C)) ⊕ k) ∈ P⊕2. Then, if
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x2⊕ y2 = x′2⊕ y′2, we have P⊕2 ∩H⊕2 6= ∅. This implies that BadPerm occurs which
contradicts our assumption that this is a good execution of G2. This completes the
analysis of case (i) where we assumed that the two distinct queries were table-defined
in different query cycles.




2) are both table-defined in the
same query cycle. As observed before, a permutation query gets table-defined either
in a call to ReadPath(2, ·, ·) or in a call to AdaptPath(C) for a triggered 2chain
C. Since both queries are at position 2 and are table-defined in the same query
cycle, they are both table-defined through the same procedures i.e. either both
through calls to ReadPath or both through calls to AdaptPath. Hence, we consider




2) are table-defined through
calls to ReadPath(2,+, x2) and ReadPath(2,+, x
′
2) respectively or through calls to
ReadPath(2,−, y2) and ReadPath(2,−, y′2) respectively. (b) (2, x2, y2) and (2, x′2, y′2)





in calls to AdaptPath(C) and AdaptPath(C ′) respectively.





were table-defined through calls to ReadTape(2,+, x2) and ReadTape(2,+, x
′
2) re-
spectively, then x2, x
′
2 ∈ H and y2, y′2 ∈ P . Note that y2 6= y′2 as the two queries
are distinct and the permutation tables always encode a partial permutation. So
x2 ⊕ y2 = x′2 ⊕ y′2 implies H⊕2 ∩ P⊕2 6= ∅. Hence BadPerm occurs which contra-
dicts our assumption that this is a good execution of G2. The analogous analysis
works for the case where calls to ReadTape was of the form ReadTape(2,−, y2) and
ReadTape(2,−, y′2).
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2) were adapted in
the same query cycle. Say they were adapted in AdaptPath(C) and AdaptPath(C ′)
respectively where C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k) and C
′ = (4, 5, y′4, x
′
5, k
′) and C 6= C ′ since
the two queries are distinct. Again, by consulting Table 4.1, we can see that 2 is
an adapt position only in a (4, 5)-query cycle. By Lemma 4.11, x2 = p1(r(C)) ⊕ k
and y2 = p
−1
3 (`(C))⊕ k and similarly x′2 = p1(r(C ′))⊕ k′ and y′2 = p−13 (`(C ′))⊕ k′.
Since we are in a safe query cycle by Lemma 4.22, p1(r(C)), p1(r(C
′)), p−13 (`(C)),
p−13 (`(C
′)) ∈ P . So, if x2 ⊕ y2 = x′2 ⊕ y′2, we have
p1(r(C))⊕ p−13 (`(C)) = p1(r(C ′))⊕ p−13 (`(C ′)). (4.7)
We consider the following sub-cases here: (a) r(C) 6= r(C ′), (b) `(C) 6= `(C ′)
and (c) r(C) = r(C ′) and `(C) = `(C ′). Consider case (a) first, if r(C) 6= r(C ′),
then in Equation (4.7), we have either 0 ∈ P⊕4 or 0 ∈ P⊕2 (where the latter occurs
if `(C) = `(C ′)). Then, either P⊕4 ∩H⊕0 6= ∅ or P⊕2 ∩H⊕0 6= ∅ and in either case,
BadPerm occurs. Considering case (b) next, if `(C) 6= `(C ′), by a similar argument
as just presented in case (a), we have either P⊕4 ∩H⊕0 6= ∅ or P⊕2 ∩H⊕0 6= ∅ and
in either case, BadPerm occurs.
Finally, considering case (c), if r(C) = r(C ′) and `(C) = `(C ′), we distinguish
between two cases here: (1) the cipher queries T−1(k, x5) and T
−1(k′, x′5) are table-
defined at the beginning of the query cycle and (2) at least one of the cipher queries
is not table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle. Considering case (1), if both
cipher queries are table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle, then a 2cycle
appears at (4, 5). This is because C 6= C ′ by assumption that the two adapted
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2) are distinct, the endpoints of the 2chains are non-
dummy by assumption that the cipher queries are table-defined at the beginning
of the query cycle, the endpoints are table-undefined since query cycles in a good
execution of G2 are safe by Lemma 4.22 and finally, r(C) = r(C
′) and `(C) = `(C ′)
by assumption. This contradicts Corollary 4.28 which says that a 2cycle does not
appear at (4, 5) in a good execution of G2.
Next, we consider the case where r(C) = r(C ′) and `(C) = `(C ′) and at
least one of the cipher queries is not table-defined at the beginning of the query
cycle. If exactly one of them is not table-defined at the beginning of the query
cycle, let us assume without loss of generality that T−1(k, x5) is not table-defined
at the beginning of the query cycle and T−1(k′, x′5) is. Also, in a (4, 5)-query cycle
cipher queries are only of the form (−, ·, ·) i.e. only inverse cipher queries are made.
Then if r(C) = r(C ′), we have r(C) ∈ C and r(C ′) ∈ H. Hence BadIC occurs as
C⊕1∩H⊕1 6= ∅. On the other hand, if both cipher queries are not table-defined at the
beginning of the query cycle and if r(C) = r(C ′), we have T−1(k, x5) = T
−1(k′, x′5)
where r(C) = T−1(k, x5) ∈ C and r(C ′) = T−1(k′, x′5) ∈ C. These are distinct cipher
queries since C 6= C ′. Hence, BadIC occurs as 0 ∈ C⊕2 implying that C⊕2∩H⊕0 6= ∅.
Concluding, in a good execution of G2, there do not exist two distinct queries




i) such that xi⊕yi = x′i⊕y′i when i = 2. A similar case analysis
works for the case when i = 4.
Lemma 4.30. In a good execution of G2, for i ∈ {2, 4} there never exist four distinct
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i ) = 0. (4.8)
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that in a good execution of G2, there exist




i ) such that Eq. (4.8) holds. We analyse the case when
i = 2. The proof for the case where i = 4 proceeds similarly. Let us consider the





2 ) for some j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. Without loss of generality, let us




2 ) (i.e. j = 1) was the last query to be table-defined. Let us
consider the various query cycles in which the query could have been table-defined.
(1, 2)-query cycle and (2, 3)-query cycle. Note that no new queries of
the form (2, ·, ·) get table-defined in such query cycles. So (2, x(1)2 , y
(1)
2 ) was not
table-defined in a (1, 2) or a (2, 3)-query cycle.
(3, 4)-query cycle. By referring to Table 4.1, we can see that in a (3, 4)-query
cycle, a query at position 2 gets table-defined only through calls to ReadTape(2,−, ·).








2 ) was already table-
defined at the beginning of the query cycle or it gets table-defined in the same




2 ) by assumption). Hence, we have y
(j)
2 ∈ H for




2 ) is table-defined at the beginning
of the query cycle or (2,−, y(j)2 ) is a pending query and hence gets table-defined in
the current query cycle. By definition of history H, the initiating query, all (non-
dummy) endpoints of table-defined 2chains and table-defined permutation queries
exist in H. Combining this fact with Lemma 4.5 (d), we have y(j)2 ∈ H for all
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j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
For the case of x
(j)
2 for j = 1, . . . , 4, we can immediately deduce that x
(1)
2 ∈
P by assumption that (2, x(1)2 , y
(1)
2 ) is the last query to get table-defined (and by
assumption that we are in a good execution of G2 and all query cycles are safe by
Lemma 4.22). For x
(j)





already table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle or it gets table-defined in




2 ) by assumption). Then either x
(j)
2 ∈
H if (2, x(j)2 , y
(j)
2 ) was already table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle
or x
(j)




2 ) gets table-defined in the current query cycle through
ReadTape(2,−, y(j)2 ). (The reasoning for this is similar to prior reasoning for x
(1)
2 .)




2 ) that get





2 ) are distinct (and that H is a multiset). Then (a) if t = 1, we have
H⊕7∩P 6= ∅, (b) if t = 2, we haveH⊕6∩P⊕2 6= ∅, (c) if t = 3, we haveH⊕5∩P⊕3 6= ∅
and (d) if t = 4, we have H⊕4 ∩ P⊕4 6= ∅. This implies that BadPerm occurs which
contradicts our assumption that we are in a good execution of G2.
(4, 5)-query cycle. Again, by referring to Table 4.1, we can see that in a
(4, 5)-query cycle, a query at position 2 gets table-defined only through calls to
Assign(2, ·, ·) that occur in a procedure AdaptPath(C) for some triggered 2chain C.




2 ) was (the last of the 4 queries to be) table-defined in




2 ) that occurred in





(1)) triggered in the current query
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cycle. By Lemma 4.11, we have x
(1)





Here, we have p1(r(C1), p
−1
3 (`(C1)) ∈ P since all query cycles are safe in a good
execution of G2.




2 ) j = 2, 3, 4 to be table-defined either the
queries were table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle or they were table-




2 ) by assumption). Cor-









table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle) or x
(j)















2 ) gets table-defined in
the current query cycle).




2 ) that get table-defined in the current
query cycle (where 1 ≤ t ≤ 4). If t = 1, then (2, x(1)2 , y
(1)
2 ) is the only query to be











2 ∈ H⊕6. Thus, if Eq. (4.8) holds, P⊕2 ∩H⊕6 6= ∅ and hence
BadPerm occurs.




2 ) are the queries to



















3 (`(Cj)) and RHS is in H⊕4 by
assumption. Since p1(r(Cj), p
−1
3 (`(Cj)) ∈ P for j = 1, 2, BadPerm occurs unless
r(C1) = r(C2) and `(C1) = `(C2). If r(C1) = r(C2) and `(C1) = `(C2), then the
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LHS of Eq. (4.9) is 0. However, by Lemma 4.29, in a good execution of G2, we cannot















Hence, if Eq. (4.9) holds, BadPerm occurs since we have either P⊕4 ∩ H⊕4 6= ∅ or
P⊕2 ∩H⊕4 6= ∅.




2 ) are the queries
























p1(r(Cj)⊕ p−13 (`(Cj)). (4.11)
Since p1(r(Cj), p
−1
3 (`(Cj)) ∈ P for j = 1, 2, 3, BadPerm occurs (since we have
either P⊕6 ∩ H⊕2 6= ∅ or P⊕4 ∩ H⊕2 6= ∅ or P⊕2 ∩ H⊕2 6= ∅). This is because even
if some of the right (resp. left) endpoints of the triggered 2chains Cj are equal, the
terms p1(r(Cj)) (resp. p
−1
3 (`(Cj))) can cancel each other out in the sum on the RHS
of Eq. (4.11) only if there are even number of right (resp. left) endpoints.




2 ) for j = 1, . . . , 4 are table-defined in the current










p1(r(Cj)⊕ p−13 (`(Cj)) = 0 (4.12)
where p1(r(Cj), p
−1
3 (`(Cj)) ∈ P for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Then, BadPerm occurs (since
H⊕0 = 0) unless the p1(·) and p−13 (·) terms in Eq. (4.12) cancel with each other. For
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the terms in the sum in Eq. (4.12) to cancel out, we need 4 pairs (r1, r2), (r3, r4),
(`1, `2) and (`3, `4) such that r(Cr1) = r(Cr2), r(Cr3) = r(Cr4), `(C`1) = `(C`2) and
`(C`3) = `(C`4) where ri, `i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and ri 6= ri′ for i 6= i′, `i 6= `i′ for i 6= i′.
Note that if we have pairs (ri, ri′), (`j, `j′) such that (ri, ri′) = (`j, `j′) this









2 = p1(r(Cri))⊕ p−13 (`(Cri))⊕ p1(r(Cri′ ))⊕ p
−1
3 (`(Cri′ ))
evaluates to 0. However, this implies that in a good execution of G2 there exist two

















0 which contradicts Lemma 4.29.
Then, without loss of generality, we can assume that the 4 pairs (r1, r2), (r3, r4),
(`1, `2) and (`3, `4) are respectively (2, 3), (4, 1), (1, 2) and (3, 4) i.e. `(C1) = `(C2),
r(C2) = r(C3), `(C3) = `(C4) and r(C4) = r(C1). Recall that Cj are the triggered








2 ) made in the
procedure AdaptPath(Cj). To analyse when Eq. (4.12) can hold, we distinguish
between three cases: (i) all cipher queries T−1(k(j), y
(j)
5 ) are table-defined at the be-
ginning of the query cycle, (ii) exactly one cipher query (say) T−1(k(1), y
(1)
5 ) is table-
defined during the query cycle and (iii) more than one cipher query T−1(k(j), y
(j)
5 )
gets table-defined in the current query cycle.
In case (i), if all cipher queries T−1(k(j), y
(j)
5 ) are table-defined at the beginning
of the query cycle, then we observe that there exists a 4cycle at (4, 5). This is





2 ) are distinct, (b) the endpoints of all triggered 2chains Cj are non-dummy
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and table-undefined since the cipher queries are table-defined at the beginning of the
query cycle and since all the query cycles are safe in a good execution by Lemma 4.22
and (c) we have `(C1) = `(C2), r(C2) = r(C3), `(C3) = `(C4) and r(C4) = r(C1)
since (r1, r2), (r3, r4), (`1, `2) and (`3, `4) are respectively (2, 3), (4, 1), (1, 2) and
(3, 4). However, by Lemma 4.27, in a good execution of G2, there does not appear
a 4cycle at (4, 5). Hence, this contradicts our assumption that we are in a good
execution of G2.
In case (ii), exactly one cipher query (say) T−1(k(1), y
(1)
5 ) is table-defined during
the query cycle. By assumption, r(C1) = r(C4) and T
−1(k(4), x
(4)
5 ) is table-defined
at the beginning of the query cycle. Also, in a (4, 5)-query cycle cipher queries are
only of the form (−, ·, ·) i.e. only inverse cipher queries are made. Then, we have
r(C1) ∈ C and r(C4) ∈ H. Hence BadIC occurs as C⊕1 ∩H⊕1 6= ∅.
In case (iii), more than one cipher query T−1(k(j), y
(j)
5 ) gets table-defined in the
current query cycle. Since we have r(C2) = r(C3) and r(C4) = r(C1), without loss
of generality, it is sufficient to analyse the sub-case where both r(C4) and r(C1) get
table-defined in the current query cycle. The analysis for this sub-case plus case (ii)
above sufficiently captures all cases where more than one cipher query T−1(k(j), y
(j)
5 )
gets table-defined in the current query cycle. So, let us consider the case where both
T−1(k(1), y
(1)
5 ) and T
−1(k(4), x
(4)
5 ) get table-defined in the current query cycle. Since
r(C1) = r(C4), we have T
−1(k, x5) = T
−1(k′, x′5) where r(C1) = T
−1(k(1), x
(1)
5 ) ∈ C
and r(C4) = T
−1(k(4), x
(4)
5 ) ∈ C. These are distinct cipher queries since C1 6= C4.
Hence, BadIC occurs as 0 ∈ C⊕2 implying that C⊕2 ∩H⊕0 6= ∅.
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(5, 1)-query cycle. By referring to Table 4.1, we can see that in a (5, 1)-query
cycle, a query at position 2 gets table-defined only through calls to ReadTape(2,+, ·).








2 ) was already table-
defined at the beginning of the query cycle or it gets table-defined in the same
query cycle. Hence, we have x
(j)





2 ) is table-defined at the beginning of the query cycle or (2,+, x
(j)
2 ) is a
pending query and hence gets table-defined in the current query cycle. By defini-
tion of history H, the initiating query, all (non-dummy) endpoints of table-defined
2chains and table-defined permutation queries exist in H. Combining this fact with
Lemma 4.5 (d), we have x
(j)
2 ∈ H for all j = 1, 2, 3, 4. The rest of the analysis for
the case of a (5, 1)-query cycle proceeds analogous to that of a (3, 4)-query cycle.











i = 0 when i = 2. A similar case analysis works
for the case when i = 4.
The core of the termination argument is presented below.
Termination Proof
We now analyze the running time of the simulator in a good execution of
G2. A large part of this analysis consists in upper bounding the size of tables
T, T−1, Pi, P
−1
i . Since one always has |T | = |T−1| and |Pi| = |P−1i |, we will only
state the results for T and Pi.
Note that, during a query cycle, any triggered 2chain C can be associated
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with the query that became pending just before C was triggered and, reciprocally,
any pending query (i, δ, z), except the initiating query, can be associated with the
2chain C that was triggered just before (i, δ, z) became pending. We make these
observations formal through the following definitions.
Definition 19. During a query cycle, we say that a 2chain C is triggered by query
(i, δ, z) if it is added to Triggered during a call to FindNewPaths(i, δ, z). We say C
is an (i, δ)-triggered 2chain if it is triggered by a query of type (i, δ).
By Lemma 4.5 (b), a triggered (i, i+1)-2chain is either (i−1,−)- or (i+2,+)-
triggered. For brevity, we group four special types of triggered 2chains under a
common name.
Definition 20. A (triggered) wrapping 2chain is either
• a (4, 5)-2chain that was (1,+)-triggered,
• a (1, 2)-2chain that was (5,−)-triggered,
• a (5, 1)-2chain that was either (2,+)- or (4,−)-triggered.
Note that wrapping 2chains are exactly those for which the simulator makes
a call to procedure Check to decide whether to trigger the 2chain or not.
Definition 21. Consider a query cycle with initiating query (i0, δ0, z0) and a per-
mutation query (i, δ, z) 6= (i0, δ0, z0) which becomes pending. We call the (unique)
2chain that was triggered just before (i, δ, z) became pending the 2chain associated
with (i, δ, z).
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Note that uniqueness of the 2chain associated with a non-initiating pending
query follows easily from the checks at lines 29 and 47.
The following two lemmas will be useful in the rest of the proof.
Lemma 4.31. Consider a good execution of G2, and assume that a complete path
exists at the end of the execution. Then at most one of the five 2chains belonging to
the complete path has been triggered during the execution.
Proof. Consider a complete path Π existing at the end of the execution, and consider
the first 2chain C belonging to Π which was triggered (if any) at some point in the
execution. Since the simulator does not abort in a good execution, by Lemma 4.5 (e),
at the end of the query cycle where C is triggered, C belongs to a complete path
which must be Π by Lemma 4.4. By Lemma 4.21, this implies that neither C nor
any other 2chain belonging to Π will ever be triggered in any subsequent query
cycle.
Lemma 4.32. For i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, the number of table-defined permutation queries
(i, xi, yi) during an execution of G2 can never exceed the sum of
• the number of distinguisher’s calls to Query(i, ·, ·),
• the number of (i+ 1, i+ 2)-2chains that were (i+ 3,+)-triggered,
• the number of (i− 2, i− 1)-2chains that were (i− 3,−)-triggered,
• the number of (i + 2, i + 3)-2chains that were either (i + 1,−)- or (i + 4,+)-
triggered.
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Proof. Entries are added to Pi/P
−1
i either by a call to ReadTape during an (i+1, i+
2)- or an (i− 2, i− 1)-query cycle or by a call to AdaptPath during an (i+ 2, i+ 3)-
query cycle (see Table 4.1).
Consider first entries that were added by a call to ReadTape during an (i +
1, i + 2)- or an (i− 2, i− 1)-query cycle. Clearly, the number of such table-defined
queries cannot exceed the sum of the total number Ni,+ of queries of type (i,+)
that became pending during an (i− 2, i− 1)-query cycle and the total number Ni,−
of queries of type (i,−) that became pending during an (i + 1, i + 2)-query cycle.
Now, Ni,+ cannot exceed the sum of the total number of initiating and non-initiating
pending queries of type (i,+) over all (i−2, i−1)-query cycles. The total number of
initiating queries of type (i,+) is clearly at most the number of distinguisher’s calls
to Query(i,+, ·), while the total number of non-initiating pending queries of type
(i,+) over all (i−2, i−1)-query cycles cannot exceed the total number of (i−3,−)-
triggered 2chains (since clearly a non-initiating pending query of type (i,+) cannot
be associated with an (i,+)-triggered (i − 2, i − 1)-2chain). Similarly, Ni,− cannot
exceed the sum of the total number of distinguisher’s call to Query(i,−, ·) and the
total number of (i − 3,−)-triggered (i + 1, i + 2)-2chains. All in all, we see that
the total number of triples (i, xi, yi) that became table-defined because of a call to
ReadTape cannot exceed the sum of
• the number of distinguisher’s calls to Query(i, ·, ·),
• the number of (i+ 1, i+ 2)-2chains that were (i+ 3,+)-triggered,
• the number of (i− 2, i− 1)-2chains that were (i− 3,−)-triggered.
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Consider now a triple (i, xi, yi) which became table-defined during a call to
AdaptPath in an (i+ 2, i+ 3)-query cycle. Clearly, the total number of such triples
cannot exceed the total number of (i + 2, i + 3)-2chains that are triggered over all
(i+ 2, i+ 3)-query cycles (irrespectively of whether they are (i+ 1,−)- or (i+ 4,+)-
triggered). The result follows.
The following lemma contains the standard “bootstrapping” argument intro-
duced in [18] that has been used to prove termination of all simulators for the Feistel
and the IEM constructions since then.
Lemma 4.33. In a good execution of G2, at most q wrapping 2chains get triggered
in total.
Proof. We show that there is a one-to-one mapping from the set of triggered wrap-
ping 2chains to the set of distinguisher’s call to Enc/Dec. The lemma will follow
from the assumption that the distinguisher makes at most q cipher queries.
By inspection of the pseudocode, we see that for each triggered wrapping
2chain C, there is a triple (k, x1, y5) such that Check(k, x1, y5) was true, i.e., (k, x1, y5)
was table-defined when C was triggered. We show that this mapping is one-to-one,
i.e., no two distinct wrapping 2chains can be triggered by the same triple (k, x1, y5).
For this, note that there is exactly one 2chain of each type in {(1, 2), (4, 5), (5, 1)}
which can be triggered by a specific call Check(k, x1, y5). Hence, this is clear for two
2chains of the same type, while for two 2chains of distinct type this follows from the
fact that once a chain C of a specific type was triggered by a call to Check(k, x1, y5),
this 2chain will be complete (unless the simulator aborts) and the two other 2chains
164
of remaining types which could be triggered by the same call to Check(k, x1, y5)
belong to the same complete path as C, hence cannot be triggered by Lemma 4.21.
Hence, each triggered wrapping 2chain can be mapped to a distinct table-
defined cipher query (k, x1, y5). This cipher query became table-defined because of
call to Enc/Dec made either by the distinguisher or the simulator. It remains to
show that the corresponding call cannot have been made by the simulator. But
this follows easily from Lemma 4.6 since when the simulator makes a cipher query
which modifies T/T−1, the corresponding 2chain has already been triggered. Hence
it will be complete at the end of the query cycle and cannot be triggered again by
Lemma 4.31.
Lemma 4.34. In a good execution of G2, one always has |P3| ≤ 2q.
Proof. By Lemma 4.32, the number of table-defined permutation queries (3, x3, y3)
(and hence the size of P3) cannot exceed the sum of
• the number of distinguisher’s calls to Query(3, ·, ·),
• the number of (4, 5)-2chains that were (1,+)-triggered,
• the number of (1, 2)-2chains that were (5,−)-triggered,
• the number of (5, 1)-2chains that were either (2,+)- or (4,−)-triggered.
The number of entries of the first type is at most q by the assumption that the
distinguisher makes at most q oracle queries to each permutation. On the other
hand, note that any 2chain mentioned for the three other types are wrapping 2chains.
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Hence, by Lemma 4.33, there are at most q such entries in total, so that |P3| ≤
2q.
Lemma 4.35. In a good execution of G2, the sum of the total numbers of (3,−)-
and (5,+)-triggered 2chains, resp. of (1,−)- and (3,+)-triggered 2chains, is at most
6q2 − 2q.
Proof. Let C be a 2chain which is either (3,−)- or (5,+)-triggered during the exe-
cution. (The case of (1,−)- or (3,+)-triggered 2chains is similar by symmetry.) By
Lemma 4.5 (e), C belongs to a complete path ((1, x1, y1), . . . , (5, x5, y5)) at the end
of the execution (since the simulator does not abort), and C = (3, 4, y3, x4, k) if it
was (5,+)-triggered, whereas C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k) if it was (3,−)-triggered.
Note that when C was triggered, (5,+, x5) was necessarily table-defined or
pending. This is clear if C = (4, 5, y4, x5, k) was (3,−)-triggered since a triggered
2chain must be table-defined. If C = (3, 4, y3, x4, k) was (5,−)-triggered, then it
was necessarily during the call to FindNewPaths(5,+, x5) which implies that x5 was
pending.
We now distinguish two cases depending on how (5,+, x5) became table-
defined or pending. Assume first that this was because of a distinguisher’s call
to Query(5, ·, ·). There are at most q such calls, hence there are at most q possi-
bilities for x5. There are at most 2q possibilities for y3 by Lemma 4.34. Moreover,
for each possible pair (y3, x5), there is at most one possibility for the table-defined
query (4, x4, y4) since otherwise this would contradict Lemma 4.29 (note that one
must have x4⊕ y4 = y3⊕ x5). Hence there are at most 2q2 possibilities in that case.
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Assume now that this (5,+, x5) was a non-initiating pending query in the same
query cycle where C was triggered, or became table-defined during a previous query
cycle than the one where C was triggered and for which (5,+, x5) was neither the
initiating query nor became table-defined during the ReadTape call for the initiating




distinct from (3, 4, y3, x4, k) such that x5 = r(C
′) = y′4⊕ x′4⊕ y′3. Since we also have
x5 = y4⊕ x4⊕ y3, we obtain x4⊕ y4⊕ x′4⊕ y′4 = y3⊕ y′3. If y3 = y′3, by Lemma 4.29
we have x4 = x
′
4 and C
′ = (3, 4, y3, x4, k), which cannot be. On the other hand, for
a fixed (orderless) pair of y3 6= y′3, the (orderless) pair of (4, x4, y4) and (4, x′4, y′4) is
unique by Lemmas 4.29 and 4.30 (otherwise, one of the lemmas must be violated by





= q(2q−1) choices of y3 and y′3; for each pair




4), so there are 2 ways
to combine the queries to form two 2chains. Moreover, C ′ must either have been
completed during a previous query cycle than the one where C is triggered, or must
have been triggered before C in the same query cycle and have made x5 pending
(in which case C was triggered by (5,+, x5)). Thus each way to combine y3, y
′
3,




4) to form two 2chains corresponds to at most one (3,+)- or
(5,−)-triggered 2chain, so at most 4q2 − 2q such 2chains are triggered this way.
Combining the two cases, the number of (3,−)- or (5,+)-triggered 2chains is
at most 6q2 − 2q.
Lemma 4.36. In a good execution of G2, one always has |P2| ≤ 6q2 and |P4| ≤ 6q2.
Proof. By Lemma 4.32, the number of table-defined queries (2, x2, y2) (and hence
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the size of P2) cannot exceed the sum of
• the number of distinguisher’s calls to Query(2, ·, ·),
• the number of (3, 4)-2chains that were (5,+)-triggered,
• the number of (5, 1)-2chains that were (4,−)-triggered,
• the number of (4, 5)-2chains that were either (3,−)- or (1,+)-triggered.
There are at most q entries of the first type by the assumption that the distinguisher
makes at most q oracle queries. Note that any 2chain mentioned for the other
cases are either wrapping, (3,−)-triggered, or (5,+)-triggered 2chains. Hence, by
Lemmas 4.33 and 4.35, there are at most q+6q2−2q entries of the three other types
in total. Thus, we have |P2| ≤ q+q+6q2−2q = 6q2. Symmetrically, |P4| ≤ 6q2.
Lemma 4.37. In a good execution of G2, at most 12q
3 2chains are triggered in total.
Proof. Since the simulator does not abort in good executions by Lemma 4.23, any
triggered 2chain belongs to a complete path at the end of the execution. Moreover,
by Lemma 4.31, at most one of the five 2chains belonging to a complete path is
triggered in a good execution. Hence, there is a bijective mapping from the set of
triggered 2chains to the set of complete paths existing at the end of the execution.
Consider all (3, 4)-2chains which are table-defined at the end of the execution. Each
such 2chain belongs to at most one complete path by Lemma 4.4. Hence, the number
of complete paths at the end of the execution cannot exceed the number of table-
defined (3, 4)-2chains, which by Lemmas 4.34 and 4.36 is at most 2q ·6q2 = 12q3.
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Lemma 4.38. In a good execution of G2, we have |T | ≤ 12q3 + q.
Proof. Recall that the table T is used to maintain the cipher queries that have been
issued. In G2, no new cipher query is issued in Check called in procedure Trigger.
So the simulator issues a table-undefined cipher query only if the path containing
the cipher query has been triggered. The number of triggered paths is at most
12q3, while the distinguisher issues at most q cipher queries. Thus the number of
table-defined cipher queries is at most 12q3 + q.
Lemma 4.39. In a good execution of G2, one always has |P1| ≤ 12q3 + q and
|P5| ≤ 12q3 + q.
Proof. By Lemma 4.32, the number of table-defined queries (1, x1, y1) (and hence
the size of P1) cannot exceed the sum of the number of distinguisher’s call to
Query(1, ·, ·), which is at most q, and the total number of triggered 2chains, which
is at most 12q3 by Lemma 4.37. Therefore, the size of |P1| is at most 12q3 + q. The
same reasoning applies to |P5|.
Lemma 4.40. In good executions of G2, the simulator runs in time O(q
8) and uses
O(q3) space.
Proof. By Lemmas 4.34, 4.36 and 4.39, the total number of queries that are defined
during an execution is O(q3). In a non-aborting execution, every time Assign is
called an undefined query becomes defined. Therefore, Assign is called O(q3) times,
which implies ReadTape and AdaptPath are called O(q3) times. The aforementioned
procedures run in constant time, so the total running time of them is O(q3).
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The procedure FindNewPaths is called once for each pending query. In a non-
aborting execution, pending queries become distinct defined queries at the end of the
execution, which implies the total number of pending queries in position i is upper
bounded by |Pi| at the end of the proof. In a call to FindNewPaths(i, δ, z), each
iteration runs in constant time; the running time of the call is either |Pi−2| · |Pi−1|
or |Pi+1| · |Pi+2|13. Take the sum over the positions, the total running time of
FindNewPaths is at most 2
∑
i |Pi| · |Pi+1| · |Pi+2|, which is O(q8) by Lemmas 4.34,
4.36 and 4.39.
The tables Pi, P
−1
i , Pending and Paths have size at most O(q
3), and the local
variables use constant space. Thus the simulator uses O(q3) space in total.
Theorem 4.41. An execution of G2 is good with probability at least 1− 1022q38/2n.
Proof. If 13q3 ≥ 2n−1, the lemma trivially holds. Thus we can assume 13q3 < 2n−1
in this proof.
By Lemmas 4.34, 4.36, 4.39 and 4.38 and by Definition 5, the number of table-
defined (5, 1)-2chains is upper bounded by 12q2 + q ≤ 13q3 (since each cipher query
in T uniquely determines a (5, 1)-2chain), and the total number of table-defined
(i, i+1)-2chains for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is at most 2((12q3 +q) ·6q2 +6q2 ·2q) ≤ 180q5 (since
each pair of table-defined queries uniquely determine an (i, i + 1)-2chain). There
are at most 40q3 table-defined permutation queries and 13q3 table-defined cipher
13Here Pi−2, Pi−1, Pi+1 and Pi+2 refer to the states of the tables when FindNewPaths is called,
which is different from the previous Pi referring to the state at the end of the execution. In this
proof we will not distinguish between the states at different time points, since they are all subject
to Lemmas 4.34, 4.36 and 4.39.
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queries. By Definition 9, the size of H can be upper bounded by
3 · (13q3 + 180q5) + 2 · 40q3 + 3 · 13q3 ≤ 698q5.
Now we consider the entries of pi/p
−1
i and ic/ic
−1 that have been read, in the
same order as they are read in the execution, and compute the probability that
BadPerm or BadIC occurs when each entry is read. More precisely, we want to upper
bound the probability that:
• (cf. Definition 12) an entry read from pi/p−1i is in P⊕j ⊕H⊕` for some j, ` ≥ 0
such that j+ ` ≤ 7, where P refers to the random values that has already been
sampled from permutation tapes in the current query cycle;
• (cf. Definition 13) an entry read from ic/ic−1 is in H or in C, where C refers to
the random values that has already been sampled from the cipher tape in the
current query cycle.
We note that the bounds in Lemmas 4.34, 4.36, 4.39 and 4.38 hold as long
as no bad event has occurred in the execution (indeed, the only property of good
executions used in the proof is that “the bad events never occur”). Therefore, unless




−1) exceeds 40q3 (resp. 13q3), and the bounds on H, P and C for
good executions also hold.
Assume no bad event has occurred in the execution, and consider a call to
ReadTape in which pi(xi) is read (the case of p
−1
i is symmetric). At this point,
less than 13q3 entries of pi/p
−1
i has been read, so the value of pi(xi) is uniformly
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distributed among at least 2n − 13q3 ≥ 2n−1 values, where the inequality is due to
the assumption that 13q3 ≤ 2n−1. The total size of the sets P⊕j ⊕H⊕` for j+ ` ≤ 7
is at most (700q5)7,14 so the probability that BadPerm occurs is (700q5)7/2n−1.
Similarly, we can show the probability that BadIC occurs on a call to Enc/Dec
is at most 700q5/2n−1.
With a union bound on the at most 40q3 calls to ReadTape and 13q3 calls to




+ 13q3 · 700q
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4.4.4 Indistinguishability of the First and Second Experiments
Recall that the only difference between G1 and G2 is in procedure Check
(line 68): in G2, it does not call Enc and hence does not modify tables T/T
−1.
We say two executions of G1 and G2 are identical if every procedure call returns the
same value in the two executions. In particular, the view of the distinguisher D is
the same in the two executions, so D outputs the same value in identical executions.
Lemma 4.42. For randomly chosen tapes T = (p1, . . . , p5, ic), the probability that
the execution of G2 with T is good and that the executions of G1 and G2 with the
same tapes T are identical is at least 1− (1022q38/2n + 2704q8/2n).
Proof. The bound trivially holds if q3 > 2n−2, so we assume q3 ≤ 2n−2.
14Note that since the entries of P will be added to H after the query cycle, the total size of P






Recall that the only difference between G1 and G2 is in Check. The only side
effect of Check is that the call to Enc may add a new entry to the tables T/T−1.
The tables T/T−1 are only used in Enc, Dec and the G2-version of Check; moreover,
the answers of Enc and Dec are always consistent with the cipher encoded by ic
regardless of the state of T/T−1. Therefore, if every call to Check returns the same
value in the two executions, the two executions can never “diverge” and are identical.
Observe that a call to Check(k, x1, y5) returns different value in the two exe-
cutions only if ic(k, x1) = y5 and (k, x1) /∈ T in the execution of G2. Since the event
can be characterized in G2 only, we will compute its probability by considering a
G2-execution with random tapes. We will assume the execution of G2 is good when
computing the probability of divergence.
As discussed above, divergence would not occur if (k, x1) ∈ T at the moment
Check(k, x1, y5) is called. This implies that the cipher tape entry ic(k, x1) hasn’t
been read in the execution, since the tape ic is only read in Enc and Dec, where a
corresponding entry is immediately added to T . Therefore, the value of ic(k, x1) is
uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n \ {y | y = T (k, x) for some x}. By Lemma 4.38,
the size of T is at most 12q3 + q ≤ 13q3, so the probability that ic(k, x1) = y5 is
at most 1/(2n − 13q3). Moreover, if Check(k, x1, y5) is called multiple times and
divergence doesn’t occur in the first call, then divergence wouldn’t occur in the
subsequent calls to Check(k, x1, y5). To upper bound the probability of divergence,
we only need to consider the first call to Check with each argument.
The procedure Check is only called in FindNewPaths. It is easy to see from
Fig. 4.1 that if Check(k, x1, y5) is called, we either have k = y4 ⊕ x5 and the three
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queries (4,−, y4), (5, x5, y5) and (1,+, x1) are pending or defined, or have k = y1⊕x2
and the three queries (5,−, y5), (1, x1, y1) and (2,+, x2) are pending or defined.
Since good executions don’t abort, the pending queries are defined at the end of the
execution. By Lemmas 4.36 and 4.39, there are
(12q3 + q)2 · 6q2 + (12q3 + q)2 · 6q2 ≤ 2028q8
ways to choose three defined queries in positions (4, 5, 1) or (5, 1, 2).
With a union bound over all distinct arguments, the probability that diver-
gence occurs in the first call to Check with some argument is at most 2028q8/(2n −
13q3) ≤ 2704q8/2n, where the inequality is due to the assumption that q3 ≤ 2n−2.
With a union bound, the probability that either the execution of G2 is bad or
the executions of G1 and G2 diverge is at most
1022q38/2n + 2704q8/2n.
Lemma 4.43. We have
∆D(G1,G2) ≤ 1022q38/2n + 2704q8/2n.
Proof. Since D outputs the same value in identical executions of G1 and G2, this is
a direct corollary of Lemma 4.42.
Theorem 4.44. With an optimized implementation, the simulator runs in time
O(q5) and makes at most O(q5) queries to the cipher oracle in the simulated world
G1.
Proof. By Lemma 4.40, the simulator runs in time O(q8) and uses O(q3) space
in good executions of G2. The simulator has the same running time in identical
174
executions of G1 and G2, so by Lemma 4.42, the simulator runs in time O(q
8) with
high probability in G1.
Using a similar trick as [23], we can trade off more space for a better running
time. In particular, the simulator can be implemented to run in O(q5) time and
O(q5) space. In the following proof, we consider the running time of a G1-execution
that is identical to a good execution of G2, so we can use the bounds proved in good
executions of G2.
15 Note that the optimized simulator always has the same behavior
as the one described in the pseudocode, even in “bad” executions.
In the proof of Lemma 4.40, the running time is dominated by FindNewPaths.
We observe that it is unnecessary to check every pair of table-defined queries in
FindNewPaths. Indeed, the simulator only needs to go through defined queries in the
adjacent position, and the query in the next position is fixed and can be computed.
E.g., in a call to FindNewPaths(2,+, x2), instead of iterating through every pair in
P1×P−15 , the simulator can iterate through x1 ∈ P1, compute y5 := Enc(y1⊕x2, x1),
and check if y5 ∈ P−15 .
However, the trick doesn’t apply to calls of the form (1,+, ∗) or (5,−, ∗), since
the simulator doesn’t know if Enc(k, x1) = y5 for some key k. To handle these
calls, the simulator maintains a hash table that maps each (table-undefined) query
(1,+, x1) or (5,−, y5) to the 2chains it should trigger. Specifically, a query (1,+, x1)
is mapped to a set of pairs (y4, x5) ∈ P−14 × P5 such that Dec(y4⊕ x5, y5) = x1, and
(5,−, y5) is mapped to a set of (x1, x2) ∈ P1 × P2 such that Enc(y1 ⊕ x2, x1) = y5.
15Most of the bounds hold in G1, except for the bound on the size of T since the simulator issues
more queries to the cipher oracle in G1.
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Then in a call to FindNewPaths(1,+, ∗) or FindNewPaths(5,−, ∗), it only takes a
table lookup to find all triggered 2chains.
The table should be updated every time a query at position 1, 2, 4 or 5
becomes table-defined. For example, when a query (1, x1, y1) is defined, for each
table-defined query (2, x2, y2) the set mapped from (5,−, y5) should be updated,
where y5 := Enc(y1 ⊕ x2, x1). By Lemmas 4.36 and 4.39, there are O(q5) pairs of
defined queries in positions (1, 2) or (4, 5), thus the size of the table is O(q5) and it
takes O(q5) time to update.
The new implementation of FindNewPaths now only takes O(q5) time: There
are O(q3) calls of form (1,−, ∗) or (5,+, ∗), in which P2 or P4 is traversed and each
takes O(q2) running time. The O(q3) calls of form (1,+, ∗) or (5,−, ∗) take O(1)
time to find triggered 2chains; there are at most O(q3) triggered 2chains throughout
the execution (cf. Lemma 4.37), so handling the triggered 2chains uses O(q3) running
time. There are O(q2) calls at positions 2, 3 or 4, and each call uses O(q3) time to
traverse a table.
Recall in the proof of Lemma 4.40 that the other procedures runs in O(q3)
time. Therefore, the total running time of the optimized implementation is still
dominated by FindNewPaths but has been improved to O(q5). Since each cipher
query takes constant time, the upper bound on the running time implies that at
most O(q5) cipher queries are issued by the simulator.
Finally, note that the above bound is only proved for the case when the G1-
execution is identical to a good G2-execution. However, since this holds except with
negligible probability (cf. Lemma 4.42) and since the simulator knows the value
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of q (cf. Definition 17), we can let the simulator abort when the running time or
the number of queries exceeds the corresponding bound. Then the simulator is
efficient with probability 1 and the change affects an execution only with negligible
probability.
4.4.5 Indistinguishability of the Second and Fourth Experiments
In this section, we will use a randomness mapping argument to prove the
indistinguishability of G2 and G4.
We start with a standard randomness mapping from G2 to G3, which has a
similar structure to the randomness mapping in [23].
Additional Assumption on D. Some of the lemmas in this section only hold
when the distinguisher completes all paths, as defined below:
Definition 22. A distinguisher D completes all paths if at the end of every non-
aborting execution, D has made queries Query(i,+, xi) = yi or Query(i,−, yi) = xi
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 where xi = yi−1 ⊕ k for i = 2, 3, 4, 5, for every pair of k and x1
such that D has queried Enc(k, x1) = y′5 or Dec(k, y′5) = x1.16
Note that for an arbitrary distinguisher D, it is easy to construct an equivalent
distinguisher D′ that completes all paths and that always outputs the same value
as D: Let D′ run D until D outputs a value b. For each cipher query that has
been made by D, D′ issues the permutation queries Query(i,+, xi) to “complete the
path” as in Definition 22. Finally D′ outputs b, ignoring the answers of the extra




queries. The distinguisher D′ issues at most q extra queries in each position.
In the rest of this section (except for Lemma 4.53), we will assume without
loss of generality that the distinguisher D completes all paths (the assumption is
without loss of generality with the cost of a multiplicative factor in the final bound).
The definitions and lemmas that only hold under this assumption will be marked
with (*).
Footprints. The random permutation tapes are used in both G2 and G3, while
the IC tapes ic is only used in G2. In this section, we will rename the random
permutation tapes in G3 as t = (t1, t
−1
1 , . . . , t5, t
−1
5 ), in order to distinguish them
from p = (p1, p
−1
1 , . . . , p5, p
−1
5 ) in G2.
Similar to previous works, we will characterize an execution with its footprint,
which is basically the subsets of random tapes that have been read.
Definition 23. A partial random permutation tape is a pair of tables p̃, p̃−1 :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n ∪ {⊥}, such that p̃−1(p̃(x)) = x for all x satisfying p̃(x) 6= ⊥,
and such that p̃(p̃−1(y)) = y for all y satisfying p̃−1(y) 6= ⊥.
A partial ideal cipher tape is a pair of tables pic, pic−1 : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n ∪
{⊥}, such that pic−1(k, pic(k, u)) = u for all k, u such that pic(k, u) 6= ⊥, and such
that pic(k, pic−1(k, v)) = v for all k, v such that pic−1(k, v) 6= ⊥.
We will use partial tape to refer to either a partial random permutation tape or
a partial ideal cipher tape. We note that p̃ determines p̃−1 and vice-versa, therefore
we may use either p̃ or p̃−1 to designate the pair p̃, p̃−1. Similarly for the partial
ideal cipher tape ic, ic−1.
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Definition 24. We say a random permutation tape p is compatible with a partial
random permutation tape p̃ if p(x) = p̃(x) for all x such that p̃(x) 6= ⊥. Similarly,
an ideal cipher tape ic is compatible with a partial ideal cipher tape pic if ic(k, u) =
pic(k, u) for all k, u such that pic(k, u) 6= ⊥.
Definition 25. Consider an execution of G2 with random tapes p1, p2, . . . , p5, ic.
The footprint of the execution is the set of partial random tapes p̃1, p̃2, . . . , p̃5, pic
consisting of entries of the corresponding tapes that are accessed17 at some point
during the execution.
Similarly, the footprint of an execution of G3 with random tapes t1, t2, . . . , t5 is
the set of partial random tapes t̃1, t̃2, . . . , t̃5 consisting of entries of the corresponding
tapes that are accessed.
We note that with the fixed deterministic distinguisher D, the footprint of an
execution is determined by its random tapes. Among all possible footprints, only a
small portion of them are actually obtainable in some execution of D. We let FP2
and FP3 denote the set of obtainable footprints in G2 and G3 respectively.
We say the random tapes of an execution are compatible with a footprint ω if
each tape is compatible with the corresponding partial random tape in ω.
Lemma 4.45. For i = 2, 3 and for an obtainable footprint ω ∈ FPi, an execution
of Gi has footprint ω if and only if the random tapes are compatible with ω.
Proof. The “only if” direction is trivial by the definition of footprints, so we only
17Recall that p̃i is actually a pair p̃i, p̃
−1
i ; an entry p̃i(xi) = yi can be accessed by reading either
p̃i(xi) or p̃
−1
i (yi). Similarly for pic.
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need to prove the “if” direction.
Let T denote the set of random tapes of the execution. Since ω is obtainable,
there exists a set of random tapes T ′ such that the execution of Gi with tapes T ′
has footprint ω. By the definition of footprints, only entries in ω are read during the
execution with T ′. If T is compatible with ω, the executions with T and with T ′
can never diverge (recall that the distinguisher D is deterministic by assumption)
and thus are identical. In particular, they should have the same footprint ω.
The above proof shows that an execution can be recovered given its footprint.
We let PrGi [ω] denote the probability that the footprint of an execution of Gi
is ω. For a set of footprints S, let PrGi [S] denote the probability that the footprint
of an execution of Gi is in S. Since each execution has exactly one footprint, the









For an obtainable footprint ω ∈ FPi, PrGi [ω] equals the probability that the
random tapes are compatible with ω by Lemma 4.45. Let |p̃i| (resp. |pic|) denote
the number of non-⊥ entries in p̃i (resp. pic), and let |pic(k)| denote the number of






























Randomness Mapping. Let FP∗2 ⊆ FP2 denote the set of footprints that can be
obtained by good executions of G2, and let FP
∗
3 ⊆ FP3 denote the set of footprints
that can be obtained by non-aborting executions of G3. Note that an execution can
be recovered from the footprint, so an execution of G2 (resp. G3) with footprint in
FP∗2 (resp. FP
∗
3) must be good (resp. non-aborting).
We will define an injective mapping ζ that maps each footprint ω ∈ FP∗2 to
ζ(ω) ∈ FP∗3, such that the executions with footprints ω and ζ(ω) are “identical”
and such that ω and ζ(ω) are obtained with similar probability (in G2 and G3
respectively).
Definition 26. (*) We define the injection ζ : FP∗2 → FP∗3 as follows: for ω =
(p̃1, p̃2, . . . , p̃5, pic) ∈ FP∗2, let ζ(ω) = (t̃1, t̃2, . . . , t̃5) where
t̃i = {(x, y) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n : Pi(x) = y}
and where Pi refers to the state of the table at the end of the execution of G2 with
footprint ω.
The mapping ζ is well-defined because the execution of G2 can be recovered
from its footprint ω and, in particular, the states of the tables at the end of the
execution can be recovered from ω. We still need to prove that ζ(ω) is in FP∗3 and
that ζ is injective.
Lemma 4.46. (*) At the end of a good execution of G2, for each table entry
T (k, x1) = y5 the 2chain (5, 1, y5, x1, k) belongs to a complete path which has been
triggered during the execution.
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Proof. By Lemma 4.5 (e), since good executions don’t abort, a triggered 2chain
must belong to a complete path. Therefore, we only need to prove that for each
T (k, x1) = y5, (5, 1, y5, x1, k) is equivalent to a triggered 2chain.
We assume without loss of generality that T (k, x1) = y5 is defined in a call to
Enc(k, x1); the proof is symmetric if it is defined in a call to Dec(k, y5).
If Enc(k, x1) is called by the distinguisher: since the distinguisher completes
all paths (cf. Definition 22), the simulator has issued permutation queries (i, xi, yi)
for i = 1, 2, 3 with x2 = y1 ⊕ k and x3 = y2 ⊕ k. We consider the first query
cycle at the end of which the three queries are all table-defined, i.e., the 2chain
C = (1, 2, y1, x2, k) is table-defined and its right endpoint is table-defined. By
Lemma 4.18 and since query cycles in good executions must be safe (cf. Lemma 4.22),
C belongs to a complete path which was triggered during the query cycle. The
lemma follows by the fact that C is equivalent to (5, 1, y5, x1, k).
If Enc(k, x1) is called by the simulator, note that the simulator only makes
cipher queries in FindNewPaths and AdaptPath; we can see from the pseudocode
that (5, 1, y5, x1, k) is equivalent to a 2chain being triggered.
The only difference between G2 and G3 is in the procedures Enc and Dec:
in G3, the cipher queries are answered by the 5-round IEM construction of the
permutations encoded by tapes t, while in G2 they are answered by the ideal cipher
encoded by ic.
The distinguisher and the simulator are identical in the two worlds, so we
can say an execution of G2 is identical to an execution of G3 if the views of the
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distinguisher and the simulator are identical in the two executions. In particular,
we have the following useful observations:
• the distinguisher outputs the same value in identical executions;
• an execution of G3 is non-aborting if it is identical to a non-aborting execution
of G2.
Lemma 4.47. (*) For ω ∈ FP∗2, the footprint ζ(ω) is obtainable in G3. Moreover,
the execution of G2 with footprint ω ∈ FP∗2 is identical to the execution of G3 with
footprint ζ(ω).
Proof. Let ω = (p̃1, . . . , p̃5, pic) and ζ(ω) = (t̃1, . . . , t̃5). Let T = (t1, . . . , t5) be
an arbitrary set of random permutation tapes compatible with ζ(ω) (which can be
obtained by arbitrarily expanding the partial tapes in ζ(ω)). We will prove that the
execution of G3 with T is identical to the execution of G2 with footprint ω, and that
the execution has footprint ζ(ω).
We prove the two executions are identical by running them in parallel and
prove by induction that they never diverge. The executions can diverge only when
the distinguisher or the simulator accesses the tapes or the cipher oracle. By sym-
metry, we only consider the forward queries (i.e., when tape entry pi(xi) is read or
when Enc is called).
A tape entry pi(xi) = yi is read only in the procedure ReadTape. In G2, the
simulator adds a corresponding table entry Pi(xi) = yi immediately after reading
the tape, which is never overwritten and exists at the end of the execution. By
the definition of the mapping, ζ(ω) contains the same entry t̃(xi) = yi and, as T is
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compatible with ζ(ω), T also contains t(xi) = yi. Thus the tape entry being read
in G3 is the same as the one in G2.
If the distinguisher or the simulator calls Enc, the value of T (k, x1) = y5 is
returned. In G2, the table T is a subset of the cipher encoded by ic and its entries
are never overwritten, so we have T (k, x1) = y5 at the end of the execution. The
execution of G2 with footprint ω is good; by Lemma 4.46, the 2chain (5, 1, y5, x1, k)
is complete, i.e., P contains queries (i, xi, yi) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 satisfying (4.3).
Similarly to the discussion in the last case, we have ti(xi) = yi for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
It is easy to check that these entries are used in a call to EM(k, x1) or EM
−1(k, y5),
so in G3 we also have T (k, x1) = y5 and the two executions don’t diverge on cipher
queries. Hence, the two executions never diverge and are identical.
Now we prove the G3-execution with T has footprint ζ(ω). As discussed before,
all tape entries read by the simulator or by the cipher oracle (in EM and EM−1) are
in ζ(ω). On the other hand, each entry t̃(xi) = yi in ζ(ω) corresponds to an entry
Pi(xi) = yi at the end of the execution (this is true for both executions since they
are identical), which is assigned in a call to ReadTape or AdaptPath.
If Pi(xi) = yi is assigned in ReadTape, then the simulator should have read
ti(xi) or t
−1
i (yi) in the same procedure call. If Pi(xi) = yi is assigned in AdaptPath,
then there exist defined queries (j, xj, yj) for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} \ {i} and a cipher
query T (k, x1) = y5 such that xj+1 = yj ⊕ k for j = 1, 2, 3, 4. When T (k, x1) = y5 is
assigned, the entries tj(xj) = yj for j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 are read in the call to EM(k, x1)
or EM−1(k, y5), which includes the entry ti(xi) = yi. In both cases, t(xi) = yi is read
and the footprint should contain t̃(xi) = yi.
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Lemma 4.48. (*) The mapping ζ is an injection from FP∗2 to FP
∗
3.
Proof. Since the simulator doesn’t abort in good executions of G2 (cf. Lemma 4.23),
Lemma 4.47 implies that the execution of G3 with footprint ζ(ω) is non-aborting
and hence ζ(ω) ∈ FP∗3.
Lemma 4.47 also implies that the ζ is injective: For a fixed ζ(ω), the G2-
execution with footprint ω is identical to the G3-execution with footprint ζ(ω),
which can be recovered from ζ(ω). Let ω = (p̃1, . . . , p̃5, pic), and it can be uniquely
reconstructed as follows: the partial permutation tapes p̃i contain entries that are
read by the simulator during the execution; the partial tape pic contains cipher
queries that are issued by the distinguisher or the simulator.







Proof. Consider the good G2-execution with footprint ω: The state of Pi at the end
of the execution is the same as the partial tape t̃i (cf. Definition 26). On the other
hand, p̃i contains an entry p̃i(xi) = yi if and only if Pi(xi) = yi is assigned in a call
to ReadTape. Thus the difference between the sizes of t̃i and p̃i equals the number
of adapted queries assigned in AdaptPath. From the pseudocode, we observe that
AdaptPath is called for each triggered 2chain, in which exactly one query is assigned.
We only need to prove the number of triggered 2chains equals the size of pic.
Note that pic contains the same queries as the table T at the end of the execution. By
Lemma 4.46, for each T (k, x1) = y5, a 2chain equivalent to (5, 1, y5, x1, k) has been
triggered. On the other hand, each triggered 2chain is completed at the end of the
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good execution, and by Lemma 4.31 the triggered 2chains are not equivalent. Thus
the triggered 2chains belong to distinct complete paths, each containing a distinct
table-defined (5, 1)-2chain that corresponds to a distinct query in T . Thus there
is a one-one correspondence between triggered 2chains and entries in T , implying
|T | = |pic| equals the number of triggered 2chains.





[ω] · (1− 169q6/2n)
Proof. The lemma trivially holds if 169q6 ≥ 2n. In the following proof we will
assume 169q6 < 2n, which implies 2n − 13q3 > 0.
Let ω = (p̃1, . . . , p̃5, pic) and ζ(ω) = (t̃1, . . . , t̃5). By Lemma 4.38, we have
|T | ≤ 12q3 + q ≤ 13q3. Since pic contains the same entries as T at the end of the
execution and pic(k) is a subset of pic, for any key k ∈ {0, 1}n we have
|pic(k)| ≤ |pic| ≤ 13q3. (4.16)
Pi contains every entry of p̃i because they are read in ReadTape, so at the end of








































where the first and the second-to-last inequalities use (4.16), and where the second
equality uses (4.15) and the fact that
∑
k |pic(k)| = |pic| with the sum taken over
all possible keys.
Lemma 4.51. (*) If the footprint of a G3-execution is ζ(ω) for some ω ∈ FP∗2,
then the view of the distinguisher in this execution is identical to its view in the
G4-execution with the same random tapes. In particular, D outputs the same value
in the two executions.
Proof. Let ζ(ω) = (t̃1, . . . , t̃5), and consider a G3-execution with tapes T = (t1, . . . , t5)
that has footprint ζ(ω). By Lemma 4.47, the G3-execution with footprint ζ(ω) is
identical to the G2-execution with footprint ω; in particular, the tables Pi/P
−1
i in
the two executions are identical. Thus at the end of the G3-execution, the table Pi
is the same as t̃i by Definition 26. The tape ti is compatible with t̃i, so if Pi(xi) = yi
we have ti(xi) = yi.
Now we prove that executions of G3 and G4 with the same tapes T are identical
to the distinguisher. The cipher oracle Enc and Dec are the same in the two games.
Consider a distinguisher call to Query(i,+, xi) (Query(i,−, yi) is symmetric): In
G3, SimQuery is called which returns the value of Pi(xi) = yi. The table Pi is
never overwritten, so we have ti(xi) = yi as discussed before. In G4, Query returns
ti(xi) = yi, which is the same as in G3. Therefore, the two executions behave
identically in the view of the distinguisher.
Lemma 4.52. (*) If the distinguisher D completes all paths, we have
∆D(G2,G4) ≤ 1022q38/2n + 169q6/2n
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Proof. Let FP∗2(1) ⊆ FP∗2 be the set of footprints of good G2-executions in which
D outputs 1, and let FP∗3(1) ⊆ FP∗3 be the set of footprints of non-aborting G3-
executions in which D outputs 1.
By Lemma 4.47, for ω ∈ FP∗2(1) we have ζ(ω) ∈ FP∗3(1). Moreover, by
Lemma 4.51, if a G3-execution has footprint ζ(ω) ∈ FP∗3(1), D outputs 1 in the
G4-execution with the same random tapes. Since ζ is injective, the probability that

























The probability that D outputs 1 in G2 is the sum of two parts: the probability
that the execution is good and D outputs 1, which equals PrG2 [FP∗2(1)], and the
probability that the execution is not good and D outputs 1, which is no larger than
the probability that the execution is not good. Combined with (4.17)
∆D(G2,G4) ≤ Pr
G2














≤ 1022q38/2n + 169q6/2n
where the last inequality uses Theorem 4.41.
Lemma 4.53. For an arbitrary distinguisher D, we have
∆D(G2,G4) ≤ 3× 1033q38/2n.
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Proof. As discussed after Definition 22, an arbitrary distinguisher D with q queries
can be converted to an equivalent distinguisher D′ that completes all paths and that
makes at most q extra queries in each position. D′ makes at most 2q queries in each
position and is subject to Lemma 4.52, so we have
∆D(G2,G4) = ∆D′(G2,G4) ≤ 1022(2q)38/2n + 169(2q)6/2n
≤ 3× 1033q38/2n.
Theorem 4.54. Any distinguisher with q queries cannot distinguish G1 from G4
with advantage more than 1034q38/2n.
Proof. For any distinguisher D we have
∆D(G1,G4) = ∆D(G1,G2) + ∆D(G2,G4)
≤ 1022q38/2n + 2704q8/2n + 3× 1033q38/2n
≤ 1034q38/2n
where the first inequality uses Lemmas 4.43 and 4.53.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In this thesis, we present two significant advancements to the theory under-
lying designs of modern block ciphers. We study two classical paradigms for block
cipher designs: the Feistel network and the iterated Even-Mansour construction. In
Chapter 3, we showed that ten rounds of the Feistel network suffice to produce an
ideal cipher, an ideal version of a block cipher, assuming that the underlying func-
tions of the Feistel network are independent, random functions. In Chapter 4, we
showed that five rounds of the iterated Even-Mansour construction suffice to pro-
duce an ideal cipher assuming that the round keys are identical and the underlying
permutations of the iterated Even-Mansour construction are independent, random
permutations.
The main open questions that remain from this work are establishing the exact
round complexity required in the contexts of the Feistel network and the iterated
Even-Mansour construction to build an ideal cipher. There has been subsequent
progress since the results presented in Chapters 3 and 4. For Feistel networks, Dai
and Steinberger [23] show that eight rounds suffice to produce an ideal cipher when
the keyed round functions are constructed from a random oracle. This result leaves
only the question of whether six or seven rounds are sufficient. (Coron et al. [17]
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have shown that at least six rounds are necessary.) We believe that the results in
Chapter 4 combined with the techniques of Dai and Steinberger [23] can be used
to prove that seven rounds of the Feistel network produce an ideal cipher when
the underlying functions are independent, random functions. However, the case of
the six-round Feistel network seems much more complicated, requiring completely
different proof techniques. (See Coron et al. [17] for a discussion of why this is the
case.)
In the context of the exact round complexity of the iterated Even-Mansour
construction, recent results have established this answer. In a recent work accepted
for publication that I was involved jointly with Dai, Steinberger, and Seurin [21],
we show that five rounds of the iterated Even-Mansour construction is necessary
to produce an ideal cipher when the round keys are identical and the underlying
permutations are independent, random permutations. Thus, combining this with
the result in Chapter 4 which proves that five rounds are sufficient, we obtain an
exact answer for the round complexity of the iterated Even-Mansour construction
with the trivial key-schedule, i.e., when the round keys are identical. In the case
where the round keys of the iterated Even-Mansour construction are derived in an
idealized manner, i.e., the attacker holding a “master” key can derive the round
keys only by querying an ideal oracle, a recent pre-print [36] claims that three
rounds of the iterated Even-Mansour construction suffice to produce an ideal cipher
when assuming that the idealized oracle for key derivation is a random function
and the underlying permutations of the iterated Even-Mansour construction are
independent, random functions.
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In conclusion, we believe that the results of this thesis significantly advances
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